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Abstract 
After a discussion of the role of thematic information in each of language acquisition, syntax 
and language processing, thematic-conceptual structure is presented as a common represen-
tation that serves each of these sub-disciplines well. Thematic-conceptual structure is a de-
compositional representation of thematic-information that is constrained to include only those 
semantic elements that are grammaticalized in some language in the world. 
Thematical-conceptual structure is then shown to be a representation that allows for the 
explanation of previously intransigent sentence processing patterns, as well as providing a 
representation that best explains sentence level priming not only in comprehension, but also 
in production. Some novel experiments are proposed, and the initial results of the experimental 
programme laid out in this thesis indicate that thematic-conceptual structure is indeed the 
correct representation to explain the results of the experiments. 
Throughout the thesis it is noted that thematic-conceptual structure is influenced in 
its form both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. This idea is somewhat speculative, but 
provocative nonetheless. In the conclusion of the thesis, these speculative aspects are dis-
cussed in depth. 
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Thematic roles are widely regarded as being an essential integral part of linguistic theory. 
However, there seems to be little agreement as to the form the theory of thematic roles itself 
should take. The part played by thematic roles differs from sub-discipline to sub-discipline. 
This thesis takes this situation as its starting point and has as its aim a coherent theory 
of thematic information which is applicable to a number of sub-disciplines, namely syntactic 
theory, psycholinguistic theory and language acquisition. I shall also discuss what the evolution 
of language may tell us about the nature of the theory of thematic roles we should propose in 
a more speculative discussion that forms part of the conclusion of this thesis. 
The thesis covers a large number of diverse areas within linguistics and cognitive science 
and contains a large amount of background information and discussion that is predominantly 
discursive in nature. 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 I present how thematic information has been used to explain syn-
tactic, language acquisition and psycholinguistic phenomena respectively. In these chapters, 
I will present empirical syntactic and psycholinguistic data that will need to be adequately 
captured by any theory of thematic information. In the course of these chapters I will explain 
how various theories of thematic information have attempted to capture segments of this data. 
I identify the strengths and weaknesses of these attempts. 
In the course of these chapters I come to the conclusion that thematic-conceptual structure 
is a representation that can be used to successfully capture phenomena from all of language 
acquisition, syntax and language processing. A number of psycholinguistic predictions follow 
from this discussion and in Chapter 5 these are discussed in more depth. 
Thematical-conceptual structure is then shown to be a representation that allows for the 
explanation of previously intransigent sentence processing patterns, as well as providing a 
representation that best explains sentence level priming not only in comprehension, but also 
in production. Some novel experiments are proposed, and the initial results of the experimental 
programme laid out in this thesis indicate that thematic-conceptual structure is indeed the 
correct representation to explain the results of the experiments. 
Throughout the thesis it is noted that thematic-conceptual structure is influenced in 
its form both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. This idea is somewhat speculative, but 
provocative nonetheless. In the conclusion of the thesis, these speculative aspects are dis- 
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cussed in depth. 
Chapter 2 
Thematic Information in 
Syntactic Theory 
In this chapter I will investigate the status of thematic information in syntactic theory. There 
are three main aspects to consider here. First, in the beginnings of research into thematic in-
formation in language, Generative Semantics proposed a decompositional analysis of thematic 
information with its own constituent structure. A number of empirical difficulties led to the 
downfall of Generative Semantics and with it the decompositional approach. 
Second, as Chomskyan syntax became the prevalent paradigm for syntactic discussion, 
thematic information was reduced, in effect, to theta-roles, which had an important configu-
rational role, but were stripped of most of their semantic origins. 
Third, decompositional theories have begun to re-emerge. As decompositional theories had 
originally been felt to have failed because of the unconstrained nature of their representations, 
these new decompositional approached have sought various ways to constrain the components 
of the representation. 
I will discuss each of these aspects in this chapter. I conclude that decompositional the-
ories should be developed further as they avoid the syntactocentrism of theta-roles in PPT 
and, as chapters 3 and 4 will show, decompositional representations of thematic-conceptual 
information can be applied successfully to psycholinguistic and language acquisition data, and 
can also capture best the new psycholinguistic evidence presented in Chapter 5. 
2.1 Thematic Roles in Generative Semantics 
I believe that decompositional approaches to thematic information have been mistrusted and 
resisted for so long because they are connected in the minds of many researchers with the 
research on Generative Semantics. Indeed, the concept of thematic roles was born at the time 
of Generative Semantics and after its demise thematic roles played very little part in linguistic 
discussion for around a decade. 
Central to the theory of Generative Semantics was the Katz-Postal Hypothesis which stated 
that transformations do not affect meaning. Any difference in meaning had to be related 
directly to lexical items and to sentence type markers (Imperative, Interrogative, etc), and 
merely moving elements around within a sentence could effect no change in meaning. 
Over the time Generative Semantics had its influence there was a gradual abstraction of 
Deep-Structures into semantic terms, leading almost inevitably to the abandonment of Deep-
Structure as a theoretical concept. 
The relevant abstractions took their form mainly in the lexical decomposition of verbs. It 
was suggested that the set of linguistic categories could be reduced to the lexical categories of 
N, V, and A. This seemed attractive as these categories corresponded in a natural way to those 
of truth-functional logic. However, this abstraction took place within the syntax, resulting in 
very complex syntactic structures such as the following: 
S 
NP 	VP 
I 	V NP NP 
declare you 	S 
NP 	 VP 
N 	 S 	 V[+pastj 
it NP 	VP 
N SV 
happen 
John V 	NP 
	
do N 	S 
it NP VP 
JohnV 	NP 
I 
cause 	N 	S 




it A be 
NP VP 
(2.1) 	a. 	 the glass broken 
John broke the glass 
A large number of transformations were necessary both for lexical insertion and conversion 
to surface structure. The theoretical motivation was originally that projection rules, which 
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project the deep structure meaning onto the surface structure form, did not supply any addi-
tional aspect of meaning, and therefore all meaning had to be contained in Deep-Structure. 
This proliferation of transformations from Deep-Structure to surface structure is now regarded 
as the major weakness of Generative Semantics. 
Generative Semantics saw the form-content link as direct. That is, the semantic content of 
the sentence was necessarily linked to a particular surface syntactic form. This conclusion was 
probably reached due to the concentration on English as the subject of study. In opposition to 
this view, I will argue in Chapter 5 that the linking between some form of thematically based 
semantic structures and the surface structure is parameterized for each language and will allow 
for differing patterns on the surface to represent the same underlying content, or, alternatively, 
two underlying content relations could be expressible by only one surface syntactic form. 
In Chapter 5 in my consideration of some new psycholinguistic evidence it is shown to be 
arguably the case that decompositional representations of thematic information can be linked 
in a variety of ways to surface syntactic structure, and that the form-content link is therefore 
not direct but can vary from language to language. 
2.1.1 Thematic Roles in Case Grammar 
The theory of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) can be identified as the source of the theory of 
thematic roles, although Gruber (1965) had already discussed what the possible identity of such 
thematic roles may be. Fillmore argued that at the deepest syntactic level a sentence consists 
of a verb and an unordered set of semantically characterizable thematic roles. The motivation 
for this was that the Aspects model of Chomsky (1965) could not capture categorical and 
thematic information simultaneously. For example into the room, towards the door, on the 
next day are all categorically PPs but are thematically LOCATION, DIRECTION and TIME 
respectively. Fillmore argued that meaning was motivating syntactic structure to some extent. 
Behind Fillmore's reasoning was the idea that there is a universal base of syntactic relations 
(Halliday (1966)) founded on a universal base of covert categories. This idea is implicit in 
Fillmore's second assumption. This states that covert categories are of central importance. 
Or in other words, all languages are similar in their expressive capacity; they are just encoded 
differently. 
This assumption is vital and should be borne in mind throughout this thesis as it is also 
central to my thinking; the conceptual relations encoded in language are language independent. 
Fillmore argues that there is a parallel between what he terms Cases (thematic roles) and 
the choice of prepositions for verbs: 
It seems to me that the discussion of case could be seen in somewhat better per-
spective if the assignment of case forms were viewed as exactly analogous to the 
rules for assigning Prepositions in English (Fillmore 1968: 15) 
This is our first example of what is commonly termed linking. That is, the conceptual 
relation to be expressed is associated (or linked) with a language-specific rule that determines 
the surface expression of the underlying conceptual relationship in that language. 
Fillmore distinguishes between pure and labeled case. Pure cases are configurational rela-
tions such as Subject and Object and labeled cases are cases assigned from prepositions or from 
the properties of governing verbs. Examples of labeled cases are Objective and Instrumental. 
Fillmore argues that Subject is an incoherent notion and that therefore labeled cases should 
be assumed. It is often proposed that Subject and Object are derived notions, derived either 
from thematic roles via a thematic hierarchy (Section 2.3), or are determined by sentential 
position. 
Fillmore also argues for a 'conceptual framework' interpretation of case systems. Only 
noun phrases representing the same case can be conjoined. This is also an indication of how 
grammaticality can be determined by a failure of interpretability. 
(2.2) 	a. *John  and a hammer broke the window. (AGENT + INSTRUMENTAL) 
b. John broke the window. 
C. A hammer broke the window. 
d. John broke the window with a hammer. 
Fillmore concentrates on the further investigation of the proposition. The proposition is 
made up of a verb and one or more case categories, these case categories being what contem-
porary linguists would term thematic roles. 
Insertion of verbs depends on the case frame of the sentence. Thus subcategorization is in 
terms of thematic classes. 
(2.3) 	run can be inserted into [_..Agentive] 
(2.4) 	open can be inserted into [_Objective + Agentive] 
The initial notation means that run can be inserted in an environment where there is an 
Agentive Case role. The second notation states that open requires both an Agentive Case role 
and an Objective Case role to be present for the sentence to be properly formed. 
Thus lexical entries will list the environments where the verb can occur. 
(2.5) 	a. 	The door opened. [Objective] 
b. John opened the door. [Objective + Agentive] 
C. The wind opened the door. [Objective + Instrumental] 
d. John opened the door with a chisel. [Objective + Instrumental + Agentive] 
and the frame for open will be: 
(2.6) 	+ [_Objective (Instrumental) (Agentive)] 
The semantic interpretation of any particular preposition introduces all the information 
provided by the specific case relationships represented in the preposition, allowing such infor -
mation to be left out of the semantic representation of the verb. 
Fillmore suggests there are a number of ways that the cases may be represented at the 
surface: selection of overt case forms by suppletion, affixation, adding of P, subjectivization, 
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objectivization, sequential ordering and nominalization. These are all further examples of 
linking rules. 
Fillmore claims semantic and syntactic benefits for his theory. The semantic benefits can 
be seen in sentences (2.7). In all the sentences the door bears the same relation to the verb, 
but is considered a surface-structure subject in (a) and a surface-structure object in (b) and 
(d). Also the door in (a) and John in (b) and (d) and the wind in (c) all manifest different 
semantic relations with respect to the verb but all are treated as surface subjects.. Here, then, 
we have an example of a semantic function being expressible by a number of different syntactic 
functions. 
(2.7) 	a. The door opened. 
b. John opened the door. 
C. The wind opened the door. 
d. John opened the door with a chisel. 
The syntactic benefits are seen in Fillmore's concept of a thematic hierarchy, which allows 
for the identity of the subject of a sentence to be predicted on the basis of its deep-structure 
case. Fillmore claims that if there is more than one NP in a sentence, the highest on the 
thematic hierarchy will become the subject. And if there are exceptions, these are marked by 
special morphological elements. In section 2.3 we will see the concept of thematic hierarchies 
being developed. 
The direct result of Fillmore's work has been that most syntacticians agree that syntactic 
theory must include a characterization of thematic roles. However, the association of thematic 
roles with Generative Semantics (unfairly, as Fillmore never counted himself as part of the 
GS movement) led to much of this work not being properly developed for some time after the 
acrimonious fall of the Generative Semantics theory. 
2.1.2 The Fall of Generative Semantics 
A number of theoretical developments played a part in the demise of Generative Semantics. 
First, the lexicalist hypothesis (Chomsky (1970)) stated that there should be no category-
changing transformational rules. This bans rules changing, say, a verb into a noun, or a noun 
into an adjective, and so on. The motivation was that derived nominals exhibited different 
syntactic behaviour to the verbs they were derived from; for example: 
(2.8) 	a. John believed that Bill was a fool. —* 
John believed Bill to be a fool. 
b. John's belief that Bill was a fool. —* 
*Johns  belief (of) Bill to be a fool. 
In addition, it was argued, the rules for deriving nominals were not productive; not all verbs 
have a derived noun and often when there is a derived nominal, it is idiosyncratic (do/deed). 
Second, many examples were found by Jackendoff (1972) where Surface Structure did make 
a difference to meaning. These examples thus refuted the Katz-Postal hypothesis 1 . 
'These are also counterexamples to Baker's theory as presented in Section 2.4.2 
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(2.9) 	a. Many arrows did not hit the target. 
b. The target was not hit by many arrows. 
(2.10) a. Only John reads books on politics. 
b. John only reads books on politics. 
C. John reads only books on politics. 
However, this remains a problem only if it is assumed that the decomposition of the meaning 
of these sentences has to be achieved within the syntax and the relationships between the 
elements have to be bharacterized by transformations. If, on the other hand, we allow separate 
levels for the thematic-conceptual relationships and the linking rules that map these onto 
surface structure, these problems can be avoided as I believe will become clear in this thesis. 
Thus the thematic-conceptual structure for each of these sentences would map in a one-to-one 
fashion onto the surface structure via linking rules. 
Third, McCawley (1968) and Jackendoff (1972) showed that selectional restrictions had 
to be based on semantics and not on syntax. So, for example, paraphrases have the same 
selectional restrictions. And when grammatical and semantic features conflict in a language, 
selectional restrictions occur based on the latter, not the former. In German, for example, 
a number of verbs occur only with semantically female subjects, but there are no verbs that 
take only a grammatically female subject. 
Jackendoff also argues that subcategorization cannot be based on semantic restrictions 
as eat, devour and dine have the same meaning, but are respectively optionally transitive, 
transitive and intransitive. However, I believe that there are differences between these verbs 
in semantic terms at some level or another of the representation as I shall be following Clark's 
(1993) principle of Contrast, which states that speakers do not tolerate complete synonyms. 
(See Section 3.5.2). 
Fourth, it was found difficult to conflate all elements into A, N and V. This is because 
there is always a difference in the behaviour of nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, quantifiers 
and prepositions in surface structure, regardless of the transformational levels that underlie 
them. 
Fifth, Lexical Decomposition failed as it proved very difficult to decompose every word into 
• limited number of semantic primitives. As Fodor (1970) argued, if lexical decomposition is 
• true representation of linguistic facts and melt can be decomposed into cause to melt, then 
the following should be paraphrases, which they clearly are not. 
(2.11) 	a. Floyd caused the glass to melt on Sunday by heating it on Saturday. 
b. *Floyd  melted the glass on Sunday by heating it on Saturday. 
There have been two main themes in this first section. The first is the birth of thematic roles 
as a theoretical construct and their definition. The second is the blossoming and subsequent 
death of the theory of Generative Semantics. The two are linked because, although Fillmore's 
theory of thematic (case) roles was not really part of the Generative Semantics movement, it 
came to be associated with it, so that, when Generative Semantics collapsed, Fillmore's theory 
and observations were largely ignored for over a decade. 
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However, this is not to say that many of the ideas of Generative Semantics will not be 
useful to my aims here. This will be the case as long as lexical decomposition and linking 
rules are assumed to be architecturally distinct from the syntax. Decomposition at the level 
of conceptual structure will allow us to develop a more flexible internally structured represen-
tation of thematic roles. The separation from syntax will allow for the continued observation 
and explanation of purely syntactic phenomena at the level of syntax. 
From Fillmore's work we can take away the early characterization of thematic roles and the 
idea that grammatical function (Subject, Object) and semantic function (AGENT, THEME 
etc) must be separated. He proposes a thematic hierarchy to provide the mapping between 
them; an idea we will see developed in the field, but that I will ultimately discard due to its 
inflexibility. 
Also of central importance to the theory developed in this thesis is the idea that thematic 
roles are in some way based on a universal set of covert categories. I will argue that thematic 
roles are shorthand for frequent combinations of covert conceptual relations, and although 
useful as shorthand, they should not replace this underlying conceptual structure as the level 
of representation to be used in the explanation of a range of linguistic phenomena in syntax, 
language acquisition and psycholinguistics. 
2.2 Thematic Roles in Principles and Parameters Theory 
Jackendoff (1972) defined the following thematic roles in semantic terms: AGENT, GOAL, 
SOURCE, LOCATION, EXPERIENCER, RECIPIENT, INSTRUMENT, BENEFACTIVE, 
THEME, PATIENT and PERCEPT. 
These are the roles that Jackendoff said could be applied to noun phrases, but, he argued, 
were not predictable from the structural position of the NP. It may be the case, however, 
that the converse is true; the structural position of the NP being predicted by the thematic 
relations to be expressed. 
Principles and Parameters Theory has nominally used these roles, but it is essential to note 
that PPT uses thematic roles in a purely structural way, and the semantic motivation of the 
roles is largely ignored. Thematic roles within PPT are analogues of argument structure merely 
expressed in other terms. The main contribution they make is that in a movement chain, there 
is always one Case position and one theta (thematic)-position. Thus only one theta-role can 
be assumed to be assigned to each NP, and this is made explicit in the Theta-Criterion. 
	
(2.12) 	Theta-Criterion Chomsky (1981). 
Each argument is assigned one and only one theta-role. 
Each theta-role is assigned to one and only one argument. 
With this criterion in place, the interaction of Case-theory, Move-a and the Projection 
Principle accounts for the movement properties of language. 
(2.13) 	Case Filter 




Any NP can move anywhere as long as it meets the constraints of PPT. 
(2.15) 	Projection Principle 
Lexical information is syntactically represented. 
A good starting point for examining the movement properties of PPT is the summary given 
in Haegeman (1994) and reproduced in (Table 2.1) 
Table 2.1: Movement Properties of PPT 
Moved category 
Landing site 
Properties of antecedent 
Case 
Chain 



















XP(NP, PP, etc) 
A'-position by 
substitution or adjunction 








Yes (when target = NP) 
Yes 
These properties of movement are predicted and explained by the interactions of the prin-
ciples above. An NP moves when it is assigned no Case in its original position to a position 
where it can get Case. This position where it can get Case is an NP position. This NP posi-
tion is an argument position. Each NP has to have one and only one theta-role, so as the NP 
has moved from a position where it already has a theta-role, it must move to a NP position 
where no theta-role is assigned. In sum, the chain of movement includes one Case-position 
and one theta-position. Such movement is manifested in the passive and raising constructions, 
for example. 
An example of a raising verb is seem. This verb is a one-place predicate that takes a clausal 
complement. We can see it is a one-place predicate because the subject position is assigned 
no theta-role by seem and this position has to be filled with pleonastic it. 
(2.16) 	It seems that John dislikes Tony. 
The lexical items in (2.17) are the same so we can assume the same thematic relations are 
in operation. 
(2.17) 	John seems to dislike Tony. 
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We note that the external argument (John) of dislike has been moved to the subject position 
of seem. We know that John has received its theta-role from dislike so it has not moved to 
receive a theta-role. John has moved to a position where it will be assigned no second theta-
role, thus fulfilling the theta-criterion. In the subordinate clause, however, there is a non-finite 
verb and in the main clause there is a finite verb. Non-finite verbs cannot assign Case, whereas 
finite verbs can do so. According to the Case Filter overt NPs must receive Case, thus John 
has moved from a position where it can receive no Case to a position where it does receive 
Case. 
The D-structure is (2.18) and the S-structure is (2.17). The chain of movement contains 
one Case position and one Theta-position. 
[ip e 	seems [ip John to dislike Tony]] 
(2.18) 	+Case -Case 
-Theta 	 +Theta 
The analysis of the passive follows the same lines, but relies on the assumption that the 
passive can assign no Case and that it loses one of the theta-roles it had been able to assign 
as an active verb through a process of argument suppression. 
Turning now to wh-movement, we find that the XP that has moved has Case in its original 
position, at least if it is an NP. Thus it must not move to another position that is assigned 
Case. It must therefore move to a non-argument position. The original position was also a 
position assigned a theta-role, so the moved element may not be moved to a position where 
it would be assigned another theta-role. Once more the chain of movement includes one Case 
position and one Theta-position. 
We have seen then that the Projection Principle states that lexical information is projected 
into the syntax, but when we examine what this actually means in PPT with respect to 
thematic roles, we see that, in effect, it is only the argument or subcategorization structure of 
the lexical item that is projected. There is no real element of content to the thematic roles; 
they may as well be numbered arguments. 
It is also the case that certain constructions lead researchers to impute certain properties 
to the lexical items that take part in these constructions. Thus raising predicates must assign 
no Case, and the passivization process is taken to absorb the Case marking properties of the 
verb that is passivized. The fact that passivization is not a process that can be applied to any 
verb is not explained in any way. A number of decompositional approaches that explain when 
verbs do and do not alternate are to be found in the course of this chapter. 
What we need, then, is a proper conception of the Projection Principle that really ad-
dresses the question of what aspects of the lexical-conceptual-structure have what effects on 
the syntactic structure. By the end of this chapter we will have been given some clues as to the 
direction our enquiry should take. The following chapter will add to these clues by examining 
the part thematic roles play in language acquisition and psycholinguistic theory. 
In the next section I will further investigate this configurational notion of thematic roles. 
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2.3 Thematic Structure versus Argument Structure 
The first modification of the PPT theory of thematic roles also takes a course where thematic 
roles are functionally equivalent to argument structure. Behind this is the assumption of 
Canonical Structure Representation (CSR) Grimshaw (1988). CSR states that each named 
thematic role projects onto a particular type of constituent in all cases. This is a small step 
away from merely numbered arguments, but the inflexibility and coarse structure of the roles 
limits the success of the projection to constituent structure. 
So, for example, AGENT will map onto NP and LOCATION will map onto PP. The aim of 
CSR was to remove the need for both subcategorization and thematic information in the lexical 
entry. CSR allows for subcategorization facts to be derived from the thematic information in 
the lexical entry. 
Grimshaw (1990) also assumes a direct linking of thematic structure to argument roles, 
but she also wants to predict the syntactic behaviour of various classes of verbs by basing 
this linking on a hierarchy of thematic roles in conjunction with a representation of the event 
structure of the verbs in question. In this respect, her theory is very similar to that of Fillmore's 
but with the additional feature of an event structure representation. 
This approach is termed a prominence theory of A-structure. A-structure represents the 
prominence relationship between arguments. Prominence is determined by thematic properties 
of the predicate and its aspectual properties. A-structure, she argues, is blind to named theta-
roles. The external argument for Grimshaw is the most prominent argument in the A-structure 
on both the aspectual and thematic hierarchy. 
Grimshaw studies the invariant linking of arguments based on the thematic hierarchy of: 
(2.19) AGENT<EXPERIENCERczGOAL/SOURCE/LOCATION<THEME 
This hierarchy should be seen as descriptive rather than explanatory as the ordering of the 
hierarchy reflects the syntactic behaviour of arguments. The reason why arguments linked to 
the levels of the hierarchy should act in a particular way based on that linkage is not explained. 
I believe that such an explanation can only be found if we look at the conceptual relations for 
which the thematic roles of the hierarchy are a shorthand version. However, it is still useful 
to examine how it is that this hierarchy reflects syntactic behaviour. 
The arguments are theta-marked in a particular order: (1) theta-marking in the NP pre-
cedes theta-marking in the clause; or in other words NP internal arguments are theta-marked 
before clausal arguments, (2) the argument lowest on the thematic hierarchy is marked first, 
the next lowest on the hierarchy is then marked and so on. Thus, for give which has the 
following A-structure 
(2.20) 	(x 	(y 	(z))) 
AGENT GOAL THEME 




(2.21) 	a. 	Gift-giving to children. 
b. 	*childgiving  of gifts. 
As an explanation of syntactic facts this seems to be quite adequate, although how this 
constraint is to be expressed with respect to language production or comprehension is unclear. 
However, fear and frighten violate the theory as presented up to now, as the EXPERI-
ENCER is realized as subject for one but not for the other. Grimshaw claims that this is due 
to aspectual differences in the semantics of the verbs. This approach contrasts with the ad 
hoc analyses of thematic reanalysis or stipulated lexical case marking. Thus it is this type of 
verb that justifies the next step in Grimshaw's argument: the postulation of a separate level 
of causal structure. 
The aspectual difference in question is that frighten has a causal meaning not shared with 
fear. So a second causal hierarchy is added to the thematic hierarchy. Within the causal 
hierarchy the element CA USE is always the most prominent: 
(2.22) 	(Cause(other( ... ))) 
In frighten the causal and thematic hierarchies conflict: 
frighten 	(x 	(y)) 
(2.23) 	 Exp Theme 
Cause 
Grimshaw goes on to argue that this causal analysis has an aspectual origin. This is 
interesting since Fillmore (1968) also saw sentences as being made up of a propositional part 
and an aspectual part. He did not examine the aspectual side of his representation. Grimshaw 
has done this and found it to be a vital part of her descriptive vocabulary. 




The Cause will always be more prominent than the entity whose state is changed. The 
aspectually most prominent argument is selected as subject. For the major verb groups the 
interaction of thematic and aspectual hierarchies is as follows. 
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(Agent (Goal (Theme))) 













f. 	Agentive Psychological Causative 
(Agent (Exp)) 
1 	2 
To account for the linking of the fear class, Grimshaw is left with no option but to stipulate 
that the EXPERIENCER is the most prominent in the aspectual hierarchy. 
The external argument is always the last to be theta-marked, therefore there can only 
be one external argument. In the frighten class there is a conflict of prominence across the 
hierarchies. For this reason, Grimshaw assumes that the frighten class verbs have no external 
argument and therefore cannot take part in the causative/anticausative alternation (Someone 
frightened John/*John  frightened). 
This in turn means that a subject is not always an external argument because frighten 
verbs have a d-structure subject but no external argument. 
Grimshaw needs to make a further stipulation to explain Unaccusatives which have no 
external argument but are monadic, to explain why the single argument is not the most 
prominent in the hierarchies. She proposes two possible explanations: (1) there is a hidden 
lexical-conceptual-structure CAUSE argument taking up the external slot. (2) the THEME 
cannot be most prominent as only arguments participating in the first sub-event (the activity) 
can be most prominent (We will see an alternative approach to Unaccusatives in section 2.5.2). 
Grimshaw has a theory that empirically is fairly accurate, but for this accuracy it relies 
on a number of lexical stipulations. For a theory of this kind to be attractive we have to find 
17 
some type of explanation as to why certain lexical items have the properties they do, i.e. are 
there features they have in common? 
Grimshaw identifies sets of verbs that behave in a certain way syntactically. However, 
identifying the sets of verbs does not constitute an explanation of why they should include 
the particular verbs they do. Commonalities between the individual verbs in a set should be 
identified, and this identification will probably be in terms of conceptual structure. 
Indeed, when of the elements Grimshaw identifies as being of relevance is cause. This is 
clearly a conceptual notion and is adopted by almost all decompositional approaches. 
The inflexibility of the description proves to be a problem for languages with freer word 
order then English. English is very fixed in using word order as the main method of signaling 
grammatical relations. Languages with richer Case systems, such as German, are frequently 
freer with respect to their word order. Thus the subject of a German sentence can be the Pa-
tient of the verb. Whenever this is the case, a rigid hierarchy of the type Grimshaw proposes 
is not easily applicable. We need to find a more malleable way of linking the conceptual rela-
tions expressed by a proposition to the surface expressions and structures used by a particular 
language. 
2.4 Further Developments of Configurational Notions of 
Thematic Roles 
In this section I will present two further developments of the configurational view of thematic 
roles. The first of these comes from Williams (1994) where a reanalysis of the assignment of 
thematic roles allows for the removal of movement from the analysis of raising constructions. 
This is provocative as it opens up the possibility that many syntactic processes actually reflect 
an underlying passing of thematic information. It may be the case that much of the movement 
aspects of syntactic theory can be reanalyzed in purely thematic(-conceptual) terms. 
The second extension of the theory comes from Baker (1988) and takes this development 
one step further by maintaining that thematic information is maintained during syntactic 
processes. 
2.4.1 An Extended Theory of Thematic Relations 
Williams (1994) does not address the problem of thematic-structure/argument-structure link-
ing, but turns his attention to the processes by which thematic roles are assigned. In so 
doing he is able to remove movement from the analysis of raising constructions. Williams 
sees raising as an example of Function Composition. This is where an element transmits its 
complement's theta-role to its subject. A functor thus combines with X, without changing the 
theta-structure of X. 
Williams is arguing for a theta-theory without semantic content as merely the number of 
arguments of a verb are given together with the realization conditions for those arguments 2 . 
Each lexical item includes the linking relations to surface structure within its lexical entry. 
This seems to be missing out in two important ways: there may well be generalizations in 
2 1n effect a CSR for each lexical item. 
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the realization conditions in semantic terms across lexical items, and the desemanticization of 
thematic structure ignores the insights of Jackendoff (1972) and Fillmore (1968). 
Williams sees the construction of the clause as akin to coordinate structure. Williams gives 
two requirements that the clause structure must fulfill. 
That Tense is head of S, as complementizers select for Tense, and only heads are selected 
for. 
The subject-predicate relationship must be well formed. That is, the index of the external 
argument should percolate to VP, and the subject must be sister of VP. 




However, this structure violates the idea of external argument because although the index 
i of V is realized external to VP, it is realized internal to IP since it is represented on the 
head of IP. But it should be external to IP. Externality is required because, as has been shown 
(Williams (1984)) the interpretation of the external argument can only be ascertained once the 
internal arguments have been discharged and interpreted. Thus, a representational position 
that allows for this internal/external interpretational difference should be respected. 
To solve the problem of maintaining the externality of the subject argument Williams 
borrows the double-headedness of the nominal conjunct structure 
NPk 
(2.27) 
NPi and NP3 
and continues to assume that S is a projection of Tense, but contrary to the usual analysis 




This structure is double-headed, and each half of the structure is maximal. It also allows 
him to claim that Nominative Case is merely the realization of Tense in a Nominal structure. 
This, for the first time, gives a theoretical reason for the Nominative case. The Nominative 
case is associated with the Subject, as it is the Subject that is most closely identified with the 
Cause side of the event in Grimshaw's terms. We have here a further conceptual link between 
the surface linguistic expression and the semantic content that is being expressed. 
Thus the final structure for the clause Williams assumes is: 
[Nom,Tense]P 
(2.29) 
[N+Nom]P 	 [V+Tense]P 
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The external argument must be the sister of the maximal projection of the verb. This 
maximal projection is a one-place predicate, and the theta-role it assigns is the external role 
of the verb that is its head. The binding of the external argument of the verb by the maximal 
projection is simply the X-bar projection of the index of the external argument. 
NP - 	XP 
x , i 
	
(2.30) 	 I 
xi 
(A2 , B, C) 
Thus a theta-role is assigned to the external argument by predication, which is defined 
by the verb and its internal arguments. The external argument of the argument structure is 
made the head of the argument structure to ensure that it percolates beyond the VP to the 
external argument NP. 
If we assume that there is an absolute head, then head with respect to F' is defined as: 
(2.31) 	X is the head with respect to F of Y if X is marked for a value of F and either X is 
the absolute head of Y, or the absolute head of Y is not marked for F. 
In cases of conflict the absolute head will always win: e.g. 
[+a,+b] 
(2.32) 	[+a] [-a,+b] 
Head 	 Complement 
With the notions of clause as coordinate structure and relativized head now explained we 
can move on to a discussion of the analysis of raising without the need for NP movement. 
Williams departs from the standard PPT approach to raising. His approach depends on 
some assumptions regarding the structure of clauses and the introduction of the concept of 
relativized head. The advantage of the approach is that it removes NP movement from the 
analysis. NP-movement appears to be the least robust type of movement psycholinguistically 
(Fodor (1989)). And as we shall see in the Chapter 4, it seems to be the case that interpretation 
of the construction takes place not at the gap but at the verb. As thematic roles are associated 
very closely with the verb, any mechanism that allows interpretation at this level and without 
positing gaps should be preferred to a movement-based argument. 
In raising structures, raising predicates assign no external theta-role and thus the comple-
ment is free to pass up its external theta-role via the mechanism of X-bar percolation and the 
notion of relativized head. In the structure below, seems is the head of its maximal projection, 
but it has no external argument associated with it. The notion of relativized head allows the 
non-head to pass its external argument through the maximal projection of seem. 
S 
(2.33) 	NP 	VP 2 
John2 	seems0 sick2 
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There is a parallel between seems and the copula. These verbs seem to be dummy case 
markers in the same way that it is a dummy argument. The difference between them is the 
aspect of their meaning that describes the attitude of the speaker to the main proposition 
expressed by the non-case-marking predicate. 
The relativized head mechanism and its concomitant approach to raising allows for the 
distinction between A'-arguments and A-arguments to be removed from the theory as there 
is no longer any requirement for A'-arguments to move, as they can now be assigned the 
theta-role they require via theta-role percolation. 
2.4.2 Thematic Roles and Incorporation 
I will use the term incorporation here for a number of syntactic processes that Baker (1988) 
has grouped together under that term. These syntactic processes had not been previously 
captured within one framework. 
The syntactic processes in question are Noun Incorporation, Verb Incorporation, Preposi-
tion Incorporation and Passive Incorporation. Incorporation theory is predominantly a theory 
of grammatical function changing. The grammatical functions that are most commonly listed 
are Subject, Object, Indirect Object, Object of a Preposition and Obliques. 
Grammatical functions, on the standard view, are seen as standing between semantic/thematic 
relationships and the surface form relationships among those phrases. Thus semantic/thematic 
structure is mapped onto grammatical functions and the grammatical functions are mapped 
onto the surface form. 
Semantic Thematic 
	
(2.34) 	Grammatic 1 Functions 
Surface Form 
With this architecture, languages do not state generalizations of how semantic and thematic 
relationships correspond to surface form relationships in any direct way. I take issue with this 
approach as one of the main features of my proposals in this thesis is that it is the direct 
mapping of semantic/thematic relationships onto surface form that is central to elements of 
language acquisition and psycholinguistic explanation. 
This links very well to Baker's opinion that languages vary in the ways they express se-
mantic relationships in surface form, together with the deeper theme that each language has 
a coherent system for this representation. So for example the same conceptual relationship is 
expressed by an SVO structure in English (2.35), by an SOV structure in Japanese (2.36) and 
by word form and not word order in Basque (2.37). 
(2.35) 	Linda eats cake 
Linda ga 	okasi o 	taberu 
(2.36) 	Linda-NOM cake-ACC eat 




'Linda sees rover' 
(2.37) 	Rover Linda-k ikusi du 
'Linda sees rover' 
Rover ikusi du Linda-k 
'Linda sees rover' 
Rover 	ikusi du 
Rover(ABS) see 	Aux/3sS/3s0 
Baker (1988) regards structures which have previously been assumed to have undergone 
grammatical function changing in the lexicon as thematic paraphrases. This is the central 
claim of his theory: the same phrases stand in the same thematic/semantic relationships in 
the two alternative structures, but are merely expressed in very different surface forms. 
A simple example of grammatical function changing is the passive: 
	
(2.38) 	a. 	Rover bit Linda. 
b. Linda was bitten by Rover. 
The grammatical functions that are changed here are the Subject NP becoming an Oblique 
and the Object NP becoming the Subject. Baker says the interest of these items is that the 
choice of forms is superfluous given that they have precisely the same meaning. However, 
I shall argue that these forms are not mere alternatives, but actually are the encodings of 
differing conceptual relationships. 
Often associated with these syntactic changes are morphological changes which can perhaps 
be seen as signposts of the change having taken place. Baker claims that the ordering of the 
affixes reflects the ordering of the syntactic changes; he calls this the Mirror Principle. 
Baker claims that at the heart of all grammatical function changing processes is the move-
ment of a word or a lexical category - i.e. X 0 - movement. Thus any transformational rules 
given in terms of grammatical functions are regarded as being mere reflexes of X ° -movement. 
To give the notion of thematic paraphrases a more concrete foundation, Baker strengthens 
the notion of D-structure, so that it is a representation of thematic structure more generally. 
(2.39) 	The Uniformity of Theta-Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH) 
Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by identical structural 
relationships between these items at the level of D-structure 
UTAH gives theoretical motivation for analyses in terms of X 0-movement. An example of 
noun, incorporation will indicate how the two alternative surface structures are related and 
that they have the same underlying deep structure. 
Ka-raku 
(2.40) 	3N-be white 
John's house is white 
Hrao- nuhs- raku 
(2.41) 	3M-house-be.white 
'John's house is white' 
ne 	sawati hrao-nuhs-a? 




Here (2.40) has an independent verb root -raku 'be white' and a noun root -nuhs- 'house' 
whereas (2.41) combines the two into a larger verb form, sometimes called a complex predicate. 
S 
NP 	 VP 
	
(2.42) 	e 	V 	 NP 





houses 	be white John t 
One lexical item is incorporated within another and the morphology indicates this. The 
object agreement on the verb switches from neuter agreement, matching the thematic argument 
of the verb, to masculine agreement matching the thematic possessor of that argument. Thus 
the possessor comes to act like an object of the verb. 
UTAH means that the two alternatives above must share the same D-structure thematic 
relationships: 
S 
isP ;c  
(2.44) 	e 	V 	NP 
NP 	N 
John 	house 
If Incorporation indeed involves movement, it should have the properties of other move-
ments and Baker presents a complex argument to show that this is the case. However, in 
my view alternations similar to incorporation in English reflect a difference in meaning in the 
underlying conceptual structure. I believe that this will be the case for the two alternative 
structures that Baker proposes for each case of incorporation. The full structure will have a 
slightly different meaning to the incorporated structure. The underlying conceptual meanings 
will be linked to their respective surface structures by linking rules. 
One of the questions Baker attempts to answer with his theory of incorporation is why 
are some orders of grammatical function changes grammatical and others ungrammatical in 
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all languages. Baker formulates his answer in terms of possible and impossible movement 
operations. Following the other major theme of this thesis, such an explanation should, in 
my view, be couched in terms of impossibility of interpretation of the underlying thematic-
conceptual structure. 
In any case, it seems to me that the positing of movement should be kept as infrequent as 
possible. In the preceding discussion of Williams' work we saw how raising could be reanalyzed 
in thematic terms without needing a movement operation and this type of analysis should be 
applied as widely as possible. 
2.5 Decomposition of Thematic Structure: A Continuum 
We have seen that a decompositional approach to thematic information became unfashion-
able with the demise of Generative Semantics. Thereafter syntactocentrism was prevalent and 
thematic information was included, if at all, in the semantically barren notion of theta-roles. 
As theta-roles were brought into theories of argument selection or linking (Grimshaw) or the 
assignment of theta-roles was explored more fully (Williams), we see the gradual reintroduc-
tion of semantic entities such as cause and the discovery that the percolation of thematic 
information can make syntactic movement processes unnecessary. 
Following on from this trend, there has been a redevelopment of theories of thematic 
information where decomposition plays a role. The amount of decomposition applied is on a 
continuum. At Level 1, the decomposition is constrained to the lexical categories V, N, A and 
P and event structure. At Level 2, there is causal structure, predication and such conceptual 
notions as temporal delimitation, states and directed motion. At Level 3, the linking rules 
are derived from the verbal entailments associated with the Agent and Patient roles. Level 
4, which is the approach I will follow in this thesis, decomposes thematic information into 
conceptual structures, where the conceptual elements introduced are those and only those 
that are relevant to surface syntactic expression. I will discuss each of these levels in turn in 
the remainder of this chapter. 
2.5.1 Level 1: Canonical Realization of Semantic Structures 
One approach that begins again to regard thematic roles as decomposable in semantic terms 
in a limited way is found in the work of Hale and Keyser (1992, 1993). They argue that the 
proper representation of argument structure is itself a syntax, which they term lexical argument 
stractures or lexical relational structures. It is perhaps not quite accurate to call their approach 
a thematically based one as they actually state that they are sympathetic to the arguments 
that thematic structure has no independent status. They see argument structure as linked to 
surface structure by a process like that of Grimshaw's Canonical Structure Realization. As I 
argued above, this is in effect a renaming of thematic structure as argument structure. The 
type of elements that occur in each of these approaches are similar. 
Hale and Keyser were led to their conception of lexical argument structures by considering 
denomial verbs such as calve, lamb, shelve and bottle. It is clear that the derivation is lexi-
cal, but this is independent of whether the process is syntactic. The syntactic process they 
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implicate in this derivation is one we have already come across in the discussion of thematic 
structure: incorporation. 
Hale and Keyser contend that verbs like shelve and saddle are formed by the head-movement 
component of move-a, or incorporation. Thus for Unergative s, which are the simplest class 




(2.45) 	V NP 
N 





Ni V N 
ti 
and this incorporation conforms to the Head Movement Constrain, where an X 0 may only 
move into the Y° that properly governs it. 
It should be noted that the structures shown above are not D- or S-structures. Rather they 
are the structures of the lexical items themselves, the so called lexical relational structures. 
As these structures seem to be constrained by the same type of syntactic rules as syntactic 
structures, Hale and Keyser contend that lexical relational structures are syntactic in nature. 
As discussed above, Hale and Keyser do not feel there is any need for a separate status 
for thematic structures. One of the reasons they see for this is that the number of thematic 
roles that have been identified in other frameworks is relatively few. They argue that the 
relative paucity of thematic roles is due to the fact that all lexical relational structures can be 
represented using the lexical categories V, N, A and P. This is combined with what they term 
unambiguous projection, where each lexical head determines an unambiguous projection of its 
category to a phrasal level XP, and an unambiguous arrangement of its arguments as specifier 
and complementizer. 
It should be borne in mind that the attempt to limit Generative Semantics structures to 
V, N, A and P was what led in part to the elaborate representations of the structures. If the 
Hale and Keyser paradigm is followed to capture all lexical items, the same problems may 
occur. All other things being equal, semantic information should be represented in semantic 
terms and not forced into a syntactic straight-jacket. 
What others see as thematic roles are seen by Hale and Keyser as being determined by these 
four categories and their projections. Thus an AGENT reflects the relational structure of the 
NP in the upper specifier position. Further, the matrix event of V implicates the subordinate 
event 
(2.47) 	e 1 -+ e2 
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This structure represents a causal relation. The external argument of this, the NP in the 
upper specifier position bears an unambiguous relationship to the V' 
	
(2.48) 	n >(e1 -~ e2 ) 
Turning to the inner VP of the verb shelve we see that the head-complement relations 
involve V and P, with the latter subordinate to the former. V is a dynamic event e and P is 
the interrelation r. 
The dynamic event implicates the interrelation: 
(2.49) 	e -* r 
and the noun in this relationship is a subject of this change of state interrelationship. This 
is sometimes called a theme or affected patient in thematic theories. 
(2.50) 	n >(e -~ r) 
The lexical category A is associated with the notional state s. An action or a dynamic 
event implicates a state (again a theme in thematic theories) 
(2.51) 	n > (e -* s) 
The fourth lexical category N is exemplified by the Unergative verbs such as laugh, sneeze 
and sing. A dynamic event implicates an entity, i.e. the event results in the creation, produc-
tion or realization of that entity. Hale and Keyser (1992) point out that a mature theory of 
these elements would not represent parts of speech but would rather represent semantic con-
structs such as activity, spatio-temporal coincidence and so on, which are canonically realized 
as V, N, A and P. 
(2.52) 	n > (e -* n) 
Thus what we see in these representations are the lexical categories V, N, A and P, a 
representation of events, and such notional concepts as state, entity and interrelation. 
Bearing in mind that these structures are not - or D-structures, but rather a syntactic 
representation of the underlying lexical relational structures of lexical items, these structures 
need to be projected into the true syntactic levels. Hale and Keyser argue for Unambigu-
ous Projection and Full Interpretation to achieve this. These elements can be illustrated by 
considering gaps in the - projection of Unergative verbs: 
(2.53) 	a. *The  clown laughed the child. 
b. *The  alfafa sneezed the colt. 
For this not to be a problem, Unergatives would need not to have a subject in lexical 
relational structure terms, but this must be more than stipulation. It must follow from some 
principle. Hale and Keyser propose predication to be such a principle. For the Unergative 
the complement of the verb is not a predicate and thus no subject is required. If the specifier 
(internal subject) for the Unergative is excluded by Full Interpretation, then the expressed 
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subject must be external. This external argument related to the verb by predication appears 
in the s-syntactic position appropriate for predication. Another problem arises, how does this 
external argument get the role from the verb? Hale and Keyser argue that the subject is 
understood as an agent in a constructional manner. 
There are a number of curious properties of the Hale and Keyser approach that may 
be its undoing. The fact that they see the LRS representations as canonical realizations of 
concepts such as activity, states, entities etc, would seem to indicate that there is arguably 
another level of semantic representation below lexical relational structures. If it can be shown 
that the realization of this underlying structure is not canonical, then it would make no 
sense to construct such a representation as lexical relational structure. In our exploration 
of the continuum of the decomposition of thematic structure we will gain more clues as to 
whether canonical realization of underlying semantic structures as lexical relational structures 
is possible. 
2.5.2 Level 2: Linking Rules and Lexical Alternations 
Regularities in the association of arguments with syntactic expressions are linking regularities 
and the rules that affect these are linking rules. Levin and Rappaport (1995) argue that 
verb meaning is a factor in determining the syntactic structure of sentences. They come to 
this conclusion in their analysis of two types of intransitive verbs, the Unaccusatives and the 
Unergatives. 
An Unergative verb takes a D-structure subject and no object, it thus has an external 
argument, but no internal argument: 
	
(2.54) 	NP[vp V] 
whereas an Unaccusative takes a D-structure object and no subject and has therefore an 
internal argument, but no external argument. In D-structure terms they are identical to 
passives: 
(2.55) 	[VP V NP/CP] 
Traditionally there have been two approaches to unaccusativity; the syntactic approach 
that contends that Unaccusatives are not fully predictable from the semantics of the verb, and 
the semantic approach that argues that unaccusativity is not encoded syntactically. Levin 
and Rappaport take the view that Unaccusatives are both semantically determined and syn-
tactically encoded. They assume that each verb has two representations: lexical semantic 
representation (similar to lexical conceptual structure) and a lexical syntactic representation 
(argument structure). The positions in argument structure in their terms are not represented 
by theta-roles, but rather by a purely syntactic representation: 
(2.56) 	put e, x <y, Pi0  Z> 
This representation shows an event with an external argument, a direct internal argument 
and an indirect internal argument with a locative preposition. Levin and Rappaport see 
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the relationship between argument structure and D-structure as trivial (cf. the discussion of 
Grimshaw's work above). 
As for the lexical semantic representation, Levin and Rappaport propose lexical semantic 
templates, which are generative entities that are constructed from predicate decompositions 
and a number of constants representing the roles of the arguments in relation to the verb. 
Thus the non-causative meaning of break as in The window broke will be represented as: 
	
(2.57) 	break: [y BECOME BROKEN] 
Levin and Rappaport identify a diagnostic for Unaccusative verbs. There is a restriction 
on all resultative constructions in that the resultative can only be predicated of the direct 
object of the verb for which the resultative forms the result.. They argue that this restriction 
can be derived from a linking rule (this rule will be presented in the course of this discussion). 
Thus for Unergative verbs where there is no direct object, no resultative phrase should be 
possible: 
(2.58) 	*Dora  shouted hoarse. 
This can be rescued by the introduction of a fake reflexive 
(2.59) 	Dora shouted herself hoarse. 
The Direct Object Restriction follows from principles of grammar. Levin and Rappaport 
argue that the lexical representation of verbs in the resultative construction does not differ 
from the verb in isolation. In Unaccusatives, the post verbal NP in the resultative construction 
behaves like an argument, the NP in the Unergative version does not behave like an argument 
of the verb. Thus in Unaccusatives the noun can be externalized by middle formation or 
adjectival passives, but this is not the case for Unergatives: 
(2.60) 	a. 	This table wipes clean easily. 
b. *This  type of pavement runs thin easily. 
To explain the direct object restriction on resultatives, Levin and Rappaport decompose 
the meaning of the resultative. Resultatives derive accomplishments from activities. Accom-
plishments in turn consist of an activity and a state. A Resultative denotes a change of state 
even when the verb in isolation does not denote a change of state: 
(2.61) 	a. The blacksmith pounded the metal. 
b. The blacksmith pounded the metal flat. 
As a first approximation, Levin and Rappaport propose the Change of State Linking Rule 
based on the preceding discussion: 
(2.62) 	Change of State Linking Rule 
An NP that refers to the entity that undergoes a change of state in the eventuality 
described in the VP must be governed by the verb heading the VP. 
An NP that refers to the entity that undergoes a change of state in the eventuality 
described in the VP must be the direct object of the verb heading the VP. 
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However, further semantic definition and decomposition needs to be carried out as not all 
Unaccusatives are compatible with resultative phrases. Specifically, stative verbs and verbs of 
inherently directed motion (come, go, arrive) are not compatible with resultative phrases. The 
semantic element that defines whether a resultative phrase is compatible or not is temporal 
delimitation. Resultative phrases serve to act as a temporal delimiter of an eventuality. Verbs 
of inherently directed motion are already lexically delimited (they describe an achieved change 
of location) and the addition of a second delimiter specifying a change of state is blocked. All 
statives are inherently delimited and a second delimiter is again blocked. 
Levin and Rappaport then examine the causative alternation to identify further the lexical 
properties of the Unaccusative verbs with regard to their adicity and their lexical semantic 
characterization. The causative alternation is said to hold between a transitive and an in-
transitive version of the same verb where the transitive meaning is understood as 'cause to 
V-intransitive' 
(2.63) 	a. Pat broke the window. 
b. The window broke. 
The subject of the intransitive verb and the object of the transitive verb play the same 
semantic role. Levin and Rappaport identify three types of intransitive verbs: 
• Unaccusatives where the semantic representation of the causative is relevant. A dyadic 
verb with a single direct internal argument. 
• Unaccusatives not related to the causative construction. A dyadic verb with two internal 
arguments 
• Unergatives which a monadic with a single external argument 
Levin and Rappaport assign both variants the same lexical semantic representation. One 
is NOT derived from the other. The intransitive verbs that alternate are dyadic, those that 
do not are monadic. The lexical semantic representation assigned is as follows: 
(2.64) [[x DO-SOMETHING] CAUSE [y BECOME BROKEN]] 
The representation of both versions includes the predicate CAUSE, and this represents the 
meaning of such verbs as involving two sub-events. Each of the arguments of the verb are 
associated with a distinct sub-event, with the passive participant (patient, theme) associated 
with the central sub-event. The non-alternating intransitive verbs do not include the predicate 
CAUSE. 
However, CAUSE alone does not determine which verbs alternate and which do not. A 
further semantic differentiation is required. This differentiation is between internally and 
externally caused eventualities. For example, verbs such as break and open are under the 
control of some external controller. However, verbs like laugh and play are not like this. They 
can be controlled only by the person engaging in the activity, control cannot be relinquished. 
Internal control verbs also have severe restrictions on the nature and identity of their single 
argument. The relevant representations are 
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(2.65) 	a. Externally controlled: [[x DO-SOMETHING] CAUSE [y BECOME STATE]] 
b. Internally controlled: [x PREDICATE] 
Interestingly given the speculative discussion to come in Chapter 6, Levin and Rappaport 
state that the relationship between the linguistic description of events and the events taking 
place in the real world is mediated by the human cognitive construal of events and this influ-
ences the form of lexical semantic representations. Indeed, the same events could be construed 
as either external or internal and this is often the source of crosslinguistic variation, according 
to Levin and Rappaport. This should be borne in mind in the discussion of language learning, 
parameter setting and grammaticalization to be found in the next chapter. 
Externally caused verbs can detransitivize where an externally caused eventuality can come 
about without the intervention of the agent 
	
(2.66) 	a. 	The waiter cleared the table. 
b. *The  table cleared. 
(2.67) 	a. The wind cleared the sky. 
b. The sky cleared. 
Verbs of existence and appearance are all Unaccusative, but do not take part in the 
causative alternation. This is explained by a further semantic differentiation. These verbs 
have two arguments, the entity that exists and a location. These are argued to be two internal 
arguments as the location requirement is required and if it is not present it is understood by 
default. They are also found in the locative inversion construction and with there-insertion. 
(2.68) 	a. In front of her appeared a fabulous sight. 
b. There appeared a ship on the horizon. 
With all these elements in place, Levin and Rappaport go on to define the linking rules. 
These linking rules are based around the causality of events. 
(2.69) 	The Immediate Clause Linking Rule (ICLR) 
The argument of a verb that denotes the immediate cause of the eventuality described 
by the verb is its external argument. 
This linking rule applies to internally and externally caused verbs and intransitive and 
transitive verbs. The internally caused verbs are typically Unergatives such as cough, shiver, 
sleep and snore. Verbs of spatial configuration in the maintain position sense also fall under 
the ICLR. The ICLR also explains why internally caused verbs cannot be causativized. Their 
single argument is an external argument and a second external argument cannot be assigned. 
(2.70) 	The Directed Change Linking Rule (DCLR) 
The argument of a verb that corresponds to the entity undergoing the directed change 
described by that verb is its direct internal argument. 
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This linking rule captures the parallels between the change of state verbs such as break 
and verbs of inherently directed motion such as fall and come. These should be contrasted 
with verbs with no inherent direction such as roll and bounce. The distinctive properties of 
internal and external causation do not seem relevant to the semantic characterization of verbs 
of existence. These verbs are Unaccusative as they take the relevant auxiliary in languages 
such as Italian, they cannot take any object, and they cannot form adjectival past participles. 
	
(2.71) 	Existence Linking Rule (ELR) 
The argument of a verb whose existence is asserted or denied is its direct internal 
argument. 
Verbs of appearance could fall under the ELR or the DCLR depending on whether the 
appearance is as a result of directed change. In this way the building up of criteria as to which 
linking rule will apply for a verb is similar to the idea of Proto-Roles found in Dowty (1991) 
(This is discussed further in the next section). 
For the other monadic verbs there is a default linking rule 
(2.72) 	Default Linking Rule (DLR) 
An argument of a verb that does not fall under the scope of any of the other linking 
rules is its direct internal argument. 
This rule has the result that a verb will take an internal argument before taking an ex-
ternal argument. This rule will not apply to manner of motion verbs with agentive animate 
arguments. These are internally caused and will thus fall under the ICLR. It will, however, 
apply to non-agentive motion verbs such as bounce, roll and spin. These are externally caused 
and will fall under the DLR, and are thus Unaccusative. 
The linking rules are ordered with the DCLR taking precedence over the ICLR. Verbs such 
as blush and bloom are internally caused and as they are Unaccusative the DCLR must take 
precedence over the ICLR. Additionally, verbs of inherently directed motion are consistently 
Unaccusative, even though they can be used both agentively and non-agentively. This is 
predicted if the DCLR takes precedence over the ICLR. 
With regard to the ordering of the ELR, if agentivity is irrelevant to the linking of a verb of 
existence, then the ELR has precedence over the ICLR and verbs of existence are consistently 
Unaccusative. 
Some verbs have multiple meaning that allow them to fall under different linking rules 
depending on which of the verbs meanings is applicable. So for example bake can have a 
change of state meaning as in bake the potatoes and a creation meaning as in bake a cake. 
Levin and Rappaport discuss internally caused verbs and point out that some of them can 
acquire an additional meaning through what they see as the application of a lexical rule. Thus 
these verbs will fall under the ICLR on the basic meaning and the DCLR on a directed motion 
meaning. 
So, for example, manner of motion verbs are found in some languages such as English, 
German and Modern Hebrew and not in others such as the Romance languages. In the non-
directed motion use these verbs fall under the ICLR and are unergative, when a directional 
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phrase is added they fall under the DCLR and are Unaccusative. This is reflected by the 
auxiliaries these verbs take in their past forms in German. 
Verbs of sound emission can also become verbs of directed motion, as in The elevator 
wheezed upwards. Sound emission verbs if internally caused are Unergative. If a directed 
motion phrase is added these verbs become Unaccusative. The sound must be a necessary 
concomitant of the motion. 
Thus what we see here is that agentive verbs of manner of motion and internally caused 
verbs of sound emission are subject to a lexical rule that can map them into the class of 
verbs of directed motion. These verbs of manner of motion and sound emission can assume 
Unaccusative class if the resultative denotes a change of location and not if it denotes a 
change of state. The explanation of such mappings would require a full theory of possible and 
impossible meaning shifts. It is provocative that in a crosslinguistic context the languages that 
allow verbs of sound emission to be used as verbs of directed motion are the same languages 
that allow agentive verbs of manner of motion to become verbs of directed motion. It may well 
be the case that meaning shifts reflect the deeper properties of the language's lexical semantic 
organization. This will be explored further in the discussion of grammaticalization in the next 
chapter. 
2.5.3 Level 3: A Simplification of the Syntax/Semantics Interface 
and the Selection of Arguments? 
Thematic roles in PPT theory are fundamentally syntactic notions. There has, however, always 
been an underlying semantic origin for these roles. In all cases, thematic roles are creatures of 
the syntax-semantics interface. The differences in opinion from one PPT proposal to another, 
in general terms, concern how the thematic roles are implicated in argument selection. 
Dowty (1991) has attempted to simplify the rules governing argument selection by re-
turning to the semantic motivations behind the roles. He proposes the adoption of thematic 
proto-roles. He defines two proto-roles: Agent and Patient. These are defined in terms of the 
verbal entailments associated with these roles. 
	
(2.73) 	Contributing properties for the Agent Proto-Role 
• volitional involvement in the event or state 
• sentience (and/or perception) 
• causing an event or change of state in another participant 
• movement (relative to the position of another participant) 
• (exists independently of the event named by the verb) 
(2.74) 	Contributing properties for the Patient Proto-Role 
• undergoes a change of state 
• incremental theme 
• causally affected by another participant 
• stationary relative to movement of another participant 
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• (does not exist independently of the event, or not at all) 
Here the notion of Incremental Theme needs further explanation. A theme is incremental 
in that in a sentence such as John ate the bagel, one can look at the bagel in the event the 
sentence describes and see how much of it is eaten. One cannot look at John, however, and 
conclude anything about the completeness of his eating of the bagel. 
The individual parts of the definition of the proto-roles should not be confused with feature 
decomposition as Dowty does not see the boundaries of these entailments as being entirely 
clear-cut. With these proto-roles in place, argument selection occurs according to the following 
principles. 
(2.75) ARGUMENT SELECTION PRINCIPLE 
In predicates with grammatical subject and object, the argument for which the 
predicate entails the greatest number of Proto-Agent properties will be lexicalized 
as the subject of the predicate; the argument having the greatest number of Proto-
Patient properties will.be  lexicalized as the direct object. 
(2.76) COROLLARY 1 
If two arguments of a relation have approximately equal numbers of entailed Proto-
Agent and Proto-Patient properties, then either or both may be lexicalized as the 
subject (and similarly for objects). 
(2.77) COROLLARY 2 
With a three-place predicate, the nonsubject argument having the greater number 
of entailed Proto-Patient properties will be lexicalized as the direct object and the 
nonsubject argument having fewer entailed Proto-Patient properties will be lexical-
ized as an oblique or prepositional object (and if two nonsubject arguments have 
approximately equal numbers of entailed Proto-patient properties, either or both 
may be lexicalized as the direct object) 
(2.78) NON-DISCRETENESS 
Proto-roles, obviously, do not classify arguments exhaustively (some arguments have 
neither role) or uniquely (some arguments may share the same role) or discretely 
(some arguments could qualify partially but equally for both proto-roles). 
The idea that traditional thematic roles can be split into their defining features is one 
that I agree with and will follow in this thesis. However, I am not going to say that any 
particular combination of features, or entailments, forms a Proto-Agent or Proto-Patient or 
Proto-anything else, for that matter. For me, the decomposition of thematic information is 
an end in itself; it does not need to define any traditional role or proto-role. 
Thus Dowty points out that certain combinations of entailments seem to correspond to 
traditional roles: AGENT is volition + causation (or just volition, or just causation), EX-
PERIENCER is sentience without volition or causation, INSTRUMENT is causation and 
movement without volition or sentience. However, each verb is be associated with a lexical 
entry that defines its meaning in terms of these semantic decompositions, or entailments. We 
do not need to say that they correspond to anything. We only need to describe how these 
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elements of meaning (represented as thematic-conceptual structure, in my terms) correspond 
to the surface realization of the sentence, and how they are implicated in the processing and 
acquisition of language. 
As Dowty himself explains, he is only looking for constraints on what kind of lexical 
predicates can exist in a natural language. This is an interesting aim, and one I address from 
a phylogenetic and cognitive setting in Chapter 6. Thus Dowty can say what the characteristics 
of an Agent or a Patient are, but he cannot predict the ordering of a sentence, or whether a 
sentence will occur in the active or the passive form, or which verbs can passivize and which 
cannot. 
2.5.4 Level 4: Thematic-conceptual Structure 
In this section I will discuss the most elaborate, yet constrained, decomposition of thematic 
structure developed thus far. I will term this representation thematic-conceptual structure. 
The basis for these representations can be found in the work of Pinker (1989) and Jackend-
off (1990). The motivation for the adoption of decompositional representations of thematic 
information can be found in three main areas: Evidence that thematic hierarchies do not cap-
ture some constructions successfully, the failure of the theta-criterion, and aspects of language 
acquisition. I will lay out the first two of these motivations here, but will only touch on the 
third. The third motivation and its representational solution in terms of thematic-conceptual 
structure will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, where language acquisition is 
discussed. 
There are problems with the use of hierarchies to explain linguistic facts. So for example 
the following examples show a number of verbs that do not passivize. 
	
(2.79) 	a. *One  kilogram is weighed by this melon. 
b. 	*30p  is cost by this pen. 
C. 	*John  is resembled by Bill 
d. *20  is equaled by five times four. 
This data was first accounted for by an actional/non-actional or stative/non-stative dis-
tinction. However, non-actional, stative and abstract passives do exist. 
(2.80) 	This shop is owned by the news-agent. 
(2.81) 	The measures were justified by the situation. 
It was thought that a constraint on passive formation based on the hierarchy of thematic 
roles (2.82) could better capture the data. The constraint was that in passives the surface 
subject must have a thematic role that is higher then the thematic role of the object of by 
or the implicit argument. So in the non-passivizable sentences above, in each case a theme is 
compared to what is a metaphorical location (as indicated by the locational prepositions). 
(2.82) 	theme < source/goal/location < agent 
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(2.83) 	a. melons AT one kilogram 
b. pens AT 30p 
C. 	Bill's similarity TO John 
d. five times four is equal TO 20. 
However, there are passives which are not predicted by the hierarchical constraint (2.84), 
and passives which do not exist, but are predicted to exist by the hierarchical constraint (2.85). 
(2.84) 	a. The audience was bored by the movie. (audience = Goal) 
b. Russia was invaded by a horde of locusts. (Russia = Location) 
C. The bed was covered by a blanket. (bed = Location) 
John was hit by a car. (John = Goal) 
The mountain was capped by snow. (mountain = Location) 
(2.85) 	a. *The  house is had by John. (John = Possessor = Location, house = Theme) 
b. *A  disk is lacked by this computer. (computer = Location) 
C. 	*Water  is dripped by this ceiling. (ceiling = Source, water = Theme) 
d. *Water  was contained by the bottle. (bottle = Location, water = Theme) 
It is also of note that the hierarchy assumed to explain passivization facts is different to 
the one that Grimshaw assumes to explain nominalization facts. If any form of hierarchical 
explanation is to be adopted, it will have to be the same hierarchy for each of the facts that 
are to be explained by that hierarchy. In general, it must be said that hierarchies are by their 
very nature susceptible to counterexamples. 
More seriously for PPT in general, as it puts in doubt the Theta-Criterion itself, there are 
both cases where a NP has more than one theta-role and cases where multiple NPs share a 
single theta-role. In (2.86) X has the theta-role of both GOAL and SOURCE. 
(2.86) X buys Y from Z 
Y changes possession from Z to X 
money changes possession from X to Z. 
It is important to note that the counter-transfer does count. It is the counter-transfer 
that distinguishes buy from obtain. In (2.87) John has two theta-roles in conceptual terms, 
according to Jackendoff. 
(2.87) 	John carried some books with him. 
Pinker (1989) examines the question of how it is that children learn the rules governing 
lexical alternations given Baker's Paradox. Baker's Paradox concerns the fact that children 
can learn which verbs have both alternate forms and which verbs do not without the benefit 
of negative evidence. Pinker examines four alternations: the dative (5), the causative (6), the 
locative (7) and the passive (8). 
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(2.88) John gave the book to the boy. 
John gave the boy the book. 
(2.89) John donated a painting to the museum. 
John denoted the museum a painting. 
(2.90) The door opened. 
John opened the door. 
(2.91) John loaded hay onto the truck. 
John loaded the truck with hay. 
(2.92) John hit the ball. 
The ball was hit by John. 
He proposes that lexical rules act directly on the semantic representation of a verb, trans-
forming it into a new semantic representation. The resulting semantic structure is then mapped 
onto surface syntactic structure by linking rules. It is only verbs that are members of certain 
semantic conflation classes that are eligible to be counted as the input to a lexical rule. 
This is the basis of the solution as Pinker sees it. However, the full discussion of this 
topic will be left to the next chapter. Pinker relies on a decompositional representation of 
thematic information for his explanation and in the remainder of this section I will present 
how Jackendoff and Pinker have come to the decompositional elements they propose. 
The theory of semantic structures must be constrained so that only the aspects of semantics 
that are visible to the grammar are allowed to be contained within the representations. The 
most successful approach to this is to look at crosslinguistic evidence. Items which appear 
in the agreement, classifier or other closed class systems can safely be represented in the 
semantic structure. The argument is that if some languages encode some of these semantic 
features directly in the syntax, it is quite likely that these features are relevant to the grammars 
of all languages, even when they are not directly represented in the grammar of a particular 
language.. 
Most of these aspects of verb meaning can be incorporated into the semantic structure of 
a lexical entry. There are some differences between Pinker and Jackendoff in how they are 
encoded and I shall indicate these. These differences are not major and it is unclear whether 
they make different predictions. 
The aspects of word meaning that have been identified as relevant are given below. It is 
interesting to note that in the lesser decompositional theories, many of the same elements have 
been proposed as having an influence on the syntactic behaviour of verbs. 
The main event: a state or motion, i.e. a position state or change of position or state 
predicated of a theme. The main event is the backbone of a verbs meaning. 
Paths,direction and location: A verb can specify a particular path of motion of a 
theme with respect to an object, the speaker or with respect to a specific kind of object 
(the ship berthed). 
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Causation: Verbs can specify whether an event has been caused or just occurs (kill 
vs.die), and what kind of causation is involved. This can be analyzed in terms of force 
dynamics. 
Manner: This refers to how an actor acts or a theme changes or refers to something 
the actor or theme is doing concurrent with the change. 
Properties of the Theme or Actor: Verbs can specify that the arguments have 
specific properties (drink, fressen). 
Temporal Distribution: Verbs can describe point-like events (hit), boundariless pro-
cesses (run), iterated events (beat), entering a state (sit down), or point-like events that 
terminate an ongoing process (arrive). 
Purpose: Verbs can encode activity in pursuit of a goal. 
Co-referentiality: In some languages to comb means to comb someone else's hair, in 
other languages it means to comb one's own hair. 
Truth Value: Verbs can express the assumptions of the speaker or some participant 
concerning the truth of a proposition. 
These elements then form the components of representational structures. The first set 
of elements the theory of semantic structures uses are the basic conceptual and ontological 
categories: THING, EVENT, STATE, ACTION, PLACE, PATH, PROPERTY, AMOUNT. 
Each category is formed from semantic constituents which are specified in formation rules. 
	
(2.93) 	[PLACE] - 
[PLACE PLACE-FUNCTION ([THING])] 
Jackendoff uses these fiat bracketed structures. Pinker, however, uses tree notations which 
are much easier to read. For this reason I shall also use the tree notation for most of the 
structures I discuss below. 
Formation rules as we have seen combine them into more complex concepts 
EVENT 
(2.94) 
GO THING PATH 
and PATH can be further expanded to 
PATH 
from 	 THING 





And a PLACE is a region defined with respect to an object, such as its interior, surroundings 
or surfaces. 
PLACE 





It is necessary to indicate which of these conceptual constituents in a particular semantic 
structure can serve as an open argument linked to a syntactic role position in the verb's 
argument structure. These open roles are indicated by open brackets (El) 
go 	EVENT 
(2.97) 	




	 to 	PLACE 
in 	 THING 
[1 
These open arguments are mapped onto syntactically distinguishable argument types by 
linking rules. There is a further constraint on the syntactic structure with respect to the 
semantic structure: Major syntactic phrasal categories must correspond to a complete con-
ceptual category. 
Sentence structures are only well formed if they contain phrases corresponding to the 
conceptual categories selected by the verb. For example, put selects for a preposition which 
incorporates the direction to (on, in, by .... ) and a PLACE. This has the advantage that the 
individual prepositions which can occur with a verb do not have to be listed individually 
if the have something in common which can be represented with the inventory of semantic 
constituents. 
But not everything in the semantics of the verb is visible to the grammar. For example 
in manner of motion verbs, the manner of motion is listed as another daughter node of the 
EVENT. The manner of motion has no effect on the syntactic structure of the clause which 
contains it. We say that the manner of motion is opaque to the linking rules. This opacity is 
notated with quotation marks. 
roll 	EVENT 
(2.99) 	
GO THING MANNER 
U 	'rolling' 
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These opaque pieces of semantic information do not have to be decomposed further. This 
obviates the need for an unconstrained set of features which are often the source of much 
criticism of representations of structured semantics. 
So much for motion, a canonical example of a STATE is a THING being situated at a PLACE. 
STATE 
(2.100) 
BE THING PLACE 
11 	H 
Incorporated arguments and selectional restrictions are two other sources for semantic ma-
terial that is opaque to the linking rules. However, selectional restrictions show that some 
kinds of specific information can percolate up to the grammar. This information are repre-
sented by a small set of specific features that lexical rules can be sensitive to. To limit the 
number of features, only those features which turn up in classifier and agreement systems 
cross-linguistically are included in the inventory. These features are: Animacy, Humanness, 
Shape (in a 3D Representation), Count/Mass, Rigidity and Substance/Aggregate. 
The machinery for spatial events can be extended to non-locational fields with the proviso 
that the name of the extension is added to the maximal conceptual constituent. Thus for the 
possessional field: 
belong 	STATE:possessional 
BE THING 	 PLACE 
(2.101) 
AT 	 THING 
[] 
In contrast to Jackendoff, Pinker does not make use of INCH operator to derive inchoatives. 
Instead, he allows GO to take a PROPERTY when it is part of a non-locational event. 
(2.102) go:(e.g. went from sick to well) 
EVENT:Ident 
GO THING 	 PATH 
H 
 //1 ~~~ 
from PROPERTY to PROPERTY 
H 	 H 
(2.103) break: 
EVENT:Ident 
GO THING 	PROPERTY 
H 'broken' 
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Actional events involve the function ACT, which takes either a single act argument, or two 
arguments, one being the agent, the other the patient. The simplest actional event has a single 
argument and can be found in Unergative transitive verbs. 
(2.104) yawn: 
EVENT 
ACT THING MANNER 
'yawning' 
An example of a dyadic ACT event is kiss 
(2.105) kiss: 
EVENT 
ACT THING THING MANNER 
[1 	11 	'kissing' 
Jackendoff deals with Actional Events in a more complex way. He uses two tiers of repre-
sentation to encode the totality of conceptual roles associated with a predicate: a Thematic 
Tier to deal with motion and location and an Action Tier to deal with Actor- Patient relations. 
He provides us with tests for Actors and Patients. 
A Patient will fit into the frame 
(2.106) What happened to NP was.... 
What Y did to NP was... 
and an Actor into 
(2.107) What NP did was. 
So on an intuitive level the contents of the thematic tiers for the following sentences are: 
(2.108) Sue hit 	Fred 
Theme Goal (thematic tier) 
Actor Patient (action tier) 
(2.109) Pete threw 	the ball 
Source Theme (thematic tier) 
Actor Patient (action tier) 
(2.110) Bill entered 	the room 
Theme Goal (thematic tier) 
Actor (action tier) 
To encode these properly we need a functional representation that has Actor and Patient 
as its argument positions. Thus events are formally elaborated in the Action tier. 
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(2.111) EVENT -4 
AFF(<[THING]>, <[THING]>) 
(Angled brackets encode optional arguments) 
AFF is an additional mainstream function. The first argument is the Actor and the second 
the patient. E.g. for The car hit the tree. 
(2.112) INCH [BE ([CAR], [AT [TREE]])] 
Event AFF ([CAR],[TREE]) 
Jackendoff goes on to use the action tier in his analysis of causation which uses the Talmy 
(1985) theory of force-dynamics. Force dynamics involves the interaction of two characters: 
the agonist and the antagonist. The agonist has the tendency toward performing or not 
performing an action. This tendency is opposed by the antagonist. So in Harry forced Sam to 
go away: 
(2.113) CAUSE([HARRY] [Go([sAM, [AWAY]) 
AFF(SAM,] 
AFF([HARRY],[SAM]) 
The antagonist here is the actor. The EFFECT is what he aims to bring about. The inference 
rule for CAUSE is that Harry was successful in his efforts. However, there are examples where 
it is not clear whether the act of Causation was successful or not. 
(2.114) a. Harry pressured/urged/goaded Sam to go away (and he did/but he didn't). 
b. Harry impeded Sam's going away (and in the end he didn't/but he did). 
To encode the degree of success of an act of causation the CAUSE function is modified to 
the function CS with various superscripts: 
• CS+ -successful outcome 
• CSu -undecided outcome 
• CS- -unsuccessful outcome 
Jackendoff captures inter-event relations by encoding them in different tiers within the 
representation. On the other hand Pinker uses a small set of subordinating relations that 
allow one event to be embedded in another. 
One subordinating relationship is that of cause and effect, the link between the two is 
annotated with 'effect'. The co-reference between entities is once again notated by indices. 
Only one of these positions is the trigger for the relevant linking rule. These relevant position 





ACT 	THING MANNER 	 EVENT 
[X] 'running' zxN 





ACT 	THING 	THING EVENT 
U [ 
GO 	THING 	PROPERTY 
Y 	'broken' 
Given this very different representation of the inter-event relations, Pinker has to propose a 
different way of encoding the degree of success of the ACT (Jackendoff did this using CS+/u/-). 
Pinker claims that two things have to be represented: (i) Whether the focus is on the result 
of the Actors action or on the action itself and (ii) Whether the Actor is stronger than the 
Patient. These differences are encoded by introducing a set of subordinating relations. These 
subordinating relations and the relevant focus and potency are: 
Relation Focus Potency Cause Effect 
'effect' cause success yes yes 
'cause' effect success yes yes 
'despite' effect failure yes no 
'but' cause failure yes no 
'let' cause success no yes 
'prevent' cause success yes no 
Instrumentals will play an important role in the psycholinguistic discussion of Chapter 5. 
Jackendoff proposes the following rule for instrumental adjuncts. 
(2.117) Instrumental Adjunct Rule 
If V corresponds to 
AFF([X] ,[Y]) 
and NP corresponds to X, then 





This rule would have fairly unconstrained applicability any sentence with a verb with 
the semantics of one entity acting on another occurring together with a prepositional phrase 
containing with would be an appropriate entity. 
The framework for the instrumental according to Pinker is encoded within the lexical entry 




ACT THING THING 	 EVENT 
H 
ACT 	THING THING 
X 	El 
It is possibly the case that the types of verbs that with-instrumentals can be attached to 
are semantically constrained in the same way that lexical alternations are constrained by the 
semantics. 
The nature of linking rules is not yet clear and the theory has not been worked out in depth. 
I will have more to say on this in Chapter 5. Jackendoff believes that the linking rules should 
operate on the Action Tier to derive syntactic structure. Pinker's linking rules operate on 
the arguments enclosed in square brackets in his representations. This difference may not be 
important, but if parsing decisions are based in any way on semantic representations, Pinker's 
method would involve one less step, with the linking rules operating on arguments which are 
embedded directly within the semantic structure, instead of in a separate tier which is only 
co-indexed with arguments in the semantic structure. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
There are a number of questions that arise from the discussion in this chapter. 
First, What is the true nature of the mapping of the semantic aspects of a lexical repre-
sentation onto the syntactic representation? This aspect will be developed throughout this 
thesis. 
Second, What is the true nature of the lexical-conceptual-semantic representation we need 
to assume? I argue that the fully decompositional structure proposed by Pinker and Jackendoff 
is the correct route to take. I will back this up in the discussion of language acquisition and 
psycholinguistics in Chapters 3 to 5. The decompositional approach to thematic-conceptual 
structures makes the correct psycholinguistic predictions for a number of new and several 
previously intransigent older psycholinguistic findings. 
Third, at what level are the typological differences between languages to be explained; the 
lexical-conceptual-semantic level, the syntactic level or at the level of the linking between the 
levels? The answer to this question depends largely on the answer to the previous question. 
In the development of the explanation of the psycholinguistic facts discussed in Chapter 5, 
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I will propose that thematic-conceptual structures are linked by reversible linking rules to 




Considerations from Language 
Acquisition 
In the preceding chapter, the role of thematic-conceptual structure in syntax was discussed. I 
noted that much of the argumentation behind one of the more elaborated theories of thematic-
conceptual structure had its basis in considerations of language acquisition. In this chapter I 
will discuss language acquisition in more depth with the aim of establishing at what level and 
to what extent thematic-conceptual structure is important to language acquisition. 
I begin the chapter by comparing and contrasting the Classical paradigm of learning to 
the currently more fashionable connectionist view of learning. I will argue that the Classical 
framework is to be preferred. 
I then go on to discuss the differing opinions as to whether functional categories are available 
to the child acquiring language from the beginning of acquisition (The Continuity Hypothesis) 
or whether they are acquired by maturation, being preceded by a more thematically based 
acquisition of language. 
I will argue that a middle ground between the no-functional categories approach and the 
all-functional categories approach can be established. I then go on to discuss the theories of 
parameter setting in general terms and conclude that they suffer from a number of problems 
that makes their successful application unlikely. 
There then follows an initial discussion of the relationship between phylogeny and ontogeny 
which includes also an examination of the early cognitive capacities of children in non-linguistic 
fields and a discussion of the impact these early capacities may have on language acquisition. 
I return to the decompositional approach to thematic-conceptual structure that indeed re-
flects many of these early representations and conceptualizations and very successfully captures 
and explains the acquisition of a number of lexical alternations. 
Rounding off the chapter, I present investigations of grammaticalization and note that 
much of what diachronically is grammaticalized in syntax reflects conceptual content. It is 
my view that the acquisition of such grammaticalized conceptual content will also need to be 
based on a decompositional representation of thematic-conceptual structure. 
After discussing the role of thematic-conceptual structure in psycholinguistics in general 
in the next chapter, I will go on to test the predictions of this chapter in chapter 5. 
3.1 Theories of Learning 
3.1.1 Connectionism 
The representational type of the thematic-conceptual structure I follow in this thesis can 
be described as a Classical theory of representations and rules. I have chosen the Classical 
paradigm as opposed to the more fashionable connectionist paradigm as I am still convinced 
that much of the criticism of Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) still holds, in spite of attempts by 
connectionists to discount them. As the Classical/connectionist paradigms clash most when it 
comes to learning theory, I shall present the criticisms of Fodor and Pylyshyn in this section. 
The issue is not the explicitness of rules - Classical architectures are not committed to 
the idea that explicit rules mediate behaviour. Equally, the issue is not about the reality 
of representational states; both connectionists and Classicists are representational realists. 
Finally, the issue is not the nonrepresentational architecture; a connectionist network may 
well be able to implement a Classical architecture at the cognitive level. 
The differences between the two paradigms occur at a number of levels. There is a difference 
as to where semantic content is assigned. In connectionism it is assigned to nodes, whereas 
in Classicist accounts semantic content is assigned to expressions. Causal connectedness is 
modeled in connectionist systems only as a primitive relation between these nodes, whereas 
Classicists model not only causal relations but also connections based on structure. If the 
causal relations that need to be explained can only be explained on a number of complexly 
related levels, connectionist systems with the flatter architecture of nodes may be stretched. 
In this same vein, Classicist versions of mental representation have a combinatorial syntax 
and semantics which allows for the structure sensitivity of processes to be modeled, processes 
can be modeled according to their form. Thematic-conceptual structure should be based on 
differences, not only in content, but also in form for its operation. Only in this way can the 
psycholinguistic predictions of Chapter 5 be realized. 
Constituent structure can only be said to exist in a system when the individual parts of 
a semantically evaluable system are themselves evaluable. But in a connectionist neurally 
distributed representation the relationship between nodes and their constituent units is a 
between-level relation. They are thus not expressed in the same terms. And micro-features 
are not the same as constituency in any case. There is no way that the constituency relation 
of John in the sentence John loves Mary is of the same type of part-whole relationship or 
feature-system as, say, has a handle could be said to be a feature of cup. 
However, Chalmers (1994) claims he can refute this type of claim in one sentence. He 
writes: 
If Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is correct as it is presented then it implies 
that no connectionist network can support a compositional semantics; not even a 
connectionist implementation of a Turing Machine or of a Language of Thought. 
But this is a problem for Fodor and Pylyshyn, as it is well-known that connectionist 
networks can be used to implement Turing Machines (or at least Turing Machines 
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with arbitrarily large but finite tape), and it is well-known that Turing Machines 
can be used to support a compositional semantics. 
But this very sort of argument was attacked in the original Fodor and Pylyshyn paper: 
we are not claiming that you can't reconcile a Connectionist architecture with a 
combinatorial syntax and semantics for mental representations. On the contrary, 
of course you can: All that's required is that you use your network to implement 
a Turing machine, and specify a combinatorial structure for its computational 
language. What it appears that you can't do, however, is have both a combinatorial 
representational system and a Connectionist architecture at the cognitive level. 
Connectionism seems in many senses to be associationism that has been improved by 
adding hidden units that detect the pattern in the visible units and can then provide a more 
global statistics. But the fact that the statistics are embedded to some extent does not hide 
the fact that the representation only reflects the statistical properties of the input and does 
not explain the statistical properties in any way. 
As the connectionist system does not allow for semantic and syntactic constituency, the 
semantic/syntactic structure of the representation of the input does not determine the selec-
tion of the output as syntactic/semantic structure is not relevant to the representations of 
connectionist models. Productivity must be based on expressions belonging to a generating 
set and must be based on a symbol system, Connectionist models are not symbol systems 
and thus cannot model productivity. For this reason connectionists reject the very idea that 
productivity exists and for this very reason linguists, who have seen so many examples of 
productivity, often reject connectionism. 
Language is systematic, if you can understand or produce one sentence, you can under-
stand and produce others. Therefore you can learn part of a language without learning the 
rest, whereas the sentences in a connectionist system are generally atomic. Systematicity, 
in turn, relies on compositionality. The parts of an expression have the same contribution 
in different contexts. A bridge to psycholinguistics can be seen here. Language expresses 
thoughts. The compositionality of language reflects the compositionality of the thoughts. The 
compositionality of thoughts is represented in this thesis by thematic-conceptual structure 
and this is joined to the surface expression of language by linking rules. As we have seen 
above, compositionality is not a feature of connectionist networks, and the meaning of a word 
in a connectionist system of nodes is never truly compositional as it is always reliant on its 
co-occurrence with other words. 
Counter-arguments against these views of connectionism tend to concentrate on the com-
putational properties of the competing systems and use as their evidence small networks with 
a very limited range of content relations, whereas the impetus of the arguments given in Fodor 
and Pylyshyn is the complexity of the explanations that the contentful linguistic data requires. 
I accept the argument from Chater and Oaksford (1990) that compositional and logical 
representation is not everything and that there are indeed aspects of cognition, such as vision, 
that may well not require a compositional semantics, but on the other hand language is a 
compositional system par excellence and I see no way that a connectionist system can model 
the complexity of the data. 
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In addition to the problems discussed above, there are other problems with statistical 
correlations in learning theories: They must be constrained so that it does not occur that 
every element is related to every other element in some statistical way. Rules are often subtle 
and subject to exceptions and how did the process begin in the first place - i.e. how did the 
statistical properties of the data arise initially. I do not believe that connectionism has, as 
yet, provided answers to these questions. 
3.1.2 Constructivism 
Constructivism (Quartz and Sejnowski (1997)) is an attempt to join cognitive development to 
neural development. Neural development in this view occurs, in part, according to the input 
the brain receives. The brain structures that this input creates shape the hypothesis space for 
further input and further neural development. 
Constructivism assumes that all that is innate is the constructivist learning mechanism 
itself. That is, all that evolution has provided us with is a mechanism of abstracting from 
the environment the information needed to construct all of the mental representations and 
mechanisms we need to function as humans. There does not seem to be any way to constrain 
what is picked up from the environment in terms of content, except perhaps the limitations 
imposed by the structure and function of our senses. There is also no true explanation of the 
order of acquisition, it has to be assumed that what we can cognize first from the environment 
is in some way simpler than what we can cognize later. 
Another issue in the learning of language and cognitive abilities in general, is the time 
course of learning with respect to the formation of the brain. The theory describes the learning 
architecture as nonstationary as it is assumed that the learning properties of the system are 
time dependent. As input determines structures it is hypothesized that factors such as the 
order of presentation will affect the order of acquisition. 
The nonstationary approach contrasts with theories that assume the Continuity Hypothesis 
(Pinker (1984)) which argues that adults and children should be seen as qualitatively identical 
unless forced to abandon this principle by some explanatory failure. 
I propose a third view which is analogous to the constructivist view in that it allows for 
time-dependency in learning. However, in contrast to constructivism I allow for genetic mat-
urational programming to play a role. The development of the brain is genetically determined 
and the various stages of development will each allow for the emergence of certain cognitive 
abilities mediated by input. This position seems more realistic than the extreme constructivist 
position as the constructivists have to assume that children will receive input in fundamentally 
the same order (or that the order is not critical for some aspects of learning), whereas the mat-
urational account stresses the cognitive abilities of the brain in the range of what proportion 
of the input it can process at each maturational stage. 
The maturational/constructivist accounts are neutral with respect to what forms a large 
part of the Quartz and Sejnowski argument: the growth of structural complexity in the brain. 
The constructivist approach predicts that the input determines the neural structure, whereas 
a maturational account emphasizes that the stages of neural development predict the nature 
and range of the cognitive capacities that a child will show at a particular maturational level. 
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Thus the constructivists claim to be following a Piagetian framework, but seem instead to be 
putting the whole weight of their argument on the nature of the input. 
So for example, Quartz and Sejnowski argue that the cortex is largely equipotential and 
free of domain-specific structure - but this does not explain that normal development results 
in localization. The argument is that input comes into the brain at certain points and seduces 
the nearby cortex into forming the appropriate representations. 
Changes to the neural substrate in developmental terms are relevant to both the construc-
tivist and the maturational account. The differences are at the level of the processes that 
regulate these changes in the neural substrate and their correspondence to changes in the 
form of the representation that is then available. In the constructivist account all changes 
to the neural substrate are determined solely by the input, whereas in the maturational ac-
count there are genetic determinants of neural substrate changes that interact with the input. 
In constructivism the changes in neural substrate drive the type of representational change, 
whereas in a maturational account changes in the representation drive the change of neural 
substrate. 
Quartz and Sejnowski have the critical target of neural selectionism (Edelman (1987)) and 
they make out that neural selectionism is the standard theory in contemporary learning theory. 
This is not the case, and with respect to language learning, neural selectionism is a minority 
view. Universal Grammar does not have to be inextricably tied to formal learning theory and 
its nonstationary character. The seeking of a phylogenetic source of language is exactly what 
is required and, as I will argue in Chapter 6, predicts the order of development. There is a 
fundamental difference between selection in the species and neural selectionism, but Quartz 
et al seem intent on conflating these. It is also not the case that a nativist account necessarily 
implies selectionism in learning. 
So Quartz and Sejnowski claim that behind language (or any complex cognitive ability) is 
no phylogenetic source, but rather increased representational flexibility. HQwever, it does not 
seem that the brain is as flexible as they would predict given the infinite number of statistical 
properties of the input that a truly flexible brain would be able to pick up. 
They claim richness of structure and not poverty of stimulus is the correct position and 
use neural networks as the basis of this argument. They do concede that the links that these 
nets can make have to be constrained by intrinsic properties. This sounds nativist to some 
extent, but they do not elaborate this point. 
To attempt to include a mechanism of localization and a constraint on learning, Quartz 
and Sejnowski make the proviso that input-determined change must be local in nature and 
must not undo previous learning. This still does not explain the order of acquisition and 
seems to contradict language learning data which often shows children reverting from correct 
structures to incorrect structures during the process of rule learning. 
To allow for critical periods, Quartz and Sejnowski propose limited temporal windows in 
which activity dependent processes can affect the neural structure. If these limited periods are 
not genetically determined I can see no way that they could otherwise be instantiated. The 
fact that representational change must be local seems to allow for localization to some extent 
particularly with respect to the input devices (eyes, ears) but does not seem to so successfully 
explain the localization of the speech centres in the brain. 
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They then turn to the learning properties of the constructivist paradigm. Their starting 
point is formal learning theory as applied to language acquisition. Gold (1967) has proposed 
that language learning involves a search through a hypothesis space to a target concept and 
to make this feasible given time and input constraints an inductive bias is required: some 
form of Universal Grammar. On the other hand I would argue that what can be described 
as Universal Grammar has actually been determined in computational terms by the earlier 
cognitive abilities that language has developed from phylogenetically. 
The impasse of bias and variance leads to nativist arguments: high variance can only be 
overcome by large training sets; and high bias needs to be carefully chosen for the task in hand. 
The second of these is what I would argue phylogenetic selectionism achieves over evolutionary 
time. 
Although the majority of the discussion of the link between language development and 
language evolution will be left to Chapter 6, due to its more speculative nature, it is important 
to stress now that the weight of the evidence points towards a classical theory based on 
maturation and not towards either a constructivist nor a connectionist account. 
3.2 Functional Categories in Language Acquisition 
There are currently two opposing camps in the discussion of the role of functional categories in 
language acquisition. The first camp (Poeppel and Wexler (1993), Deprez and Pierce (1993), 
Clahsen et al. (1993), Wexler (1994), Rizzi (1994), Deprez and Pierce (1994), Harris and 
Wexler (1996), Hoekstra and Hyams (1998)) see child language as showing 'continuity' with 
the adult grammatical system. In other words, children have the full range of functional 
categories also shown by adults. The second camp argue that children do not have the full 
set of functional categories (if any at all) and rely rather on a thematically based system 
(Radford (1990), Lebeaux (1988), Guilfoyle and Noonan (1992)). For the aims of this thesis 
the second camp's arguments are the best fit. However, I see merits in both arguments and 
would argue rather for a middle way, where the thematic basis of children's language provides 
bottom up data that is built into linking rules (setting of parameters) that are constrained by 
the top-down principles of Universal Grammar. 
The nature of the starting point for parameter setting is important for another reason. 
Parameter setting has to work with something and the nature of the something that forms the 
starting point will influence and constrain the parameters that can be set and will form the 
basis of the form of the parameterized system. If such starting points can be established, we 
might expect that when the parameterized system breaks down, in agrammatism, for instance, 
the speaker will revert to the forms of the unparameterized system. 
3.2.1 An initial view: a thematic based acquisition device 
An important work on the starting point for parameterization is found in Radford (1990). 
Radford argues that early child English lacks what have come to be known as functional 
categories. These functional categories are the Determiner system, the C system, the I system, 
and the Case system. He argues that what is left is basically a thematically based system of 
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language. This suggestion is particularly interesting for the aims of this thesis as it predicts 
that parameterization will consist of adding other expressive linguistic devices to the thematic 
system in a language-specific way. This prediction fits in very well with the conceptual-
thematic structure and linking hypothesis developed throughout this thesis. 
If the determiner system is indeed absent from child speech we would expect that where 
adults use determiner phrases children will use simple noun phrases. This expectation would 
appear to turn out to be the case as children use indeterminate nominals in spontaneous 
speech, in answer to what-questions and in imitative speech. It is often argued (e.g. Fukui 
(1986)) that genitive 's is a determiner and thus in Radford's theory we would expect it to be 
missing from children's speech in any productive way and Radford gives some empirical data 
that this is indeed the case. 
The determiner system also encodes semantic relations such as the referential properties 
of nominals and pronominals. If children lack determiners they should also have trouble with 
the referential properties normally encoded by them. Young children seem not to realize that 
nominals in adult speech are used only in third person contexts, and will use them to refer to 
the speaker or the addressee. 
Radford notes the similarity in form of the utterances of young children and Small Clauses 
uttered by adults. Adult small clauses have the schematic form [DP, X']. Given that children 
seem to lack a determiner system we would expect children to utter clauses of the form [NP, 
X']. If it is indeed the case that young children are uttering what in effect are small clauses, it 
suggests that they lack a Complementizer system, or C-system. 
Adult small clauses also lack a C-system. They can never be introduced by overt com-
plementizers and do not allow auxiliaries to be preposed to a putative C-position. They also 
lack a position where wh-phrases can be preposed to; thus they lack C-spec. It is also the 
case that early child complement clauses show the same [NP, X'] patterns they produce in 
their independent clauses, thus as a complement of want small clauses of the form [NP, P'] 
are common (want [hat on]). Also common is the structure [NP, V] (want [Teddy drink]). 
Children never introduce these complements with overt complementizers. 
In full adult speech, the C-constituent provides the landing site for Auxiliary inversion. 
Given that the C-constituent does not exist in Early Child English, we would expect children 
not to show any examples of subject-auxiliary inversion in direct questions, or any evidence 
of wh-movement to the equally absent C-spec position. This expectation is confirmed by 
the evidence. The few examples of wh-questions that young children do produce seem to be 
formulaic and are not productive. 
Radford argues that the empirical language acquisition data for English shows no evidence 
of the acquisition of the following aspects. Given that these aspects appear to be missing 
Radford concludes that Early Child English lacks an I-system. 
. infinitival to 
S modals 
. finite verb inflections (+s/+d) 
• do-support 	 • 	- 
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I .J 	- 
• copula be 
• progressive be 
• perfective have 
It is generally assumed that Case is an inherent property of the D-system, as it can clearly 
be argued to be, as it is in the D-system that case is marked in most languages that are rich 
in Case. Thus if Radford is correct that children lack a D-system, we would expect them in 
turn to lack a Case system. If children were to lack a Case-system we would expect children 
to use caseless NPs in situations where adults use case-marked DPs. 
Pronominals are arguably determiners and also encode case directly. It is thus predicted 
that if young children lack determiners and a case-system, pronominals will likewise be absent 
from their production data. 
Radford argues that these early lexical structures produced by young children might be 
said to be thematic structures in the sense that they directly encode the thematic relations 
between a head lexical category and its arguments, in so far as all theta-marked arguments of 
a given head noun are superficially contained within its maximal projection and, I argue, they 
are later linked to other expressive linguistic devices. 
This thematically based structure is certainly promising for the approach taken in this 
thesis. However, the nature of the thematic stage of child language acquisition has not been 
characterized in any detailed way by Radford. 
Another paper at this end of the spectrum comes from Guilfoyle and Noonan (1992). They 
suggest a Structure Building Hypothesis which makes reference to a distinction between lexical 
and functional categories. Two grammars are postulated; a lexical grammar (LG) and a 
functional grammar (FG). Guilfoyle and Noonan suggest that only LG is present at the onset 
of language acquisition and that FG emerges according to a maturational schedule. This 
avoids the trigger problem of the Continuity Hypothesis where it is difficult to see how the 
child can easily identify the criteria that are crucial in order to reset a parameter from the 
unmarked form, and the question as to why a child suddenly pays attention to a trigger, when 
the trigger was available all along. The structure building hypothesis is also more constrained 
than a purely maturational approach, where the stages in language acquisition are related 
purely to physical maturation. This allows no input for linguistic data and every change can 
be explained post-hoc as maturation, resulting in a loss of explanatory power. 
LG is regarded as having a thematic basis and move-a at this stage would always have to be 
via adjunction as no landing sites would be available. The emergence of functional categories 
could perhaps be as a result of non-linguistic changes in the child's perception. The grammar 
will not violate UG at any stage but rules relying on functional categories will hold vacuously. 
Thus three word speech is characteristically telegraphic, with the first elements being verbs 
and nouns. Guilfoyle and Noonan interpret child language acquisition in the following ways: 
there are few determiners in child speech and it unclear that those that do occur can be 
analyzed as being in D'. The case filter is not in force in child grammars and this is relevant in 
the acquisition of IP. They argue that INFL is not present and hence there is no agreement or 
tense on the verb, and modals and auxiliaries are absent. With no IF, there is no Spec of IP 
and thus no landing site for movement and the subject remains in the base-generated position 
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internal to the VP. But as no INFL or case is present the NP can appear as a SPEC of VP 
without violating UG. 
Guilfoyle and Noonan believe that the functional categories appear at different times, with 
INFL before COMP and DP before IP. However, they also contend that there is crosslinguistic 
variation in the order of emergence of functional categories depending on the saliency of 
particular functional categories in the input. This would seem to cast doubt on a purely 
maturational account. 
3.2.2 The Opposing View: The continuity of functional categories 
Deprez and Pierce (1993, 1994) note that although there are systematic errors in the placement 
of the subject with respect to negation (expected if subjects are generated VP-internally), 
errors with respect to the placement of negation relative to the verb are systematically absent. 
Deprez and Pierce argue that the early acquisition of verb movement together with the early 
placement of subjects and negation strongly imply that functional projections are represented 
in early child grammars. 
They make the following predictions: 
If children fail to raise the subject consistently and the subject is VP-internal, then the 
order NEG-SUBJ-V is expected. 
Given main verb raising in French, we expect to find Vfin-NEG-SUBJ orders. 
The absence of verb raising in English means that it is not expected that we will find 
postverbal subjects and negatives. 
If verb movement to COMP is early then we expect to find postverbal subjects and 
negatives in 2yr-old German. 
Deprez and Pierce provide crosslinguistic acquisitional evidence to support their position. 
There is evidence from English for the early use of NEG-SUBJ-V orders. They argue that the 
NEG cannot be in COMP as at later stages NOT appears in non-initial position, and there 
are no utterances where NEC appears to the left of an overt auxiliary. Thus, they argue, the 
word order pattern reflects the option to leave the subject VP-internal, implying a continuity' 
of structure between adult and child grammars. 
For French, in early child language, the NEG is positioned to the right of the finite verb, 
and the position of pas depends on whether or not the verb is finite. Thus, the contrast in 
word order between French and English is a result of verb movement and not as a result of a 
difference in D-structure. 
For German, it could be the case that V-to-C movement develops simultaneously to V-
to-I movement. However, the data suggests that this is a later development. If the child 
raises verbs to COMP, then the negative element should be postverbal. However, in early 
child German, preverbal negatives occur, meaning that raising to COMP is not obligatory in 
early child German. Deprez and Pierce also give evidence from Swedish, French subject-clitic 
inversion, and embedded questions in English to show that movement to COMP is delayed in 
these languages as well. 
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Some have argued that this delay in movement to COMP suggests that the functional 
category COMP does not exists for early child grammar. Deprez and Pierce disagree with this 
view as they argue COMP has to exist for the construction to be optional. They suggest the 
following hypothesis for the delay in using COMP in the adult manner: Parameters involving 
a unique way of satisfying some UG principle appear to be set at the onset of grammatical 
development. Parameters involving distinct ways of setting UG principles or language-specific 
constraints are set after a delay; up to the point at which they are set, both options are 
manifested. 
Poeppel and Wexier (1993) also contend that early child German shows evidence of the 
major functional categories (including I and C). This evidence is based on a corpus analysis of 
a 25-month-old child'. From this acquisition data Poeppel and Wexler hoped to establish and 
finite verbs occurred in V2 and non-finite verbs occurred in final position. If -en occurred in a 
verb stem it was counted as a non-finite verb. 231 verbs were finite, of these 216 were in verb 
second position and only 15 were in verb final position. Of the 51 non-finite verbs, 44 were in 
verb final position, and only 7 were in V2 position. German is a verb final language and head 
movement from V-to-I-to-C to give V2 in matrix clauses relies on functional projections. Thus 
as V2 with finite verbs is so strongly established at this stage, Poeppel and Wexler argue that 
functional categories must be present. To further back this up, they point out that 50% of the 
sentences had non-subjects in initial position, implying that the V2 phenomenon is indeed in 
place. 
Perhaps one of the strongest positions in favour of the Continuity Hypothesis can be seen in 
Hoekstra and Hyams (1998). Their paper contends not only that children have full command 
of the finite/non-finite distinction, but that UG constrains the types of DPs that can occur 
with either of these verb types. Their original claim was that bare nominals are non-finite 
DPs as they are underspecified with regard to number. Distributionally a finite verb will take 
a finite DP subject and a non-finite verb will take a non-finite DP subject. They provide 
evidence from German and English to support this claim. 
However, evidence from early child Dutch has caused them to re-evaluate their claim as 
Det-less DPs were found not only with non-finite verbs as expected, but also with finite 
verbs, contrary to the hypothesis. They capture this by arguing that the marked form of the 
verb must be licensed by its specifier and the unmarked form is licit autonomously. As the 
infinitive is an unmarked form in English, the asymmetry in the distribution of Dutch and 
English pronouns can also be captured; in Dutch pronouns are almost always found with finite 
verbs, and in English with both finite and non-finite verbs (licensed autonomously). 
3.2.3 Middle Ground: Grammars constrained by UG, but with bottom-
up thematic information as the input to linking rules 
Rizzi (1994) takes the middle ground. He argues that there seems to be a parsimony, in the 
functional categories available to children at some stages of their grammatical development. 
He bases this idea on his findings that early null subjects (see section on Hyams (1986) below) 
do not have the same properties of null subjects in adult grammars. Thus early null subjects 
'Wexier (1994) seems to tone down this claim to some degree, to a claim that UG is respected, but that 
functional categories can develop maturationally 
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occur extremely rarely after a preposed wh-element, although this is a valid option for the 
adult grammar (in Italian, for example). The early null subject is also limited to main clauses. 
This is not the case for adult grammars where null subjects are allowed. Rizzi argues that early 
null subjects (and null subjects in diary accounts) are null constants that need to be bound 
by a null operator. This is not allowed in adult English, as Rizzi argues that it is only allowed 
in languages that allow ROOT=CP, which English parametrically does not. Rizzi argues that 
it is allowed in early child English as the functional categories are not fully developed at this 
stage and the ROOT=CP restriction cannot hold. Thus the child grammar is consistent with 
UG, but the full set of functional categories have not yet matured. 
Part of Wexler (1994) can also be understood in the same vein. Wexier examines the 
phenomenon of optional inflections in early child language. Thus, there is a stage in child 
language where inflections are either omitted or incorrect. Wexler identifies two possibilities 
for how this can be explained. There is the Growing Strength (GS) view where the child has to 
learn to add inflections, and there is the Strong UG (SUG) view where the child is assumed to 
know that inflection exists, but is unsure of the forms. The problem with the GS view is that 
it is unclear why it takes the child so long to learn the forms. The problem with the SUG view 
is that if the child knows the rules of inflection, why is the inflection sometimes optional for 
the child? Wexler also assumes UG-constrained maturation. That is, although the capacities 
might mature, the representations are always consistent with UG. 
In this regard, Wexler points out that to ask whether a child knows inflection is tantamount 
to asking whether they know about head movement (or more specifically V-to-V movement). 
Wexler gives evidence (much of which has been discussed above) from French, German, Dutch, 
Norwegian, Swedish and Danish to show that an optional infinitive stage exists. In this optional 
infinitive stage according to Wexler the child: 
• knows about the possibility of head movement 
• knows that head movement is forced in the finite case 
• knows the Principle of Economy (infinitives do not move) 
• the existence of Neg outside VP and above I 
• does not know that non-finite verbs cannot appear as main verbs 
More controversially given the discussion above he also argues that the child: 
• knows the existence of I and C 
However, the inflection is still optional and given Wexler's position, this needs to be licensed 
by UG. Normally, the Economy of Derivation would rule out optionality. Thus for optionality 
to be present, both derivations must be equally complex. Wexler thus sees two equally complex 
derivations; raising of V-to-I, resulting in the finite form, and the lowering of I-to-V resulting 
in the non-finite form. 
Clahsen et al. (1993) cover similar ground to Poeppel and Wexler (1993) (discussed above), 
but come to slightly different conclusions with regard to the Continuity Hypothesis. They see 
the acquisition of COMP in a maturational way. In other terms, the functional categories are 
55 
posited by the child on the basis of input data. They are not existent from the beginning of 
grammatical development, but rather mature based on the linguistic input the child receives. 
Clahsen et al. (1993) argue that the child at the first stage has IP, but no CP. V2 requires 
two functional categories, there are three possibilities as to how child grammar reflects this: 
. A full adult tree with two functional categories 
. A tree with only one functional category 
. A PS tree with only lexical projections 
Clahsen et al. (1993) ordered their data by MLU. At the two word stage this should not 
exceed 1.75. Thus they identified two stages. Stage 1, where MLU was less than or equal to 
1.75, and Stage 2, where MLU was less than or equal to 2.75. 
At stage 1 there was evidence of IP, but no evidence of CP. Verbs occurred before subjects 
which would not be expected if only PS rules were available to the child. To ascertain CP they 
searched for lexical complementizers, wh-pronouns and postverbal negation patterns with an 
overt lexical subject. At Stage 1 these were not evident, but were present at Stage 2. 
Atkinson (1996) also takes this middle-ground approach. He complains of the orthodoxy 
that is being established in which it is proposed that a child embarks on grammatical devel-
opment with a complete syntactic system in place. This is known as the Full Competence 
Hypothesis. Atkinson believes that this may be wrong. He proposes rather to follow the 
Structure building approach of Radford (1990), but this only as far as stating that there is 
a stage at which children have no functional projections. This therefore means that a differ-
ent approach to language acquisition is necessary. Maturation seems to be the most likely 
mechanism. 
Methodologically some claim that embracing maturation should be a last resort (Cram 
(1991), Hyams (1994)). But this approach is qualified as being with all other things being 
equal. Given that a maturational account is to be followed, it needs to be explained by what 
mechanisms functional categories can be acquired. For learning one would have to maintain 
that the input data provides an adequate inductive basis for the learning of a functional 
category. This could be via hypothesis making and testing. However, from this the triggering 
problem Hyams (1994) arises; if the child can represent C, why is its consolidation in the 
grammar protracted. 
Atkinson sees this initially as not the concern of psychologists or linguists, but rather 
that explanations of this process may be sought in biology. However, if the development is 
maturational and if X occurs before Y (representational capacities), then we would predict 
this occurs cross-linguistically. Atkinson points out that most biologists would probably see 
maturation as the norm in the development of complex biological systems. 
Lebeaux (1988) sees the acquisition of language as being made up of stages, and at the 
first stage, the system as he sees it is based purely in theta-assignment. The later stages 
are geological in their acquisition and the various geological levels correspond to the levels of 
representation in the synchronic analysis of adult grammar. The levels also correspond in a 
one-to-one manner to the stages of acquisition. 
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Lebeaux sees linking rules as being maximally general in associating thematic roles with 
grammatical functions or abstract case. This is similar to Pinker's idea of semantic bootstrap-
ping. Lebeaux says this early reliance on thematic information is a case of analytic priority. 
(3.1) 	Analytic Priority 
A set of primitives a1 , a2 ... a,2 is analytically dependent on another set b1 , b 2 . . . b, if 
bi must be applied to the input in order for aj to apply. 
Lebeaux thus sees the set of theta-theoretic primitives as being analytically prior to the 
set of case-theoretic primitives. The question then is how the child moves from the one-word 
thematic looking grammar to full phrasal syntax. Lebeaux argues for a continual application 
of Project-a to achieve this. Looking at the representation from the head outwards, Lebeaux 
assumes that the phrase structure enveloping it is projected from lexical argument structure, 
relying on the theta-subtree. The lexical argument structure proposed is similar in nature to 
those proposed by Hale and Keyser or Levin and Rappaport in the discussion in Chapter 2. 
This leads to four questions for acquisitional accounts. 
• As the phrase structure is already articulated, does not adding a lexical representation 
introduce redundancy? 
• Assuming Project-a occurs, is all the information projected or just part of the informa-
tion? 
• Is there evidence for pre-Project-a representations in acquisition or elsewhere? 
• How does a difference in language typology get represented in Project-a? 
As mentioned above, Lebeaux sees the pre-Project-a representations in acquisition as fully 
syntactic. This is true at the one-word stage, but becomes intuitively more plausible at 
the 2-3 word stage. Thus, such two word combinations as want baby, want car, want high, 
boot off, that Dennis, there ball and there dog are seen by Lebeaux as small clauses missing 
the copula. At this telegraphic stage of acquisition, Lebeaux sees the child as talking in 
thematic representations. It then falls to the child to insert closed class elements into these 
representations. 
Interestingly, for the discussion of psycholinguistics in the next two chapters, Lebeaux 
proposes an interesting relationship between the grammar and the parser. When the child's 
parser fails, it will fall back into another permissible grammar. This lower grammar will also 
be a lower grammar in the geological acquisition of language. In other words, the parser will 
fall back to a grammar from an earlier stage of acquisition. Lebeaux terms this the Property of 
Smooth Degradation. Lebeaux states as evidence for this the fact that a telegraphic grammar 
can also be used by adults in diary reports, for example. 
Thus the middle way between the Full Competence Hypothesis and the No-competence 
hypothesis sees a thematic basis for language acquisition with functional categories developing 
maturationally. 
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3.3 Parameter Setting 
One of the fundamental tenets of contemporary PPT is that UG can be configured in different 
ways by different languages. The aim is to find the smallest possible number of parameters 
that explain the variation in the world's languages. That is, each parameter that is set is 
assumed to explain more than one variation in structure. 
A less developed part of the theory of linguistic parameters is the learning of these pa-
rameters. Given the poverty of the stimulus, what can the child use to set, or trigger each 
parameter. 
I shall describe the sort of parameters that have been proposed in the literature and also 
theories of the acquisition of parameters. I argue that syntactic hegemony has once more 
oversimplified the true state of affairs and has resulted in unrealistic assumptions as to the 
explanatory potential of syntactic parameters. 
The basis of this failure is the belief that syntax is in some way optimally structured and 
that parameter setting is a purely syntactic phenomenon. I agree that there are undoubt-
edly syntactic parameters but they are only a small part of linguistic variation. Rather, each 
language is merely a design solution (and not necessarily an optimal one) to the problem of 
encoding thematic-conceptual relations into speech. Thus it is not syntax that is parameter -
ized, but rather the linking rules between thematic-conceptual structure and the full range of 
expressive linguistic devices, including syntax. 
Thus parameter setting is in many ways analogous to grammaticalization and has its origins 
there. As languages will not be optimally designed there is always the possibility of reanalysis 
and change, and language acquisition will be centrally implicated in this change. Indeed, it 
often seems to be the case that with respect to syntactic parameters, children are generating 
parameter values based on often inconsistent triggers rather than picking up parameters from 
the input (Lightfoot (1991)). 
It has also to be explained why parameters are learned in any particular order. It could 
be the case that the order of acquisition is determined by complexity, as constructivists would 
presumably argue. On the other hand, it may be the case that the order of acquisition is 
maturationally determined. 
Suggestions for the parameters governing word-order (Travis (1984, 1989); Koopman (1984)) 
are head-ordering, directionality of case assignment and the directionality of theta-role assign-
ment. Hawkins (1995) claims that this is purely descriptive and gives no account as to why the 
phenomena have the particular properties they do. This seems to be a largely valid conclusion. 
One example set of parameters would be: 
Head Case-Directionality Theta-Directionality Frequency 
Japanese final Left Left Frequent 
English initial Right Right Frequent 
Chinese final Left Right Rare 
Kpelle initial Right Left Rare 
And in an even more complex way German changes theta-directionality and case-directionality 
according to liqguistic category. 
The explanation does seem to be purely descriptive as it fails to predicts much of the 
variation shown in Jackendoff (1977) on modifier orders. The relative frequency of the patterns 
in languages also has to be explained. 
One of the first attempts to apply the concepts of PPT to language acquisition was Hyams 
(1986). The parameter in question has come to be known as the null-subject parameter. This 
parameter has been posited as languages appear to group into two camps with the following 
contrastive properties: 
Null Subject Non-Null Subject 
Overt Subject Expressed 	No 	 Yes 
Subject Can be Inverted Yes No 
Subject Can Be Extracted from 	Yes 	 No 
tensed Subordinate Clause 
The extended projection principle states that all clauses must contain a subject. Thus even 
in null-subject languages, such as Italian, Spanish and Hebrew, a subject must be present in 
some form or other. As the subject is not overt, it must be an empty category. It cannot be 
PRO as PRO must appear in an ungoverned position, and the null-subject position is governed 
by finite I. 
Hyams adopts a proposal made by Rizzi (1982) that the empty category is pro. The central 
idea is that I can be specified as [+pronominal]. When this is the case, this feature absorbs 
the nominative case normally associated with the subject position. It will also qualify as a 
proper governor for the Empty Category Principle as it has lexical properties. 
The specific parameter Hyams first proposes is: 
(3.2) 	The Null Subject Parameter 
AG=PRO 
AG j4PRO 
This requires some explanation. Here AG is analogous to Rizzi's [+pronominal] I. The 
precise rule Hyams uses is 
(3.3) 	I -* (AG), AUX 
Hyams stipulates that if AUX contains lexical material it is the head of I, whereas if AUX 
is empty, AG heads I. AG encodes person, number and gender features. 
The first of the values of the parameter states that languages with this value allow AG to 
be identified with PRO, licensing pro. This has the result that modal verbs cannot appear in 
AUX as long as AG=PRO as this would result in PRO being governed. 
With regard to acquisition, Hyams takes the continuous approach (Pinker 1984). That 
is, a child may have an incorrectly set parameter for the language she is learning, but the 
incorrect language will be compatible with UG. She claims that English children start off with 
the parameter set to the null subject value. 
The question then remains as to how this incorrectly set parameter is then reset to the cor -
rect value in English. Italian seems to operate under the Avoid Pronoun Principle (Chomsky 
(1981)): 
(3.4) 	Avoid Pronoun Principle 
Avoid lexical pronominal if a null pronominal is possible. 
Children faced with English input will be confronted with expletive subjects and unstressed 
subject pronouns, which must be grammatically motivated. This provides positive evidence 
to the child that the parameter must be reset. 
The problem of giving both sufficient licensing conditions and identification conditions has 
led Hyams (1987) to rethink her initial proposal. The licensing conditions have been fulfilled 
in both early English and Italian by the AG=PRO parameter. But whereas the Italian pro 
can be identified by the system of verbal agreement in that language, children at the proposed 
AG=PRO stage of English mostly have not developed verbal inflections, meaning that they 
cannot identify the interpretation of pro. 
This is part of a more general problem of associating null-subjecthood with richness of 
inflection. The starkest evidence for the problematic nature of this correlation is Chinese 
which is a null-subject language with no agreement features. Conversely, German has a rich 
inflectional system but does not allow null subjects. 
Hyams proposes a new parameter value based on the fact that Chinese is inflected in none 
of the positions in its verbal paradigm, and Italian is inflected in all positions. Thus inflection 
in these languages is uniform. In contrast English is inflected in only one position. 
(3.5) 	Uniformity Parameter 
Null subjects are permitted in all and only languages with morphologically uniform 
inflectional paradigms. 
Identification is satisfied in Italian by sentence-oriented agreement features and in Chinese 
by discourse-oriented topic-identification. German is still a problem; licensing is fulfilled so it 
must be identification that forms the stumbling block preventing null-subjects being possible. 
It may be that Tense is in C and agreement in I' following the movement that results in 
SVO order in main clauses in German, and this separation would ensure non-identification. 
However, in subordinate clauses this movement has not taken place and null-subjects should 
still be possible, which they are not. 
A further problem is that without agreement features to aid identification, children learning 
English at a null-subject stage must be using topic-identification. But Chinese allows null-
objects and we would thus expect this to be the case for English, which Hyams claims it is 
not. 
Further problems can be found in the fact that neither of these proposed explanations 
captures the third correlate of null-subjecthood: the possibility of inverted subjects. The 
choice of AUX or AG as head also seems to be stipulative and ad hoc. It also needs to be 
explained why uniformity/non-uniformity should have the effects it does. 
In addition, it seems strange that English children do not reset the parameter earlier, 
given that they are continuously confronted with expletive subjects and unstressed subject 
pronouns. Thus we would seem to require an explanation based on the representation that the 
child has internalized, and that such an early acquired representation predicts and constrains 
later representations. Or alternatively a maturational account may be called for. 
Crucially, perhaps, pro is in a functional position (DetP) and its licensing relies on a further 
functional position I. Above we have seen that Radford (1990) claims that Early Child English 
lacks both these positions. If this claim is true, Hyams theory could not possibly be correct, 
at least not for the early stages of language acquisition. 
Another model of parameter setting is known as Subset Theory. This was developed by 
considering binding phenomena. The theory of binding relies on the concept of Governing Cat-
egory. There seems to be crosslinguistic variation as to the definition of Governing Category. 
Yang (1983) has surveyed these differences and has come up with the following values: 
(3.6) 	The GC Parameter has five values: 
a is a governing category for /3 if a is the minimal category which contains 0, a 
governor for 3 and: 
a subject English 
an I Italian se 
a TENSE Icelandic hann 
an indicative tense Icelandic sig 
a root tense Korean caki. 
The technical details of this are not important to our aims here. What is important is the 
relationship of the various possible values for the Governing Category parameter to each other. 
Manzini and Wexler (1987); Wexler and Manzini (1987) (henceforth W&M) have postulated 
the Subset Theory as a way for learners to be able to set the correct parameter for these 
languages. 
There are two strands in this framework. One strand is the Subset Principle itself and the 
second strand is the Lexical Parameterization Hypothesis which states that parameter values 
are associated with particular lexical items. I shall describe each of these in turn. 
If the assumption that no negative data is available to learners is correct, an English child 
may assume value (e) for anaphor binding, and would receive no negative data that this is 
too free. W&M thus conclude that if the languages are subsets of each other in the following 
pattern 
(3.7) 	L(a) c L(b) C L(c) C L(d) C L(e) 
and the child starts off by assuming the smallest of the grammars, then the other larger 
grammars will be learnable as the child will encounter positive evidence that the larger gram-
mar is the one used by the language they are learning. 
Turning to pronominals the subset relations are exactly the opposite: 
(3.8) 	L(e) C L(d) C L(c) C L(b) C L(a) 
Thus there cannot be an unmarked value for the Governing Category Parameter in general 
and a parameter can, in principle, be set separately for anaphors and pronominals. 
This separation of anaphora and binding into different subset relations is unusual as they 
are normally in complementary distribution. However, the relationship between them emerges 
only accidentally in W&M's system. 
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Based on the fact that two words in Icelandic (hann and sig) are associated with different 
values of the GCP, W&M (1987) have proposed the Lexical Parameterization Hypothesis which 
states that parameter values are associated with particular lexical items. 
The problem with this hypothesis is that it allows no leeway for the child to generalize, 
it is more likely to be the case that there are generalizable parameters which are non-subset 
theoretic and lexically parameterized parameters (not many) which are subset theoretic. 
Gibson and Wexler (1994) accept the problems of a rigid theory based purely on subset 
relations between parameters. They identify instead three ways that parameters can be set. 
. General Motor of Learning 
. Subset Theory 
• Triggers 
Under the General Motor of Learning it is assumed that parameters can be set on the 
basis of primary data by fitting parameter values to the data. Subset parameters are set in 
the manner given above. The idea of Triggers is that for non-subset parameters, there will be 
a sentence that will be grammatical only under the correct parameter setting and thus this 
sentence will be the trigger for the setting of that parameter. 
Gibson and Wexier provide us with an Algorithm for setting parameters from these triggers 
and a pair of constraints that will prevent the learner diverging away from the correct grammar. 
(3.9) 	The Triggering Learning Algorithm 
Given an initial set of values for n binary-valued parameters, the learner attempts to 
syntactically analyze an incoming sentence S. If S can be successfully analyzed, then 
the learner's hypothesis regarding the target grammar is left unchanged. If, however, 
the learner cannot analyze S, then the learner uniformly selects a parameter F, 
changes the value associated with P, and tries to reprocess S using the new parameter 
value. If the analysis is now possible, then the parameter value change is adopted. 
otherwise the original parameter is retained. 
(3.10) 	The Single Value Constraint 
Assume that the sequence h 0 , hl ,....hn  is the successive series of hypotheses proposed 
by the learner, where h0 is the initial hypothesis and hn  is the target grammar. then 
hi differs from h_ 1 by the value of at most one parameter for i>0. 
(3.11) 	The Greediness Constraint 
Upon encountering an input sentence that cannot be analyzed with the current 
parameter settings, the language learner will adopt a new set of parameter settings 
only if they allow the unanalyzable input to be syntactically analyzed. 
In mathematical terms Gibson and Wexier show that learners may arrive at a situation 
where one of a set of local maxima holds. This is where the learner can find no local triggers 
to set parameters. 
This can be seen as one of the major failings of the theory of syntactic parameters - as 
parameters are stated in terms of (mathematical) configurations with no notion of language 
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content or the purposeful use of language, there is a concentration on mathematical arguments 
regarding these configurations. 
Gibson and Wexier suggest two ways that learners might escape such maxima. 
. default states 
• parameter ordering 
If the number of parameters is large it seems unlikely that the parameters could be suc-
cessfully ordered as they will interact in complex ways. We will see in Chapter 4 an analogous 
argument for the problem of basing processing theories on PPT theory as the sub-theories 
cannot be put into an optimal ordering. 
On the other hand default states mean that the learner must come to the task with a 
great deal of innate knowledge of a very specific nature. If so much knowledge is innate, one 
may expect languages that have more parameters set to the default value to be learned more 
quickly. There is no evidence that this is the case. 
In this section we have seen that each of the theories of how parameters could actually be 
set falls down on various counts. Hyams' theory ultimately collapses as the elements it relies on 
arguably do not exist in child language at that stage. Subset theory removes useful observations 
of complementary distribution. The Lexical Parameterization Hypothesis does not allow for 
generalizations and Gibson and Wexier's triggers rely on too much innate knowledge. 
3.4 The Relationship of Ontogeny and Phylogeny 
There has been a recent shift in genetic theory (Ho (1995); Jones (1996)) that emphasizes the 
holistic nature of genetic inheritance. In this view, environment, culture and society interact 
with the genes at an epigenetic level and the results of the interaction can be passed on to 
future generations. 
In this way, the stability or change of both genes and environment, and specifically for 
humans, society, can evolve in concert. And following on from this combined evolution, there 
will be similarities in the historical emergence of language and its ontogeny. The societal forces 
that led to the emergence of language, perhaps social grooming as Dunbar (1993) suggests, are 
still relevant today and still influence the form and nature of learning and constrain the way 
language is learned. 
And at another level, we may expect parallels to be found in the history of how conceptual 
relations become grammaticalized into language structure, and the steps children pass through 
in learning the structure of a language. The relationship between grammaticalization and 
language acquisition will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
The case can also be made that phylogenetically and hence ontogenetically early develop-
ments will influence the structure of the later-learned language capacity. These starting points 
for language learning will be discussed in the next section. The hypothesis space is constrained 
by the phylogenetic history of the language component. 
Learnability and learning theory should not be seen in terms of mathematical criteria as 
in Gold (1967)'s theory, but rather in terms of biological criteria. This emphasis on biological 
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criteria is yet another link to the phylogenetic approach and should thus be contrasted with 
the other approach that claims to be based in biology: constructivism. 
Constructivism makes the claim that input is enough to determine the structure of the 
language processor and the order in which the structure of language is acquired. However, 
most studies of language acquisition have emphasized the poverty of the stimulus. 
Others claim that the hypothesis space for parameter setting is set at the beginning of 
acquisition (Pinker (1984)). This is known as the Continuity Hypothesis. However, there 
are two other possibilities. The child could construct grammars that are in some way at 
variance with UG and only later converge on a UG compatible grammar. Alternatively, 
certain grammatical principles may be maturationally determined and only come into effect 
at later stages of acquisition. 
There is also the question as to which extent the ontogeny of a cognitive system corresponds 
to its phylogeny. Thus, in a strong theory, evolutionarily simpler and prior structures would 
correlate with what is learned earliest in acquisition. For this claim to be tested we have to 
determine what form the course of evolution of language took and calculate what the formal 
linguistic correlates of the stages of evolution are in representational terms. I will discuss this 
more fully in Chapter 6. 
3.5 The Starting Point for Language Acquisition 
I believe that early emerging cognitive conceptual abilities will be of the highest salience and 
will influence the types of conceptual metaphor that thematic-conceptual structure relies on. 
In this section I shall assess what some of these early emerging conceptualizations are. 
Given the arguments of the previous section we will expect these early emerging cognitive 
abilities to have a long phylogenetic history and to have a particular saliency both for language 
acquisition and for language processing. This will be explored in the conclusion to this thesis. 
There is evidence of early salience of shape, colour, height and width, and in Prototype 
theory (Keil (1981)) it seems that the ontological trees of children have the same overall form 
as those of adults but merely have fewer branches and therefore fewer distinctions. Perceptual 
knowledge, object knowledge, ontological knowledge, primitive understanding of mechanics 
and number and a rudimentary grasp of causal processes arise early and are all well in place 
when children make their first two word utterances. 
Spelke (1991) suggests that the processes by which humans perceive objects are inseparable 
from the processes by which humans reason about objects, just as Piaget believed. Physical 
reasoning and object perception do not, however, undergo revolutionary changes over human 
development. They develop through a process of enrichment around core principles that are 
constant. 
Although Piaget's writings contain no inventory of the constraints that humans come to 
appreciate, five constraints figure prominently in his experiments: continuity, solidity, no action 
at a distance, gravity and inertia. 
Studies of infants require tasks within infants' behavioural repertoires. The challenge is 
to devise tasks that meet this requirement without sacrificing what is essential to Piaget's 
experiments: The tasks must not be solvable by engaging in habitual actions or by responding 
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to superficial properties of events. 
An example can be found in Leslie (1984): In the causal event Leslie studied, one object 
(A) caused a second object (B) to begin moving, and B caused A to stop moving, whereas 
in the reversal of that event, A caused B to stop moving, and B caused A to begin moving. 
Leslie's experiments provided evidence that infants apprehended causal relations, in accord 
with the principle of no action at a distance. 
This innateness of the understanding of causal events makes possible the clear preference 
and salience of the endpoint of events in language processing. That is, there is a clear preference 
to concentrate on the results of an action, or the object acted upon. 
The experiments of Baillargeon (1987) provide evidence that infants represent the continued 
existence of an object that is hidden from view. 
In the critical events of the studies, infants are shown an object that moves out of view 
behind a screen. Then the screen is raised, revealing the object at rest in either of two 
positions. One resting position is consistent with all physical constraints on object motion; 
the other resting position is inconsistent with one or more constraints. 
Continuity and Solidity 
The first experiment carried out by Spelke (1991) provides evidence that 4-month-old infants 
infer that a hidden object will move on a connected, unobstructed path. 
The second set of findings shows that infants infer that no part of a ball will pass through 
the surface in its path. These findings corroborate Baillargeon's findings that infants represent 
the size of a hidden object and honour a rigidity constraint, inferring that a hidden object will 
maintain a constant shape and size. 
The studies reveal pre-existing conceptions of object motion and do not 'teach' such con-
ceptions over the course of familiarization. Concerning Piaget's theory, these findings, along 
with the findings of Leslie and Baillargeon, provide evidence that the capacity to represent 
and reason about the world develops long before the attainment of major sensorimotor coor-
dinations. 
Gravity and Inertia 
Spelke also investigated whether infants appreciate that objects move downwards in the ab-
sence of support and that objects continue in motion in the absence of articles in their path. 
Infants looked longer at the outcome of the consistent event test. The experiment therefore 
provided no evidence that 4-month-old infants were sensitive either to the effect of gravity or 
to the effect of inertia on the motion of a falling object. 
The experiment was repeated with a sample of 6-month-old children with the more familiar 
pattern of findings. Between the ages of 4 and 6 months, infants evidently began to infer that 
the hidden, falling object would continue falling to a surface. 
These experiments do not reveal what aspects of object motion 6-month-old infants have 
begun to appreciate. Between 4 and 6 months, infants may develop a general conception that 
objects require support or a general conception that objects do not stop moving abruptly in 
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the absence of obstacles. As a third possibility, infants may develop more specific expectations 
about the behaviour of falling bodies. 
The findings of a further experiment provided no evidence that 6-month-old infants have 
developed a general appreciation that objects require support. Although such infants evidently 
infer that a falling object will continue falling until it reaches a supporting surface, they do 
not appear to infer that a stationary object will begin to fall when it loses its support. 
Inspection patterns suggested that 6-month-old infants do not appreciate that object mo-
tion is subject to inertia. 
4-month-old infants looked reliably longer at the superficially novel consistent event, con-
trary to the inertia constraint. The experiment was repeated with 6 and 8 month-old children. 
Like the 4-month-old children, the older infants looked reliably longer at the consistent event. 
The experiment showed no evidence that infants infer that a linearly moving object will con-
tinue in linear motion. 
A final experiment investigated infants' expectations of linear motion in a situation in 
which the consistent and inconsistent event outcomes were equally novel. In this situation 
sensitivity to inertia began to manifest itself between 6 and 8 months of age. 
It now seems that knowledge of continuity and solidity is more deeply rooted in human 
development than is knowledge of gravity and inertia. Also present is a knowledge of causal 
structure. Knowledge of continuity and solidity may derive from universal, early developing 
capacities to represent and reason about the physical world. In contrast, knowledge of gravity 
and inertia may derive from the child's growing acquaintance with particular kinds of events 
involving physical objects. 
3.5.1 Early Capabilities Reflected in Lexical Acquisition 
Siskind (1992) has attempted to solve the early bootstrapping problem by proposing a cross-
situational learning algorithm which is based on visual perception and the early capacities of 
children. Siskind takes an approach that is on the right lines, but, because it relies on logical 
algorithms which cannot be realistically assumed to be in operation in young children, the 
model is somewhat unrealistic. 
He claims that the appropriate semantic representation for the meanings of simple spatial 
verbs such as throw, pick up, put and walk must incorporate the notions of support, contact 
and attachment. 
The question then is how support, contact and attachment relations necessary for these 
representations can be picked up from the context of utterances. In Siskind's model the 
putative link between cognition and language can be seen most clearly. He proposes that 
children learn the meanings of these verbs by using counter-factual simulation. 
Counter-factual simulation involves imagining the short term future of a potentially mod-
ified image under the effects of gravity and other physical forces. Counter-factual simulation 
in turn relies on an imagination capacity. Imagination capacity is normally assumed to be 
some kind of simulator of kinematic motion. Traditional approaches to kinematic simulation 
take physical accuracy and the abilities to simulate mechanisms of arbitrary complexity to be 
primary. This type of kinematic simulator is thus abstracted away from what we need which 
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is a kinematic simulator that simulates the way human beings perceive the world. Human 
perception seems to be based on a number of principles which include the very basic principles 
that Baillargeon, Leslie and Spelke have found to be present in very young children, namely: 
• Substantiality: Solid objects do not pass through each other. 
• Continuity: Objects follow continuous paths when moving from one location to another. 
They do not disappear and reappear elsewhere later. 
• Gravity: Unsupported objects fall. 
• Ground plane: The ground acts as universal support for all objects. 
Siskind provides a mechanism by which children can use these features of cognition to con-
struct the semantic representations necessary within the linguistic system from the linguistic 
input they receive and its context. Given the general argument in this thesis, it would seem 
hardly surprising that human language mirrors the way we perceive the world and that the 
representations involved also include elements of human cognition. And it is also hardly sur-
prising that the language learning system employs these aspects of cognition in the learning 
process if indeed language has evolved from other aspects of human cognition. 
It may well be the case that the source of the salience of contact, attachment and so on for 
the language systems may lie in the gestural stage in the evolution of language (to be discussed 
in Chapter 6). 
We see that the early capacities of children can predict and help explain at least to some 
extent the learning of a set of verbs. We would also expect these ecological saliencies to be 
operant in language processing. In Chapter 5 I shall show that a similar type of conceptual-
ization (i.e. continuity, solidity, contact and attachment) can explain attachment decisions in 
NP/PP adjunct attachment ambiguities such as the following. 
	
(3.12) 	Verb Attachment Preferred: 
The spy saw the cop with binoculars. 
was preferred to 
The spy saw the cop with the revolver. 
(3.13) 	Noun Attachment Preferred: 
The woman married the man with money. 
was preferred to 
The woman married the man with delight. 
3.5.2 General Principles of Language Acquisition 
It seems to be the case that language goes through maturational stages, but that these stages 
are not universal across children and the theory has to be flexible enough to capture these 
differences. We have also seen that children are probably learning language structure in its 
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basic form by linking a conceptually based language structure to their more general conceptu-
alization of what they cognize. This conceptualization will necessarily be constrained by what 
they can cognize at this early stage. 
In this section of the chapter I shall examine suggestions as to more general principles 
of language acquisition that have been proposed with specific reference to lexical learning by 
Clark (1993), but that are, in my opinion, relevant to all aspects of language learning. For each 
proposal I shall give the original definition as relevant to the lexicon and then discuss what 
relevance they have for the learning of syntactic structure via thematic-conceptual structure. 
MAPPING: Across languages strong correlations exist between word classes and on-
tological category (see Croft (1991)). By the age of one children have a good deal of 
conceptual ontological knowledge. If children assume early on that there must be differ-
ent word classes on the basis of meaning-form mappings, they can bootstrap themselves 
into syntactic categories. This is an example of what is known as semantic bootstrap-
ping to syntax. It may be the case that the process could work in the opposite direction. 
That is, syntactic inflections could be used to predict what class a word is and help to 
predict its meaning. A lexicon that has been bootstrapped in this conceptual manner 
would then form the input for the learning of syntax. 
CONVENTIONALITY: What makes an item conventional is that everyone in the 
speech community agrees with everyone else on which words or expressions denote which 
kinds. The store of conventional forms can be used by the child to predict production of 
new words. Such predictive ability would also be the case for the learning of structural 
aspects of language. That is, whatever is conventional in structural terms could be 
applied to new cases, and any new forms that the child hypothesizes will be tested 
against the input to check whether they are conventional. The checking tells the child 
whether its hypotheses fit into the conventional forms of the language. 
CONTRAST: The major consequence of this principle is that speakers do not tolerate 
complete synonyms. This makes the following predictions about the major properties of 
the lexicon: 
• words contrast in meaning - what characterizes lexical domains is that all their 
members differ in meaning. 
• Established words have priority - if the child finds a word in its conventional lexicon 
for the expression needed, it will be used. 
• innovative words fill lexical gaps - speakers must make sure the listener can compute 
the intended meaning. 
Contrast offers economy of effort in acquisition. Thus children can immediately set 
about working out how a word is different from the other words they know. If this idea 
is carried over to syntax we would expect every sentence structure to be associated with 
a different meaning. A claim for the principle of contrast in syntax is a strong claim as 
it has often been assumed that, for example, the passive version of a sentence does not 
differ in meaning from its active counterpart. 
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TRANSPARENCY OF MEANING: Words are transparent when children know 
the meanings of its morphological elements. Sentences are transparent when children 
know the meanings of its constituent elements. 
SIMPLICITY OF FORM: words are simple when the elements to be combined re-
quire no changes or only minimal changes in form. The principle of simplicity of form 
also predicts that more simply constructed sentences will be learned before more complex 
ones. 
If we can assume that different word classes are learnt on the basis of mapping, then 
semantic bootstrapping is possible. Children also show a great sensitivity to what is important 
in their own language. 
Also vital to the future development of my argument is the principle of contrast. This 
principle means that not only all lexical items, but also all differences in structure are associated 
with a different meaning. This idea will be central to my reanalysis of the syntactic priming 
(Bock (1986)) literature in chapter 5. 
3.6 Thematic-Conceptual Structure and Language Ac-
quisition 
In the previous chapter we saw that one of the motivations for thematic-conceptual structures 
was to overcome Baker's paradox. There I gave examples of the dative alternation. The 
child is able to learn the alternation patterns of various verbs from their underlying thematic-
conceptual structure. Here I will describe how the dative alternation and its learnability can 
be captured by thematic-conceptual structures. 
The lexical rule for the dative alternation with to converts a verb with the semantic struc-
ture X causes Y to go to Z into a verb with the semantic structure X causes Z to have Y. 
Thus verbs can alternate only if they signify a transfer of an object that can result in its being 
possessed - note the impossibility of (3.14) 
	
(3.14) 	She carried the mailbox a letter. 
However, negative exceptions do exist (3.15). 
(3.15) 	?Reach me that book. 
To capture negative exceptions, Pinker introduces the notions of broad conflation classes 
and narrow conflation classes. Membership of a broad conflation class is only a necessary 
condition for alternation, it is membership of a narrow conflation class which is a necessary 
condition. The negative exceptions are created by applying the broad range rule without 
paying heed to whether the verb in question fits into one of the narrow conflation classes. 
Narrow conflation classes have the following properties: They are verbs that enter into the 
construction fall into semantically cohesive subclasses involving a narrower range of meanings 
than that which is directly associated with the argument structure. A common set of elements 
of meaning, such as contact, motion and effect enter into the definitions of these semantically 
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cohesive classes. Whether a verb belongs to a class depends not on the characteristic features 
of the event in the world but on the aspects of the event that its semantic structure constrains. 
Pinker proposes the following subclasses of verbs in the dative alternation (N.B. all of these 
verbs fit into the broad conflation class for the dative alternation): 
Subclasses which do alternate: 
Verbs of giving. 
Verbs of instantaneous imparting of force: flip kick, toss. 
Verbs of continuous imparting of force with a specified direction: bring, take. 
Verbs of future having: offer, promise, bequeath, forward. 
Illocutionary verbs of communication: tell, show, ask, teach, write, read. 
Instrument of communication verbs: fax, radio, e-mail. 
Subclasses which do not alternate 
Verbs of Continuous imparting of force: pull, push. 
Verbs of future not having: cost, spare, envy, bet, refuse. 
Verbs of presentation: present, credit, reward. 
Manner of speaking verbs: shout, murmur, grunt. 
The motivation for these subclasses is that if the thematic core of the double object dative 
involves an actor acting on a recipient in a way that causes the recipient to possess something, 
then those verb subclasses that suggest that the action inherently involves the beneficiary as 
patient directly are more likely to dativize. 
Broad-range rules could not be replaced by narrow-range rules because evidence exists for 
the on-line application of broad-range rules to produce (in a one-off manner) forms which are 
not licensed by the narrow-range rules. An example from the causative alternation: 
(3.16) 	a. The experience grew me up quickly. 
b. 	Sparkle your table with.... 
Broad-range rules are thus said to be property-predicting: they dictate what grammatical 
properties a form would have should it exist. Narrow-range rules on the other hand are 
existence-predicting: they allow a speaker who possesses one form to add a related form to 
the grammar automatically. 
It now remains to be shown that the restrictions on lexical alternations can be represented 
within such a system of semantic structures. We have considered the dative alternation with 
to. 





ACT THING THING 	 EVENT 
[(Bob)] 	[(ring)] 
(3.17) 	 GO 	THING 	PATH 
(ring) /,/\ 
to 	PLACE 




ACT THING THING 	 STATE 
(3.18) 	
[(Bob)] 	[(Sue)] 
HAVE THING THING 
(Sue) 	[(ring)] 




ACT THING THING 	 STATE 
(3.19) 
HAVE THING THING 
Y 
2nd Direct Internal Argument 
In the prepositional form, the transferred object is the patient, whereas in the double-
object form the recipient is the patient. This underlies the pragmatic differences in which 
argument is construed as 'affected'. In the double-object construction the change of possession 
is expressed not as an analogue of a motion of the object, but as the direct causation of a state 
whereby the possessor has (HAVE) the object. This has the consequence that the double-object 
form is incompatible with the expression of pure physical motion. But as we have seen the 
Broad Range rule is only a sufficient condition for the alternation to occur, it is the narrow 
range rules that are a necessary condition and which predict that the alternation will actually 
occur. 
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The narrow-range rules are of the following types: First there are the verbs of Giving. 
Give would have a representation almost identical to the input of the broad range rule, though 
the semantic filed would be specified as possession. Pass would specify possessional: physical 
custody. Hand would introduce an additional MANNER constituent specifying the use of hands. 
Second, Sell, trade and pay. These verbs have a subordinate counter-transfer event to 
which the agent is committed. The patient/theme of the counter-transfer (1100) is linked to 
the oblique argument role because it is embedded under ACT and would be expressed by for 




T10E 	 PROPERTY 	 GO 	 THING 
money" (C100) 
at 	 THING 
Third, there are the verbs of Manner of Speaking. These are non-dativizable. The aspect 
of the representation that ensures their non- dativizability is that the MANNER refers to a 




ACT 	THING THING EVENT:perc MANNER 
[(Bob)] [(news)] ti 





Fourth, there are the verbs of Communication. These verbs involve a subfield of possession 
involving the communication of ideas. An example tree for this would be similar to the tree 
for the verb of manner of speaking, except that the manner substructure is unnecessary and 





(3.22) 	BE 	THING 	 PLACE 
at 	 THING 
(kids) 
Fifth come the verbs of future having, where the main event is not one of giving but of 
commitment - the possession transfer is an effect at a different point on the time-line. The 
verb specific information is tentatively put into a means substructure: 
EVENT: phys 
effect 	means 
ACT 	THING THING 	 EVENT:poss "will" etc. 
[(Bob)] [(wealth)] 





Sixth are the verbs of Presenting. These are also non-dativizable. They encode the trans-
ferred theme as a with-object in the alternative form. The to-form is probably derived from 
the with-form. The construction shares features of both the dative verbs (change of possession, 
leading to use of the preposition to rather than into and onto) and the locative (the change of 
state and the existence of the with form, linked to the entity whose transfer effects the change 
of state). 
The transferred object has a property 'for the recipient to possess it' because of some 
deontic cause specified idiosyncratically by the individual verbs. 
We still have to explain why the dative rule cannot apply to this structure. It could perhaps, 
yielding a structure which is linked to the double-object but the semantic representation of 
with fused with the linking rule for oblique arguments of ACT blocks or preempts the second 
object linking rules because it is more specific. Pinker opts for the simpler explanation that 
the extra complex property structure makes the verbs dissimilar enough for them not to work 
with the rule. 







BE 	THING 	PLACE 	EVENT 
(medal  
at 	 THING 
(Sue) 
Finally, there is the group of verbs of Causation of Motion. Here we have to explain throw 
(dativizable), pull (non-dativizable) and bring (dativizable). The crucial difference between 
these three is the interaction of aspectual and force -dynamic components - for throw the 
causing is instantaneous and precedes the motion of the object. For pull it is a continuous 
process that is temporally co- extensive with the motion of the object. 
Bring doesn't specify MANNER but supplies deictic information concerning the PATH and 
implying that the Actor moves. 
It is obviously important to constrain the semantic features required by the model to a 
manageable number. The requirement that each feature posited be grammaticalized in some 
language or other seems a reasonable way of limiting this number. It seems plausible that all 
the features that various languages grammaticalize are part of the relevant semantics in all 
languages. 
This contrasts greatly with the unconstrained features used in connectionist attempts to 
link semantics and syntax. McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) use 1,052 input features. The 
training sessions involved require input sentences to be paired with their output representa-
tions. A verb could pair the input features [object is food and female], [subject is soft and 
medium-sized] and [verb is intense and causes chemical change] with the output features [agent 
of causal event is round], [patient of no-change is compact] and [instrument of shredding is 
soft]. The result is a massively knowledge driven process of sentence interpretation in which 
the actual contents of the sentence play a small role, merely activating preexisting associa-
tions of what typically happens in the world. Pinker gives examples of how their model assigns 
arguments to predicates during sentence comprehension. 
	
(3.25) 	The plate broke. What broke? 
A vase or window. 
(3.26) 	The boy broke. What broke? 
A piece of furniture. 
(3.27) The pillow broke the window. What broke the window? 
Something hard. 
The approach of semantic structures, where it is assumed that aspects of the representation 
link to syntactic positions via unchanging linking rules and that the representations explain 
why only certain verbs enter into various alternations seems far more acceptable. It may also 
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be the case that semantic structures together with their linking rules play a role in phenomena 
which are normally explained in terms of purely syntactic representations. (e.g. Minimal 
Attachment). 
3.7 Parameter Setting and Grammaticalization 
In this section I shall first describe the sub-discipline of grammaticalization. I will present the 
principles of grammaticalization that have been proposed. I will argue that grammaticalization 
is very similar to language acquisition in the tasks it has to perform. 
I will then go on to give some examples of the choices languages have made in the way 
they grammaticalize our conceptualization of the world. These examples present a complexity 
that a theory of parameter-setting, particularly one based on binary parameters will be hard 
pushed to capture. 
If we see language acquisition as a task that involves associating a linguistic representation 
with the conceptual relation in the world that humans cognize, then we can see a clear link 
between language acquisition and grammaticalization. Grammaticalization takes place over 
time and is the theory of how languages turn particularly salient conceptualizations into a 
grammatical form. Under this view the form of a language will be a design solution to the 
task of facilitating communication. But as a design solution it is unlikely that the design 
decided on will be optimal. 
It is interesting to note that, although language acquisition and grammaticalization are 
very similar in the task that has to be completed, the sorts of arguments that are used in 
these two sub-disciplines are widely divergent. 
Over time languages grammaticalize contentful elements that are particularly important to 
a particular culture. Thus, in this way, the rules and rigidity of the distinction of synchronic 
and diachronic linguistics is called into question by the study of grammaticalization. 
With regard to the function word/content word distinction it should be noted that function 
words are very often derived from content words. 
The grammatical nature of the element becomes more and more abstract along the following 
dine: 
content item < grammatical word < clitic < inflectional affix 
Hopper and Traugott (1993) see grammar as a process for organizing cognitive and commu-
nicate content. They adopt a more flexible view of language universals - a universal component 
broadly characterizes the properties of the human constitution and can be modified by outside 
stimuli and by the functional purposes to which language is put. 
Two main processes of grammaticalization are reanalysis and analogy. Reanalysis modifies 
underlying representations, whether semantic, syntactic or morphological and brings abOut 
rule change. Analogy modifies the surface manifestations and does not in itself bring about 
rule change. 
There are three conflicting inputs/motivations to reanalysis. Old information is placed 
first and new information later. Ideas that are closely connected tend to be placed together 
and what is uppermost in speakers' minds is first expressed. 
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These are the processes, but what are the factors that actually enable these processes to 
come into operation. Here three factors are relevant: 
• Language Acquisition 
e Role of the types of contact within the speaking community 
. The different priorities of the speaker-hearer roles. 
Concentrating first on the speaker-hearer roles, hearers process the input in ways that may 
not match the speaker's intentions. Thus over time, the pragmatic inferences that are made 
by the hearer with respect to the speaker's utterances may become conventionalized. 
The first step in this is semanticization, where the conversational implicature becomes part 
of the polysemies of the form that these implicatures are associated with. Thus, in English, 
since has come to be understood as signaling causation, whereas it originally was merely 
temporal. 
Within the concept of inferencing two main processes are relevant: Metaphorical processes 
and metonymic processes. 
In Metaphorical Processesa more concrete meaning is used to express an abstract meaning. 
For example grasping an idea uses the mind-as-body metaphor. This process is normally seen 
as a semantic process but Hopper and Traugott (1993) argue that it is in fact pragmatic. 
Other examples are where SPACE is seen in terms of an OBJECT as in behind the cupboard 
and where TIME is seen in terms of SPACE as in we are behind in paying. It could also be 
argued that the semantics of the modal have been based on principles of force dynamics. 
Metonymic Processes rely on the conceptual association of one entity with another. For 
example, the future meaning of going to is based on the dual inferences of later time indexed by 
go and the purposive meaning of to. From this example we see that the process of metonymy 
depends on contiguity and reanalysis. 
Heine et al. (1991) argue that underlying grammaticalization is a principle of exploitation 
of old means for new functions. Using this concrete concepts are used to understand, explain 
and describe less concrete phenomena. so  for example non-physical experiences are understood 
in terms of physical experiences, time in terms of space, or abstract relations in terms of kinetic 
processes or spatial relations. 
The relevant processes may be described in terms of a few basic categories which can be 
arranged linearly in the following way: 
(3.28) PERSON>OBJECT>.PROCESS>SPACE>TIME>.QUAJJTy 
Each of these categories can be viewed as representing a domain of conceptualization which 
is important for structuring experience. The relationship among them is metaphorical i.e. any 
of them may serve to conceptualize any other category to its right. 
The cognitive categories are reflected in various aspects of language structure. Interrogative 
pronouns are often structured in a way that mirrors these distinctions: Thus all African 
languages have separate pronouns for the categories PERSON, OBJECT, PROCESS, SPACE, 
TIME and QUALITY. 
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There appears to be some correlation between these metaphorical categories and the divi-
sion of word classes: 
Category Word Type Constituent Type 
PERSON human noun NP 
OBJECT non-human noun NP 
PROCESS verb VP 
SPACE adverb, adposition ADVP 
TIME adverb, adposition ADVP 
QUALITY adjective, adverb modifier 
The task of grammaticalization is to construct an efficient way of communicating our 
conceptualization of the world. Elements that are particularly salient to a culture's ecologi-
cal niche are more likely to be grammaticalized. More complex conceptualizations are often 
grammaticalized using the more central grammaticalized conceptualizations in a metaphorical 
manner. Thus, once more, central to the form of language is an understanding of what is 
important to us as humans. 
3.7.1 The Complexity of the Grammaticalization Data 
I think it is useful to see one example of the complexity of the grammaticalization data in 
order to realize quite how many small variations need to be captured by parameters. Lehman 
(1988) looks in detail at the phenomenon of clause linkage. Lehman lists six semantic-syntactic 
parameters that can be identified in the linking of clauses. The complexity of these 'parameters' 
does not seem expressible in the form of parameters posited by PPT theory: 
• The hierarchical downgrading of the subordinate clause. 
• The main clause syntactic level of the subordinate clause. 
• The desententialization of the subordinate clause. 
• The grammaticalization of the main verb. 
• The interlacing of the two clauses. 
• The explicitness of linking. 
The link between the two clauses can be seen in terms of a continuum from Autonomy 
running to Integration. 
• No hierarchical relation = parataxis. 
• Adjoined clauses - one of the two clauses contains a subordinate conjunction - not em-
bedded. 
• Correlative diptych - relative clauses subordinate but not embedded. Sometimes the 
subordinate clause has to appear in the last position as last constituent of the main 
clause. 
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• Clause-chaining: verbs in subordinate clauses with loss of tense, aspect and mood are 
taken to be those of the main verb. Person agreement shows whether the same subject 
or a different subject of the main clause is the case. 
• Embedded clause - object clause governed by main verb. 
In line with this continuum there are increasing constraints on the position of the subor-
dinate clause: 
parataxis <- 	 > embedding 
independent adjoined correlativemedial 
	
conj. 	 governed 
clauses 	clause 	diptych clause part. clause 
With regard to syntax there is variation according to the main clause syntactic level which 
the subordinate clause belongs to: 
sentence < 	 . 	 > word 
subordinate clause is: 	 complex predicate formation 
outside 	 at margin inside 	inside 	verb 	auxiliary 	verbal 
main of main main VP serial- periphrasis derivation 
clause 	 clause 	clause 	 ization 
Another aspect is the degree to which the subordinate clause is desententialized - the more 
desententialized it is the more nominal it becomes. A fully-fledged sentence is characterized 
by illocutionary force, mood, tense, aspect, actants and circumstants. 
The Desententialization hierarchy is: 
sententiality < 	 > nominality 
clause 	 nonfinite constructions 	verbal noun 
no illocutionary force 
constraints on illocutionary elements 
constraints on/loss of modal elements and mood 
constraints on/loss of tense and aspect 
dispensibility of complements 
loss of personal conjugation 
conversion of subject into oblique slot 
no polarity 
conversion of verbal into nominal 
government 





Languages also vary as to the explicitness of the linking of the two clauses. The absence 
of a connective device is termed syndesis. The most explicit linking is termed asyndesis. 
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syndesis < 	 > asyndesis 








Lehman has found the following correlations among these various options. 
• High integration of subordinates into the main clause correlates positively with its de-
sententialization. 
• Strong grammaticalization of the governing predicate presupposes either advanced de-
sententialization or strong interlacing. 
• Interlacing of clauses as brought about by raising presupposes downgrading, thus inte-
gration of the subordinate clause. 
• Interlacing of clauses as brought about by dependent subject control leads to desenten-
tialization of the subordinate clause. 
• Asyndesis correlates with dependent subject control and thus with interlacing. 
The main aim of this section was to show the sheer range of possibilities for joining two 
clauses. This range of possibilities is not likely to be expressible or described by a small set of 
binary parameters that pay no attention to content. 
3.7.2 A Link between Metaphor and Thematic Conceptual Structure 
Sweetser (1990) puts forward a cognitively based theory which takes not the objective real 
world', but human perception and understanding to be the basis for human language. 
In our conceptual organization, vision and knowledge are linked and for this reason any 
theory of semantics has to take this into account. But many theorists have been reluctant to 
take seriously the idea that language is shaped by cognition. One reason is that linguists have 
hoped to analyze language relatively independently of the rest of human abilities. 
The metaphors manifested in most linguistic systems fall out from a more holistic view-
point, which takes language as part of our general cognitive system: linguistic structure is 
then as logical and objective as human cognition, no more and no less. 
So for example the following vision metaphors are prevalent in English and other Indo-
European Languages: 
1. The most common semantic sources for vision verbs are: 
(a) The physical nature of sight (light, the eyes, facial movement etc) 
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(b) Metaphors of vision: 
Vision f- physical touching manipulation. The probable basis of this is in 
the channeling and focusing ability connected with our visual sense; vision, far 
more than the other senses, can pick out and attend to one stimulus amid a 
multitude of input stimuli. 
Visual monitoring 	control: The basis for this metaphor is probably the 
fact that guarding or keeping control often involves visual monitoring of the 
controlled entity; and the limited domain of physical vision is further analogous 
to the domain of personal influence or control. 
(c) Basic Indo-European vision roots: There is a set of basic Indo-European roots which 
seem to have referred to vision as far back as history can be traced. 
2. Target domains for vision verbs. Vision verbs commonly develop abstract senses of 
mental activity: 
Physical sight -* knowledge, intellection: This metaphor has its basis in vision's 
primary status as a source of data; not only does English have expressions like I 
saw it with my own eyes to indicate certainty, but studies of evidentials in many 
languages show that direct visual data is considered to be the most certain kind of 
knowledge. 
Physical Vision -* mental vision: This metaphor is probably based on the strong 
connection between sight and knowledge, and also on the shared structural prop-
erties of the visual and intellectual domains - our ability to focus our mental and 
visual attention, to monitor stimuli mentally and visually. 
This type of metaphorical basis for linguistic expression will form a useful addition to the 
theory of thematic-conceptual relations I set out in the next chapter. The two in conjunction 
will be used as part of the psycholinguistic theory I set out in Chapter 5. 
3.8 Chapter Summary and Predictions for Psycholinguis-
tics 
In the next chapter I will be continuing my survey of the role thematic information has been 
seen to play in the various linguistic sub-disciplines. In that chapter psycholinguistics will be 
addressed. 
In this chapter I have been considering language acquisition. I have argued for a Classical 
theory of rules and representations. The representation I have adopted is that of thematic-
conceptual structure. We saw in this chapter how this type of representation can explain how 
it is possible for children to learn which verbs alternate syntactically and which do not via the 
underlying semantics of the verb as represented by thematic-conceptual structure. 
We have seen that it is most likely that children begin with a thematically-based system 
that then matures into a more syntactic system with functional categories. The putative 
semantic content of this early thematic system was discussed with such elements as contact, 
attachment and support playing a major role. We also saw a proposal from Lebeaux that 
when a grammatical system acquired later breaks down, the processor will fall back onto a 
lower (earlier acquired) grammatical system. 
In Chapter 2 we saw that the components of thematic-conceptual structure should be 
limited to those semantic items that are found to be grammaticalized in some language in the 
world. 
In the final section of this chapter, grammaticalization itself was discussed. Language 
acquisition can be regarded as a synchronic version of the diachronic process of grammat-
icalization. The child is grammaticalizing the thematic-conceptual structure underlying all 
language into the particular syntactic structure of the language she is learning. Thus what 
the child is learning is the linking from thematic-conceptual structure to the surface structure. 
It is possible that it is at this level that parameters may be able to be defined. The idea of 
thematic-conceptual structure and linking as a psycholinguistic process will be central to the 
argument of Chapter 5. 
The adoption of thematic-conceptual structure in syntax and language acquisition makes 
the following predictions for language processing: 
Thematic-conceptual structures will be a major player in the processing of sentences, 
as processing is then understood as the linking from thematic-conceptual structure to 
syntax or vice versa, depending on whether production or comprehension is being con-
sidered. 
The grammaticalization of metaphors that have become central to humans in their eco-
logical niche (See Chapter 6 for further discussion) will play their part in the content 
that is relevant to processing. 
The breaking down of a higher processing system will result in the processor falling 
back on lower processing systems. The lowest level of this processing will be thematic-
conceptual structure, as thematic-conceptual structure forms the earliest stages of lan-
guage acquisition. 
Linguistic parameters may well be able to be stated and defined at the level of the linking 
of thematic-conceptual structure to the surface syntactic structure. 
In the next chapter I will survey the role thematic information has played in psycholinguistic 
theory in the past and in Chapter 5 I will address these predictions directly. 
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Chapter 4 
Thematic Information in 
Psycholinguistic Theory 
In Chapter 2 we saw how thematic roles have been built into syntactic theory. We noted that 
within PPT thematic roles were basically analogous to argument structure. Modifications 
of the basic formulation of thematic roles incorporated the notion of hierarchies to predict 
the linking of thematic structure into grammatical functions, or used an extended structure 
to explain, within thematic structure, transformations that were usually explained with a 
movement operation. We also saw decompositional representations of thematic information. 
In this chapter I shall turn my attention to the part thematic roles have been assumed 
to play in psycholinguistic theory. A priori it may be expected that thematic roles in syntax 
and thematic roles in psycholinguistics should coincide. However, as we shall see this does not 
seem to be the case. Thematic roles often seem to be peripheral to the explanations employed 
by psycholinguists (except in a minority of frameworks). 
When thematic roles are used in any coherent explanatory way, there seems to be doubt 
as to the form of the thematic roles that are assumed to be part of the parsing process. I 
will show that thematic structure plays an important part in parsing decisions and that the 
approaches that concede this are explanatorily the most adequate. I shall show in Chapter 
5 that thematic-conceptual structure can be incorporated into the thematically based system 
discussed in this chapter, and that it will also be able to explain phenomena that remain 
unexplained by that system. 
There are four main approaches in psycholinguistics with respect to thematic roles, one of 
these being not to include any mention of thematic roles within the parsing algorithm. Parsing 
algorithms based on the statistical properties of language take this approach. A typical paper 
which takes this stance is Mitchell and Cuetos (1991). In that paper it is assumed that the 
statistical properties of a lexical item predict the parsing preferences associated with that item. 
It seems that an approach such as this does not do much to explain parsing preferences but 
serves merely to reflect them. The argument seems to be particularly circular. 
If the parsing preferences associated with a lexical item are based on the statistical prop-
erties of that item, what governs the statistical properties of the item, why does it have the 
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statistical properties it has? The only answer that seems to be put forward is that it has these 
statistical properties because they are preferentially produced with one structure associated 
with them as compared to another structure that could be associated with that lexical item. 
No explanation is given for why a particular structure is produced more often in association 
with that lexical item as compared to the less frequent lexical item-structure association. 
The three other current approaches in psycholinguistics that do mention thematic roles see 
thematic roles as (i) a method of bringing latent parallelism into the parsing algorithm, (ii) a 
filter on what the syntactic processor has produced, (iii) determining parsing decisions. I shall 
discuss each of these below. Before I do that, however, I think it is worthwhile to list the type 
of empirical data that psycholinguistics is typically trying to capture. 
4.1 What Psycholinguistics is Trying to Explain? 
Before we get into the details of the parsing algorithms including thematic roles/structure that 
have been proposed, it is best to list the phenomena that are the explananda of psycholinguis-
tics in an unbiased way. 
It has been argued that since language processing is so fast, it is only when the system 
breaks down that we will be given clues as to its operation. For this reason most of the research 
effort has been expended on explaining the parsing preferences of sentences that are ambiguous 
in some way or other. The breakdown in processing that occurs in ambiguous contexts allows 
us to make inferences about the processes that operate in normal processing. 
The first type of ambiguity is where there is a choice for the processor between constructing 
a Main Clause or Relative NP. It is generally accepted that the ambiguity is resolved in favour 
of a main clause analysis. The dispreferred reading results in a conscious garden-path. There 
are certain types of ambiguity that can be resolved with very little effort by the processor and 
some that are consciously difficult to understand. 
(4.1) 	a. The boat floated past the house. 
b. The boat floated past the house sank. 
The second type of ambiguity is between a preferred Complement Clause reading and the 
dispreferred and consciously difficult to understand Relative Clause. 
(4.2) 	a. The farmer persuaded the vet that he was having trouble with his sheep. 
b. The farmer persuaded the vet that he was having trouble with to leave. 
A third type of ambiguity involves a noun following a verb which could be analyzed as the 
object of that verb or the subject of a following verb. The ambiguity is resolved in favour of 
an object interpretation. The subject interpretation produces conscious difficulty. 
(4.3) 	a. While Ron was sewing the sock it fell on the floor. 
b. While John was sewing the sock fell on the floor. 
(4.4) 	a. 	I suspect John. 
b. I suspect John will come soon. 
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(4.5) 	a. I warned John. 
b. I warned John would come soon. 
A similar kind of ambiguity occurs when a noun can be analyzed as being attached to a 
possessive, pronoun and then proves not to be, as in the second sentence here: 
(4.6) 	a. Without her it would be impossible. 
b. Without her contributions would be impossible. 
The fourth type of ambiguity is the Double-Object Ambiguity. This appears to be resolved 
in various ways. In some cases there is no conscious difficulty. 
(4.7) 	a. 	I gave her presents. 
b. I gave her presents to Ron. 
On the other hand, in other cases there is a conscious processing difficulty. 
(4.8) 	a. 	Joe put the biscuit in the jar into Jill's mouth. 
b. Fred gave the cat the dog bit a saucer of milk. 
There are also ambiguities based on a straightforward ambiguity in the meaning of an 
individual lexical item. The Lexical Ambiguity at times produces no conscious processing 
difficulty. 
(4.9) 	a. 	The warehouse fires destroyed all the buildings. 
b. The warehouse fires a dozen employees every week. 
And at other times there are conscious difficulties, as can be seen in the second of these 
sentences. 
(4.10) 	a. The old train chugged down the track. 
b. The old train their dogs. 
Similar to the object/subject ambiguity is the case of preposed adverbial clauses with, or 
without a comma. In the case without the comma a conscious processing difficulty occurs as 
the NP is attached incorrectly to the preceding verb and then has to be reanalyzed as the 
subject of the next verb. 
(4.11) 	After the boy had eaten (,) the remaining food went off. 
In reduced relative sentences, the disambiguating region takes longer to process than the 
disambiguating region in the full relative. 
(4.12) 	a. The defendant examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable. 
b. The defendant that was examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable. 
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There are therefore of the order of only a dozen different ambiguity types in English. There 
are thus two main questions that the processing literature has to answer. The first is how the 
ambiguity is handled in the first place. That is, whether ambiguous materials are more difficult 
to process than unambiguous material. This difficulty can be either in the ambiguous region 
itself, or the region that disambiguates the ambiguous region. 
There are three main options in this regard: 
Serial Processing: Assemble the structure for just one of the potential meanings (Kimball 
(1973); Frazier (1979)). 
Parallel Processing: Construct the structure for both potential analyses (Gorell (1987)). 
Minimal Commitment Processing: Make a partial analysis and delay decisions on the 
ambiguity until it is possible to do so successfully (Weinberg (1990)). 
The second question concerns the mechanism of initial choice. That is, what decides which 
of the two potential meanings/structures associated with an ambiguous word will be pursued 




Discourse Driven procedures 
Exposure Based Procedures 
General Processing Cost Strategies 
In Sections 4.2 to 4.4 three parsing algorithms which include a role for thematic structure 
are presented. 
4.2 Latent Parallelism in Thematic Roles 
The approach where thematic roles are seen as providing latent parallelism in a mainly serial 
parser has been associated with the work of Tanenhaus and his colleagues. The theory was 
first delineated in Carison and Tanenhaus (1988). 
In this initial paper the authors are unclear what the exact nature of thematic roles is; 
they could be syntactic, semantic or conceptual in nature: What is most important is that 
they see thematic roles as a mechanism of interaction between syntax, the discourse model 
and world knowledge. Thus in terms of the (Fodor (1983)) modularity thesis, where there is 
a central processor (which includes world knowledge) and input modules (and Fodor argues 
that language is an input module) thematic roles form a frontier module at the boundary of 
the language system and the central processor. 
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4.2.1 The Discourse Strand 
With respect to parsing, Carison and Tanenhaus (1988) argue that all senses of a word are 
activated in parallel, regardless of context. This seems a reasonable claim given the work of 
Swinney (1979)1.  They then argue that the most appropriate sense remains active, and that 
thematic roles are assigned as soon as possible. Any roles that are not assigned remain open 
in the discourse model and this will make integration of some sentences that follow in the 
discourse event easier than others. This is one strand of their predictions - let us call it the 
Discourse Strand 
Thus in the following sentences (4.13c) is read more quickly after (4.13b) than after (4.13a), 
they argue, because although suitcases are conceptually linked to travel (as in (4.13a)), there 
is an open unassigned role associated with unload that could easily be filled with the suitcases, 
and thus the (4.13c) sentence will be easily integrated into the discourse as the open role will 
form a conceptual link between the two sentences. 
	
(4.13) 	a. 	Bill hurried to catch his plane. 
b. Bill hurried to unload his car. 
C. The suitcases were very heavy. 
It is predicted then that open roles thus form antecedents for definite NPs. This was tested 
by constructing a target sentence such as (4.14c) preceded either by a context sentence that 
introduces an open thematic role that the NP could plausibly fill (4.14a) or a sentence with a 
plausible context but no open role (4.14b). 
(4.14) 	a. The miners were drilling a large tunnel. (open Location) 
b. The miners were making a large tunnel. (no open role) 
C. The rock was hard. 
Subjects had to judge whether the final sentence made sense. 97% judged the final sentence 
to make sense after reading (4.14a) compared to only 84% who judged it to make sense after 
reading (4.14b). The decision latency was also faster after (4.14a) than after (4.14b); 1628m-
sec versus 1847m-sec. 
It was also found that after a context such as (4.15 a), sentence (4.15 b) was more easily 
integrated than sentence (4.15c). 
(4.15) 	a. Her nephew's birthday was coming up so.. 
b. Mary sent a book. (open Goal) 
C. Mary bought a book. (no open role) 
A final test utilized the probe recognition task, where the recognition time to decide that 
a word occurred in the preceding sentence or short discourse is faster when the word is an 
antecedent for a subsequent anaphor. 
'Although this may not be totally true. It seems that the interpretation can be influenced by the context to 
some extent ( Burgess and Simpson (1988)). Burgess and Simpson argue that the two contrasting results can 
be explained if the two hemispheres of the brain are seen as doing different things. In the right hemisphere the 
non-dominant meaning is activated for longer. In the left hemisphere, on the other hand, categorical choices 
are made on the basis of frequency. 
(4.16) 	I don't know who should sweep the crumbs off the floor. 
However, I bet Carol was the one who made the mess (makes sense, but no VP 
anaphor). 
However, I bet Carol will volunteer to, reluctantly. (VP ellipsis) 
C. 	However, I bet Carol will volunteer (to do it) reluctantly. (explicit VP anaphor 
or unexpressed verbal complement) 
The relevant probe was the verb sweep here. The recognition time was faster in the VP 
ellipsis condition (120 im-sec) and the VP anaphora/null complement condition (11 76m-sec) 
than in the non-anaphoric condition (1283m-sec), providing evidence that the priming effects 
for VP anaphors are similar to those for NPs. 
4.2.2 The Thematic Recovery Strand 
A second strand is the Thematic Recovery Strand. Although Tanenhaus and his colleagues 
have been convinced that parsing is essentially a serial process, with only one syntactic parse 
being followed at any one time, Carlson and Tanenhaus argue that recovery from misparses is 
generally quick (they seem here to be ignoring what seems to be a clear distinction between 
conscious garden-pathing and non-conscious garden-pathing). The argument is that the parser 
is able to recover quickly as, although it is only following one syntactic parse, the various 
thematic grids associated with a lexical item are activated in parallel throughout the parse, 
and that when a misparse is detected, it is the fact that these thematic grids are all still active 
that allows for quick recovery. This is reminiscent of the Property of Smooth Degradation as 
proposed by Lebeaux with respect to language acquisition. 
What this argument means with respect to linguistic representation is that thematic grids 
and subcategorization frames are assumed to be different things, and have different contents 
and thus must be listed separately for each lexical item. Thus a verb will have a core meaning, 
a subcategorization frame and a number of thematic grids associated with it. 
Thus there are different effects of core meaning ambiguities when compared to thematic 
ambiguities. Sentences with temporary thematic ambiguities (4.18) show weaker garden paths 
than sentences with sense ambiguities (4.17), as only the sentences with thematic ambiguities 
will have the alternative roles still available to the sentence processor, facilitating recovery. 
	
(4.17) 	Bill passes the test to his friend. 
(4.18) 	Bill loaded the truck onto the platform. 
4.2.3 Thematic Influence on Initial Decisions 
The third strand of prediction in the model can be termed the Thematic Influence on Initial 
Decisions. Thus Tanenhaus et al do not see thematic roles as purely enabling recovery from 
misparses; the also believe that thematic information can influence decisions on parsing on-
line. 
They argue that animacy is a part of thematic knowledge (if this is the case, they would 
seem to be arguing for thematic roles that are not primitives, but are built from smaller 
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conceptual primitives), and that it is the non-animacy of truck in the following example from 
Stowe (1986) (later replicated in a self-paced reading paradigm by Holmes et al. (1989)) that 
makes it an unlikely agent for stop and that therefore (4.19b) is easier to parse than (4.19a) 
as the misparse is less likely to occur. 
	
(4.19) 	a. Even before the police stopped the driver was getting nervous. 
b. Even before the truck stopped the driver was getting nervous. 
It seems that the form of thematic roles that Tanenhaus and his colleagues are arguing for, 
in spite of their doubt on this point, is a form where thematic roles are semantic or conceptual 
rather than purely syntactic. This is very much in line with the more decompositional approach 
to thematic information we saw in the final sections of Chapter 2. 
This argument has its source in Crain and Steedman (1985) who contend that sentence 
comprehension involves rapidly and optimally integrating lexical, syntactic and contextual 
information in some form of mental models representation, a position that will also be taken in 
this thesis. However, Crain and Steedman had not worked out the nature of the representation 
required nor any specific mechanisms by which input could be integrated into a mental model. 
I shall argue for thematic-conceptual structure as the relevant representation and linking rules 
as the mechanism. 
Further evidence that thematic information comes to bear early in sentence comprehen-
sion can be found in long distance dependencies (Tanenhaus and Carlson (1989)). Filler-gap 
dependencies allow the properties of different verb frames to come to bear. So, for example, 
in the following sentences, which girl is an implausible object of hope and a plausible object of 
the verbs persuade and hurry. 
(4.20) 	a. Which girl did the boy hope -- 
Which girl did the boy persuade -- 
Which girl did the boy hurry -- 
The embedded anomaly technique trades on the difference in plausibility of a filler after 
different verbs. There is an increased load if a gap is posited at an implausible site. Using this 
technique it is possible to test for thematic influence on sentence comprehension. 
(4.21) 	a. The physical therapist wasn't sure which doctor the orderly hurried rapidly 
towards 
b. The physical therapist wasn't sure which bed the orderly hurried rapidly towards 
Here there is a decoy gap after hurried, where which doctor would be a plausible filler 
and which bed would be an implausible filler. When sentences with verbs with a transitive 
preference were compared with sentences with verbs having an intransitive preference, it was 
found that in sentences with transitive preference verbs, the implausible fillers were read more 
slowly at the verb. Thus the gap was posited, filled and semantically interpreted at the verb 
and hence thematic information must have been available and used at this point. In contrast 
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to this, in sentences with verbs with an intransitive preference, there was no plausibility effect 
at the verb, there being no available thematic role against which to test the plausibility of the 
filler. 
Boland et al. (1990) add a qualification to this. They argue that immediate incongruity 
is spotted only if the filler is implausible in all potential roles. They use sentences such as 
the following, where read is a verb that is typically transitive and does not allow an infinitival 
complement, and remind is obligatorially transitive and allows a complement clause. 
	
(4.22) 	a. Which child did Bill remind to watch the show. 
b. Which movie did Bill remind to watch the show. 
(4.23) 	a. Which book did the child read in bed at night. 
b. Which food did the child read in bed at night. 
In a self-paced reading stop-making-sense task, where readers read the sentence word by 
word and push a 'No' button when they feel the sentence has stopped making sense it was found 
that the read sentences produced similar results as in Tanenhaus and Carlson (1989). However, 
the remind type sentences resulted in no difference between the plausible and implausible filler 
conditions. 
It is claimed that the reader is not associating the filler with a role in which it is incongruous 
until there is no other choice, that is at to. This is further evidence that the decision can not 
be made in terms of syntactic structure alone as it is hard to explain how the processor could 
judge the congruity of the filler with respect to positions based on the syntactic representation 
alone. To gauge the congruity requires access to thematic role information. 
There is a further issue that has been addressed within this framework. The results up to 
now with respect to gap filling have been compatible with two accounts: 
. The location of the gap must be identified first. 
. The filler is initially interpreted using semantic information that was made available as 
soon as the verb was recognized. 
To test which of these was true Tanenhaus et al. (1994) created sentences where the 
implausibility is contingent upon the filler having been assigned a particular role and the 
implausibility precedes the syntactic location of the empty category. They achieved this by 
using non-dativizable double-object verbs. 
(4.24) 	a. Which campus party did John contribute some cheap liquor to -- last week. 
b. Which public library did John contribute some cheap liquor to -- last week. 
Both of these sentences have an implausible Theme but a plausible Recipient. The thematic 
filling hypothesis predicts that interpretation can take place at contribute. The syntactic 
hypothesis predicts that interpretation cannot take place until to is encountered. In a stop-
making-sense experiment subjects were found to be noticing the oddity in the implausible 
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condition before reaching the syntactic gap and were thus argued to be using the thematic 
filling strategy 2 . 
Trueswell et al. (1994) used an eye-tracking experiment to show that thematic information 
could be used by the processor to lessen the size of a garden-path effect in reduced relative 
sentences. They were careful to use animate/inanimate NPs in sentences that did not allow 
plausible past tense completions, thus avoiding the problems of that nature that they identify 
in Ferreira and Clifton (1986). 
	
(4.25) 	a. The man recognized by the spy took off down the street. 
b. The man that was recognized by the spy took off down the street. 
C. The van recognized by the spy took off down the street. 
d. The van that was recognized by the spy took off down the street. 
Normal garden-path effects occurred after the animate nouns. However, there was no 
reliable difference between the reduced/unreduced relative clauses after the inanimate nouns. 
This conceptual approach is on the right lines as, arguably, true sentence comprehension 
centrally involves the computation of the thematic roles that the entities in the sentence 
play. The pure computation of syntactic structure cannot provide this information. And as 
Tanenhaus and colleagues argue, the computation of thematic roles is essential to building 
the discourse model into which following sentences can be integrated. If this claim is true, we 
would expect thematic roles to have an effect on discourse structure - some of the evidence 
given above appears to support this claim. In section 4.6 we shall see that it is not merely 
that thematic roles are implicated in the construction of a discourse model, but that there are 
differing psychological saliencies associated with the various thematic roles. 
4.3 Thematic Roles as a Filter on Syntax 
Tanenhaus and Carlson identified two approaches to the immediacy of comprehension in pars-
ing. The first of these involves rapid building of syntactic structure, so rapid that the parser 
makes hypotheses without using lexical knowledge. This would mean that there would be 
very many small garden-paths occurring during parsing. The second approach involves the 
integration of lexical, syntactic and contextual knowledge in some form of mental models rep-
resentation. The work of Tanenhaus and his colleagues we have seen above is most easily 
identified with the second approach. The first approach finds its most well-known proponents 
amongst Lyn Frazier and her colleagues. 
Indeed, early work in this framework was based very strongly on mechanisms that took 
no account of lexical knowledge. A typical paper in this regard is Frazier (1979) where the 
principles of Minimal Attachment and Late Closure are proposed. These are very similar to a 
number of the parsing principles to be found in Kimball (1973). 
(4.26) 	Minimal Attachment 
Attach incoming material into the phrase marker being constructed using the fewest 
nodes consistent with the well-formedness rules of the language under analysis. 
2 Although Nicol and Pickering (1993) have found evidence for reactivation at both the verb and the gap. 
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(4.27) 	Late Closure 
When possible attach incoming material into the phrase or clause currently being 
parsed. 
These two principles are defined over tree-structures and are thus susceptible to changes 
in the theory of syntax. Structures that were assumed to be easier to parse because they have 
a simpler structure may have been reanalyzed in more recent syntactic theory as having an 
equally complex or a more complex structure. This change arguably happened when Abney 
(1987) reanalyzed the noun phrase in terms of more complex determiner phrases. 
Over the years the approach has been modified to some extent, so that the effects of other 
aspects of linguistic representation can be built in. The architectural assumptions that Frazier 
now makes are made most explicit in her 1991 paper. We will see that Frazier has come 
remarkably close to the position of Tanenhaus, without wanting to recognize this fact. 
In general, what seems to have happened is that the growing part played by thematic roles 
within syntax has had a knock-on effect in psycholinguistics and, in the same way as in syntax, 
researchers have tried to build thematic roles into whatever theoretical framework they were 
advocating before with as little effect on that initial framework as possible. So the differences 
that seem to be emphasized between various psycholinguistic theories are derived from the 
starting assumptions of the researchers' early work and not actually by the endpoint. 
What needs to be done is an exploration of thematic roles in parsing divorced from other 
theoretical assumptions. Or, as I argue in this thesis, to install thematic-conceptual structure 
in a central position within linguistic theory and not a peripheral one. 
In the 1991 paper Frazier assesses what bearing psycholinguistics has on the Fodor (1983) 
modularity thesis. She notes that it is problematic that world knowledge influences the ease of 
reanalysis of unpreferred structures which have garden-pathed the parser. She concedes that 
if this only happens on conscious garden-path sentences, it could be argued that the reanalysis 
takes place outside the language processor. However, she cites data from Frazier and d'Arcais 
(1989) which shows that in Dutch there are pragmatic effects for automatic reanalysis in non-
conscious garden-path sentences and thus it is unlikely that recovery is taking place in the 
central processor. 
Frazier argues that most of the subsystems of PPT are informationally encapsulated mod-
ules, having their own vocabulary. However, like Tanenhaus and his colleagues, she regards 
the thematic processor as being to some extent on the frontier of the language processor and 
the central processor. 
Frazier states that form-driven subsystems of the language module are supplemented by 
the effects of world-knowledge, once translated into the vocabulary of a grammatical module 
by 'pseudo-encapsulated' linguistic systems. 
Evidence for such differing processing vocabularies can be found, she claims, in the work 
of DeVincenzi (1989) on the processing constraints for Binding Theory. The informational 
encapsulation is there, as there is no guarantee that the constituent structure decisions cannot 
carry on without checking the information that the binding-processor is providing. Thus the 
information provided by the Binding theory module and the constituent structure module may 
be inconsistent and will need to be cleaned up at the end of the sentence. 
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Frazier follows Rayner et al. (1983) in the idea that there is a subsystem of the language 
processor concerned with thematic and predication assignments which considers alternate 
analyses in parallel but delays a decision until all the arguments have been received. This 
arrangement is the latent parallelism of Tanenhaus and his colleagues. The difference is that 
thematic roles are not assumed to be able to guide the parse, only help to remedy a misparse. 
The question is whether this position is coherent. Why should syntax operate in a serial 
way and thematic structure in a parallel way? As Fodor (1991) points out this is a very 
tentative suggestion, although it has been made by both Tanenhaus and Frazier. If it could 
be shown that thematic structure operating in a serial way could better explain the parsing 
decisions, this parallel/serial dichotomy would be cast seriously into doubt. Elements of the 
Pritchett (1988) approach as delineated in the next section go some way to doing this. 
Another problem that is faced by both Frazier and Pritchett and indeed any psycholin-
guistic theory that bases itself closely on PPT as it stands, is the problem that is also faced 
by computational modules of PPT grammars: There does not seem to be a globally optimal 
ordering of the principles - the interrelationship between the principles is too complex. 
The interactions involved can be seen in the following diagram from Berwick (1991). 
X-bar Theory 
X-bar structures 
Projection Principle Theta theory 





7 	Case theory 








Empty Category Principle 
Fong (1991) has considered the issue of principle combination and ordering in some detail. 
He built a parser where the order of the principles could be easily changed. He found one 
3see also Pritchett (1992) 
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major problem; there does not seem to be a globally optimal ordering. To see this consider 
(4.28). 
(4.28) 	a. 	*Johni  is crucial [c [ip ti to see this]] 
b. 	*[Np John 1 's mother][vp likes himself i ] 
C. 	*Johni  seems that he 1 likes t1. 
Example (4.28a) violates the Empty Category Principle. Hence the optimal ordering must 
invoke the ECP operation before any other operation that it is not dependent on. On the 
other hand (4.28b) violates Condition A. Hence the optimal ordering must invoke Condition 
A as soon as possible. In particular given that the two principles are independent, the optimal 
ordering must order Condition A before the ECP and vice versa. Similarly (4.28c) demands 
that the Case Condition of Traces' operation must precede the other two operations. Hence a 
globally optimal ordering is impossible. 
Given that no optimal ordering is possible, Fong proposes a heuristic which the parser can 
use to reduce the amount of unnecessary work. The parser 'predicts' a failing filter. That is 
it will predict what principle the structure is most likely to violate given certain structural 
clues. Each structure clue is associated with a list of possible failing filters. Some of these are 








Possible failing filters 
ECP, and Case Condition on traces 
Case Filter 
Theta Criterion/Case Filter 
Theta-criterion 
Binding Theory Condition A 
Binding Theory Condition B 
Although this dynamic ordering principle performs well in many test cases, it is by no 
means foolproof. There are also many cases where the mechanism triggers an unprofitable 
reordering of the default order of the operations. 
Frazier has to hope that it is when optimal ordering breaks down in this way that garden-
paths and, particularly, conscious garden-paths occur. But overall it seems unlikely that 
processing based on PPT is plausible with our current understanding of the nature of PPT 
and its computational complexity 4 . 
4.4 Thematic Roles Determine Parsing Decisions 
Pritchett (1988, 1992) proposes a system where thematic roles are central to the parsing 
decisions and to predictions as to when a garden-path will be conscious and when it will not. 
4 Although it may be the case that principle ordering could be achieved by using recurrent constraints, where 
if one principle started to apply the other principles would be relegated. This may be able to decide which 
principle is most apt at a particular point, but will not be able to calculate the principles that will apply across 
the whole sentence and the ordering in which they should apply, as the constraints approach will not be able 
to solve the problems identified by Fong. 
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He sees the parser as being isomorphous with the grammar. This seems to be the position 
that Frazier (1991) was (unexpectedly) taking. This is an unusual position as Frazier and 
most others felt that the parser and the grammar must be distinct following the demise of the 
Derivational Theory of Complexity (See, for example, Miller and Isard (1963)). 
Much of what Pritchett has to say is reminiscent of the work of Tanenhaus and his col-
leagues. However, the form of thematic roles assumed by Pritchett is somewhat weaker than 
that assumed by Tanenhaus. Whereas Tanenhaus sees thematic roles as conceptual entities 
providing a link to mental models, Pritchett sees them as purely structural entities that need 
not have any content whatsoever. 
This view comes as no real surprise as Pritchett's theory has been derived directly from 
the principles of PPT. Indeed, he expands the thematic principles below to include the on-line 
application of all of the principles of PPT. We have seen the kinds of problems that such an 
approach comes up against in the previous section. However, with these provisos in mind, it is 
still worthwhile investigating Pritchett's mechanisms which do fairly successfully predict when 
a parsing mistake will become conscious. This aspect of the theory could well be expanded 
into a richer theory by adding some of the insights of the Tanenhaus framework. What is 
fairly successful in terms of structural thematic roles may be even more successful when these 
thematic roles are incorporated into a decompositional representation of conceptual-thematic 
structure. 
The principles Pritchett assumes are: 
	
(4.29) 	Theta Attachment 
The theta criterion attempts to be satisfied at every point during processing given 
the maximal theta-grid. 
(4.30) 	Theta-Reanalysis Constraint 
Syntactic reanalysis which reinterprets a theta-marked constituent as outside of a 
current theta-domain is costly. 
and the theta domain is defined in the following way: 
(4.31) 	Theta-Domain 
a is in the theta-domain of /3 if a receives the -y theta role from /3 or a is dominated 
by a constituent that receives a theta role from /3. 
If it is accepted that Pritchett's theta roles are really only argument positions, these three 
principles could be paraphrased as what I will call the Conscious Garden Path Hypothesis. 
(4.32) 	The Conscious Garden-Path Hypothesis (CGPH) 
In on-line processing, attempt to attach each NP as an argument of a preceding 
predicate. If an argument, once attached to one argument position of a predicate, 
has instead to be attached to a different argument position of that predicate, or 
alternatively to an argument position of a different predicate, a conscious garden-
path will occur 
Turning now to the data we saw in section 2, we can see how Pritchett's theory accounts 
for the patterns observed. 
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(4.33) 	=(4.1b) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
Race has the maximal theta-grid (Agent, Location). As soon as race is encountered the 
horse is allocated the Agent role. Past the barn is then assigned the Theme role. When input 
then continues fell is encountered which has the theta grid (Agent). No Agent is available, 
so reanalysis has to occur, with the horse being removed from the theta grid of race and 
reanalyzed as the Agent of fell. Or, in terms of the CGPH, the horse is no longer an argument 
of the predicate race, rather it is reanalyzed as an argument of the predicate fell. 
The explanation for the second type of garden path sentence proceeds in an analogous way. 
(4.34) 	= (4.2b) The patient persuaded the doctor that he was having trouble with to leave. 
Persuade has the maximal theta-grid (Agent, Goal, Proposition), or in terms of the 
CGPH, three arguments. The patient is assigned the Agent/ist argument role when persuade 
is reached. The doctor is assigned the Goal/2nd argument role, and the Proposition/3rd 
argument role is assigned immediately to that he was having trouble with as both internal 
arguments could be satisfied at this stage by doing so. Encountering to leave forces reanalysis 
as a relative clause. Thus that he was having trouble with has to be removed from the third 
argument position and reassigned as part of the second argument/Goal role. 
In each of the object/subject ambiguity sentences in (4.3), the object analysis will be 
preferred as this will mean the relevant NP being attached to a verb that has already appeared 
with its potential argument position available to the reader. A subject analysis would require 
waiting for a verb requiring a subject, an event that the reader cannot be sure will happen. 
4.5 Thematic Information in Sentence Processing 
In general, there seems to be no load difference between ambiguous and non-ambiguous mate-
rial. This fact favours serial models or resource free parallel models. In terms of the thematic 
role/structure models this means that each of the Tanenhaus, Frazier and Pritchett models 
are consistent with this finding. 
When it comes to the disambiguating region, however, there do seem to be differences in 
the processing load. At least, a continuation after the ambiguous region takes longer to process 
than the same material in a non-ambiguous context. Once more all of the models that include 
a place for thematic roles are compatible with this observation. 
The evidence with regard to the mechanism of initial choice is more confused. Frazier's 
approach (Section 4.3) was a tree-based approach with a thematic checking mechanism. Both 
the Tanenhaus account (Section 4.2) and the Pritchett account (Section 4.4) are thematic 
assignment accounts. The difference between these latter two accounts is that the Tanenhaus 
account provides latent parallelism and thus predicts ease of recovery, whereas the Pritchett 
account is strictly serial and predicts conscious difficulty in recovering from misparses. 
Problems for the tree-structure account can be found in Taraban and McClelland (1988), 
where it is shown that in sentences with PPs that could be attached either as modifiers of the 
NP or as modifiers of the verb, the preferred attachment to the verb that the tree-structure 
based approach suggests is not always the preferred option. This will be discussed in depth 
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in the next chapter. There is also the problem of the complexity of PPT in any theory that 
is to be based on the principles of PPT in totality, as Frazier's most recent suggestions would 
seem to suggest. 
Lexical frame strategies and discourse-driven strategies suffer from the problem that it is 
difficult to differentiate between the mechanism of initial choice and the mechanism of checking. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, exposure-based strategies do not seem to 
explain processing preferences but merely to reflect them in a circular manner. 
The thematic-based accounts suffer from the problem of insufficient coverage of the data. 
These accounts make no prediction whatsoever for cases where adjuncts are involved (The 
PP/NP ambiguity in Taraban and McClelland (1988) provides an example of this). However, 
I will show that a thematic account based on thematic-conceptual structures, as opposed to 
mere thematic roles) can provide a solution to this problem (See Chapter 5). 
4.6 Thematic Structure in Discourse 
All things being equal, sentence comprehension can only really be said to have occurred when 
the reader has calculated the thematic relationships within the sentence. In other words, it 
is thematic structure that is central to language comprehension. If this is so, it comes as no 
surprise that thematic structure plays a role in language processing, as I have shown in the 
previous sections. 
When we turn to discourse structure and specifically to the construction of a discourse 
model in comprehension, there is evidence that thematic structure acts as the interface between 
syntax and this discourse model. This evidence comes from Stevenson et al. (1994). This work 
shows that thematic roles differ in their saliency in the construction of the discourse model 
with particular regard to reference resolution. 
The Carlson and Tanenhaus model suggests that the nature of described events and the 
relationship between them may also influence the way that pronouns are understood. 
Following this train of thought, we might surmise that the arguments associated with the 
verb introduce entities into the discourse model. These entities can then serve as the potential 
antecedent of a pronoun. Thematic roles could then be seen as specifying the relationship of 
these arguments to the verb. 
It may also be the case that some thematic relationships make certain entities more salient 
than others. This could perhaps be modeled within thematic-conceptual structure. These 
issues were examined by Stevenson et al. They examined preferences for one antecedent over 
another in sentence continuations such as 
(4.35) 	Ken admired Geoff and he. 
Here, the he could refer either to Geoff or Ken. They examined how other factors could 
interact with the preferred antecedent and the influence of thematic roles. These factors are 
. The observed advantage for the first mentioned individual in the sentence. 
• The presence or absence of a pronoun (Pronoun/No Pronoun Conditions) in the sentence 
presented to the subjects. 
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(4.36) 	a. Ken admired Geoff and he... (Pronoun) 
b. Ken admired Geoff and... (No Pronoun) 
• The difference between within- and between-sentence 'references. 
(4.37) 	a. Ken admired Geoff and he... (within-sentence) 
b. Ken admired Geoff. He... (between-sentence) 
To examine the influence of the first mention advantage, the sentence position of the 
antecedents was varied (Stevenson et al. 1994). A proper evaluation of the relative salience 
of antecedents with different thematic roles requires that any effect of thematic role is pitted 
against the first mention effect. 
Omitting the pronoun allowed investigation of two aspects of pronoun comprehension: 
the way that a particular antecedent may be more highly focused. This is termed a 
top-down effect because the focused antecedent can be thought of as being in focus even 
before a pronoun is encountered. 
the way that a pronoun may trigger specific search processes. They call this a bottom-up 
effect because it concerns processes that are triggered by linguistic input. 
(4.38) 	Goal-Source 
Version 1: John seized the comic from Bill. (Goal Theme Source) 
Version 2: John passed the comic to Bill. (Source Theme Goal) 
(4.39) 	Agent-Patient 
Version 1: Joseph hit Patrick. (Agent Patient) 
Version 2: Patrick was hit by Joseph. (Patient Agent) 
(4.40) Experiencer-Stimulus 
Version 1: Ken admired Geoff. (Experiencer Stimulus) 
Version 2: Ken impressed Geoff. (Stimulus Experiencer) 
(4.41) Agent Goal/Source 
Version 1: Simon ran towards Richard. (Agent Goal) 
Version 2: Simon ran away from Richard. (Agent Source) 
For all these sentences, the subjects had to produce a continuation, The following pattern 
was observed. 
• In Goal-Source sentences there was a preference for Goal. 
• In Agent-Patient sentences there was a preference for Patient. 
• In Experiencer-Stimulus sentence there was a preference for the Stimulus. 
• In the Agent-Goal/Source sentences there was no preference. 
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Stevenson et al. concluded that the influence of thematic roles is a top-down effect, since the 
role preferences were observed even in the No Pronoun condition, i.e. where the continuation 
was elicited merely by and. It appears then that the thematic role effect is due to the preferred 
role becoming more highly focussed and accessible in the mental model. 
It now remained for the thematic preference to be characterized. There is an apparent 
preference for focusing on the consequence of an event. However, this preference can be 
manipulated to some extent. If the two sentences are conjoined by and the Experiencer is 
preferred to the Stimulus. It is suggested by Stevenson et al. that the clausal link between 
the sentences is nullified by and. That is, when there are two sentences there is a focus on the 
cause of the event and when the sentences are conjoined there was a focus on the consequences 
of the experience. 
This proposed psychological saliency of the consequences of an event was tested by using 
the connective so which focuses on the consequence of the event, and the connective because 
which focuses on the cause of an event. These connectives were expected to reinforce or reduce 
the focusing due to event structure. Thus the preferences for Goal and Patient are expected 
to be reduced by because. 
The lack of focus in the Experiencer-Stimulus sentences leads to the expectation that so 
and because will be the sole determinants of the preference, with so leading to a preference for 
the Experience and because leading to a preference for the Stimulus. These predictions were 
all shown to be correct. 
We see in the work if Stevenson et al. clear evidence for a focusing on the consequences 
of an event. This psychological saliency with regards to language will be discussed in more 
general cognitive terms the in Chapter 6. 
4.7 The Time-Course of Sentence Comprehension 
In the course of this discussion, two main themes have emerged: the determinants of parsing 
decisions and the time-course of parsing decisions. I have discussed the various potential 
determinants of parsing decision (statistics, phrase-structure, thematic/argument structure) 
without examining in any principled way when these factors come into play during sentence 
comprehension. 
In this section I will describe what seems to be the contemporary consensus with respect to 
the time-course of parsing. It is worth pointing out that much of what follows is controversial 
nonetheless. However, what can be drawn from an overview of psycholinguistic data is that 
thematic/conceptual structure would seem to be implicated most strongly over the entire act 
of language comprehension in general and should thus be central rather than peripheral to 
theories of parsing and language comprehension. 
A distinction is often drawn between lexical proposal and lexical filtering. In lexical pro-
posal, combinatory information in the lexicon is used to propose structure in advance of input. 
In lexical filtering, structure is built, and then filtered, as lexical information is used to reject 
the structures so generated. 
This distinction can be misleading. So for example, studied could be either a past-participle 
or the past form of the verb. If the thematic role of the subject is used to choose between 
these options, this could in some sense be seen as filtering. But the choice that has been made 
could then be said to be proposing further structure. 
In general, in sentence comprehension, there are four main elements distributed over time: 
selection, assembly, checking and revision. Selection involves selecting the lexical information 
to be used to make initial decisions. On the basis of these decisions, a structure is assembled. 
This structure is then checked for coherence and if found to be incoherent, the structure is 
revised. 
Any decisions made on psycholinguistic proposals should be made with one thing in mind - 
psycholinguistics is not merely about structure building, but rather it is about interpretation. 
Thus there is the question of whether one interpretation or two is followed over the course 
of language comprehension. The weight of the evidence suggests that serial, rather than 
parallel, interpretation takes place, as interpretation seems to be incremental. However, as we 
have seen Tanenhaus argues for latent parallelism. This parallelism is latent as only one core 
meaning of the verb in question is followed and the parallelism is in terms only of the possible 
assignments of thematic roles associated with that core meaning. Another choice would be to 
suspend decisions on interpretation (Perfetti (1992)), but suspended interpretation decisions 
seem unlikely given that gap-filling seems to take place very rapidly at the verb rather than 
at a syntactic gap, or possibly at both (Nicol and Pickering (1993)). 
The evidence also seems to favour a model where thematic roles predict structure and 
where interpretations are assembled on the basis of this information. Revision after checking 
also seems to have a thematic component (Frazier (1991); Carlson and Tanenhaus (1988)) and 
in terms of discourse, thematic structure seems to be the crucial link here also. 
Assembly must construct linguistic representations. Checking is required to see whether 
these representations are coherent. The only plausible way for checking to be carried out then 
is in terms of interpretation. Thus central to both checking and assembly is the process of 
interpretation and the main aim of psycholinguistics should be to explain the processes of 
interpretation. - 
Thus in assembly, models that allow integration of sentences into conceptual or discourse 
models are to be preferred to assembly procedures that result only in syntactic trees. Whatever 
the relevant representation turns out to be, it should be able to handle such phenomena as 
co-reference. Syntactic theories would seem to have the upper hand here, but this is only 
because no real attempts have been made to explain within conceptual/thematic structure 
phenomena that have up to now been captured within syntactic theory. 
So, for example, the results of experiments on gap-filling would indicate that a conceptual 
rather than a syntactic theory seems to be most apt as gap-filling seems to be based on a 
conceptual decision at the verb rather than a syntactic decision at the gap site. 
With respect to checking we have seen that Frazier (1991) has proposed a checking device 
based on thematic information and the Tanenhaus model also provides a recovery procedure 
based on thematic roles. This finding now opens up the question of whether the checking 
procedure on discovering a misparse requires the structure to be computed from scratch, or 
whether the checking procedure itself can provide clues as to the correct structure. 
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4.8 Language Processing and Language Acquisition 
Fodor (1998a) has pointed out that theories of language processing and language acquisition 
have been to a large part in ignorance of each other. This is especially surprising as models 
of parameter setting have made it very clear that in order to set parameters from input 
data, learners need to be able to parse the input data. Indeed, it is difficult to relate the 
psycholinguistic data discussed above to the discussion of language acquisition in chapter 3. 
In this section I will discuss how Fodor attempts to link parsing to learning, and learning 
to parsing (Fodor (1998a, 1998b)). I will then suggest how I see a way to link the syntactic 
discussion of Chapter 2 to the language acquisition discussion of Chapter 3, and all this in turn 
to the psycholinguistic discussion of this chapter. In doing this, I will make some suggestions 
as to how we would expect these links to shake out in testable psycholinguistic terms. I will 
explore these suggestions both by referring to previously intransigent psycholinguistic data, as 
well as by testing experimentally the kinds of predictions I make. 
Fodor discusses data from Cuetos and Mitchell (1988), where it was discovered that ad-
juncts in English tend to attach low, whereas adjuncts in Spanish tend to attach high. With 
regard to this data, Gibson et al. (1996) suggested that there was potentially a parameter for 
the height of attachment and Mitchell and Cuetos (1991) suggested that the preference could 
be set as a response to the frequency of a particular construction in the relevant language. 
Fodor argues that we have a deeper explanatory theory if what the parser does is not a 
product of learning. Her evidence for this is that wherever a parser has a choice of construction, 
there is a systematic preference for one of the other, as was clear from the previous discussion in 
this chapter. Secondly, the parser does not invariably choose the most frequent construction 5 . 
Fodor chooses to remain with a purely structural theory (without thematic content) and argues 
that all other things being equal, the parser prefers the simplest structure. 
For Minimal Attachment it thus makes sense that less structure is preferred to more, but 
for this to be implemented in learning the parser needs to be able to tell what less structure is. 
She proposes that there is a 'race' mechanism in which comparative evaluation of alternative 
potential attachments takes place. The first attachment that is computed (presumed to be 
the simplest) wins. Fodor claims that this can occur at no extra cost. This seems an unusual 
claim, as it clearly seems to be the case, as she herself contends, that one structure is preferred 
initially, and the evidence overall clearly seems to indicate that only one structure is followed 
at a time, and if this structure proves to be incorrect, recovery comes at some cost. Thus to 
argue that all potential attachments being computed at the same time with one winning out 
is equal to a preferred initial analysis does seem to be having her cake and eating it. 
Fodor then turns this around and looks at what the parser has to offer the learning system. 
Fodor argues that the Human Sentence Processing Mechanism is innate and that as language 
learning implicates parsing routines, the learner's encounters with language are filtered through 
the parsing mechanism. There are, however, a number of problems for the setting of parameters 
by the parser. First, the setting of a parameter is often reliant on facts about a sentence that 
are not apparent from the surface form. Second, many sentences are parametrically ambiguous, 
and third as we saw in section 4.4, the interaction of parameters is often very complex. 
5 However, the discussion of Taraban and McCIeIland (1988) in the next chapter adds even more to this 
discussion. 
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Sentences need to be parsed before parameters can be set, but a parser needs a grammar 
inside it to achieve this. Any sentence a learner can parse successfully is already licensed and 
thus the learner can learn nothing new from such a sentence. Thus, in order to learn, an 
unlicensed sentence must be presented. One option for the learner would then be to parse as 
best it can and then patch up a solution for the remainder of the sentence. This was what 
the Triggering Learning Algorithm (Gibson and Wexler (1994)) was doing (see discussion in 
Section 3.3). Thus the child would guess a parameter value, and test whenever an unlicensed 
sentence occurs. This is not only extremely inefficient, it would also mean that some children 
would be operating with a language significantly different to the one they are exposed to (for 
a period of time at least). 
Fodor sees the parser helping out in such an impasse by giving clues as to the way the input 
could be successfully parsed. Specifically, she proposes a set of innate tree-lets, representing 
parameters. These tree-lets are pieces of a syntactic tree. Tree-lets can be seen as the correlate 
of the parsing packages Fodor proposed in the companion paper discussed previously in this 
section. A learner using these tree-lets is termed a Structural Triggers Learner (STL) by Fodor. 
At a point of ambiguity the learner will have access to full set of tree-lets. But parallel testing 
is unlikely as we have seen that the consensus is that parsers operate in a serial manner. 
If the learning system could be told whether or not there is a competing analysis, it would 
learn parameter values from the unambiguous cases and set aside the ambiguous sentences. 
This is what Inoue and Fodor (1995) termed flagged serial parsing. Thus a learner would 
engage in no more learning past the ambiguity point. This would be a problem, of course, in 
languages such as Japanese where most of the ambiguity is in the initial part of the sentence. 
There are other potential problems with such an approach; some parameters may only occur 
after points of ambiguity, and ambiguity may be underestimated and parameters may be set 
on the basis of ambiguous data, where the ambiguity was not detected by the parser. Crucially 
at the onset of learning, almost all sentences will be ambiguous. 
Fodor suggests three possibilities by which such problems could be avoided. First, with 
robust parsing the parser could be allowed to continue past an ambiguity point to see how 
much of the remaining sentence could be successfully parsed. At ambiguities the alternative 
parses could be evaluated and preference ratings posted on the flags. It is difficult to know 
how such preference ratings should be calculated, and how much decision-making the child 
would have to put 'on hold'. 
The second option could be parametric defaults. Defaults empower learners by allowing 
learning to get underway. Ordering of parameters could also be an option, but the discussion in 
Section 4.4 shows that orderings of principles and parameters is extremely difficult to ascertain. 
Both of these options may appear stipulative. Fodor argues that they fall out naturally from 
the notion of learning by parsing as the parser is seen as a least effort device. The default value 
is whichever value is the quickest for the parser to access, that is, the quickest and simplest in 
the parsing 'race'. Again this seems to suggest latent parallelism in the parsing mechanism, 
which goes against the weight of the evidence. 
The third option, particularly interesting in light of the discussion on the role of functional 
categories in language acquisition of the previous chapter, is the idea that some parameters 
may be subordinate to others. In other words, there is a simpler, set of parameters that need to 
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be set initially (as well as a simpler set of functional categories) and that additional parameters 
can only be set when the initial parameters have been set (and/or further functional categories 
emerge). The younger child would thus have less ambiguity to contend with. This would be 
very much a maturational theory. The weight of the evidence of Chapter 3 would indeed 
favour a maturational acquisition theory, with thematic structure forming the all-important 
initial layer. 
4.9 Conclusions 
We have seen that thematic roles can explain both initial parsing preferences in sentence 
processing, and that they are centrally implicated in the construction of a discourse model, 
and that within this discourse model certain aspects (the consequences) of the event structure 
are more salient than others. 
We certainly need some way of connecting the thematic structure to the arguments of a 
verb so that Pritchett's parsing principles can be maintained. His relational, plainly syntactic 
thematic roles cannot be individuated from syntactic arguments in theoretical terms. 
We would also like a framework which ensures representation of event structure in a way 
that allows the psychological saliency of the consequences of an event to be easily derived from 
the representation. This is an important link to other aspects of the psychology of language 
that are often ignored. By concentrating on the computational aspects of the processing 
of language, it is often forgotten that the processing theories must be consistent with the 
processes and stages involved in the acquisition of language by children. And in addition to 
this concept, the evolution of language, in the ecological perspective of human beings, will also 
have shaped certain saliencies that are relevant to processing. These issues will be discussed 
in the concluding chapter. 
In the next chapter I will discuss phenomena from a number of past experiments and evi-
dence from a number of new experiments designed in this thesis that indicate that a thematic-





In this chapter I will address some further psycholinguistic issues that do not seem to have 
been adequately explained in the literature, or to the extent that explanations exist they are 
erroneous, in my opinion. The topics I will cover here are noun/verb attachment ambiguities, 
specifically after with, and what has come to be known as syntactic priming. All these can be 
successfully explained by using thematic-conceptual structure. 
5.1 Attachment Ambiguities with with 
Tree-structure based approaches to sentence processing have until recently been arguably the 
most influential of all psycholinguistic theories. The best known principles in the tree-based 
framework are Minimal Attachment (MA) and Late Closure (LC), which are identified with 
the work of Lyn Frazier (See Section 4.3) and her colleagues. This approach has been claimed 
to have had a number of successes in explanatory terms for a range of ambiguities as can be 
seen below. 
(5.1) 	NP/S Ambiguities 
As soon as he had phoned his wife started to prepare for the journey. 
As soon as he had phoned his wife she started to prepare for the journey. 
(5.2) 	Modifier Ambiguities in NP V NP PP Sentences 
The girl hit the boy with a stick. 
(5.3) 	Reduced Relatives 
The horse raced past the barn fell. 
(5.4) 	Choice of NP to attach modifier to 
The actor saw the sister of the man with a limp. 
However, I argued in Chapter 4 that tree-structural approaches are necessarily sensitive 
to whatever changes the theory of tree-structures itself undergoes. Many of the structures 
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assumed in the early work on Minimal Attachment and Late Closure are no longer standard. 
In addition, in recent years cross-linguistic evidence has started to cast doubt on the validity 
of claims based purely on tree-structure. This evidence came in the work of Cuetos and 
Mitchell (1988), who compared the attachment preferences in Spanish and English for the 
types of sentences that had previously been explained in MA/LC terms. They found that in 
the equivalent English and Spanish sentences (5.5)-(5.6) there was a difference in attachment 
preference from one language to another. 
(5.5) 	El periodista entrevisto a la hija del coronel que tuvo el accidente. 
(5.6) 	The journalist interviewed the daughter of the colonel who had had the accident. 
In Spanish, there is a preference to assign to the first NP, the opposite strategy to Late 
Closure. In English, Late Closure effects were replicated and the preferred attachment was 
to the second NP. There are currently two competing explanations for this crosslinguistic 
difference. One relies on linguistic exposure and the other on memory-based heuristics. 
Psycholinguistic parameters were first proposed by Cuetos and Mitchell (1988). They 
propose that the attachment preferences shown by speakers of a particular language are based 
on the frequency of the preferred attachment to which the speaker of that language has been 
exposed. Thus it is assumed that attachment to the first NP is most frequent in Spanish and 
attachment to the second NP is most frequent in English. There is some counter-evidence to 
this claim, however. In English it would be expected that in NP VP NP PP ambiguities such 
as (5.7), the verb attachment would be most frequent in the language as this has been claimed 
to be the preferred attachment in English (we will see that the facts of this case are a good 
deal more complicated). 
(5.7) 	The man hit the girl with a stick. 
However, in one of the very few analyses of the frequencies of contrasting attachments in a 
large corpus Hindle and Rooth (1993) have shown that it is in fact the noun attachment that 
is most common in English. 
To circumvent this problem Gibson et al. (1996) have proposed a theory centred around 
memory-based parsing heuristics. They provide two principles which the parser uses to give 
the correct parsing preferences for the two languages Cuetos and Mitchell (1988) consider. 
These principles are 
The Property of Recency Preference 
The cost of attaching an item increases as the distance from the attachee increases. This 
increase in cost is not incremental. Rather it is defined as an increasing exponential 
decay function. 
The Property of Predicate Proximity 
There is a processing cost whenever an element is attached to a site which is further 
away from the predicate than another position to which the same item could have been 
attached which is closer to the predicate. 
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It is then assumed that the Recency Preference dominates in English and that the Pred-
icate Proximity Preference dominates in Spanish. In sum, the memory-based analysis of the 
crosslinguistic differences seems at this point to be the most successful. But as Gibson et al. 
(1994) acknowledge, their approach does not explain one of the best-known parsing preferences 
which we have already touched on: the NP VP NP PP ambiguity. They concede that some 
form of content-based or plausibility-based approach will probably be necessary. 
However, the parsing preferences for this ambiguity are not as clear-cut as was first claimed 
by Rayner et al. (1983). And it is because of the complexity of the data for English alone, 
that a frequency based account of both Spanish and English data is thrown into doubt. 
Taraban and McClelland (1988) have shown that in different contexts the parsing pref-
erences change. This gives further support for a content-based explanation of these parsing 
preferences. If this linguistic content could be linked in some sensible way to other aspects of 
human cognition, this would of course be even more interesting from a theoretical standpoint. 
I will concentrate on a subset of the sentences that Taraban and McClelland discuss. This 
subset comprises what is probably the stereotypical NP VP NP PP ambiguity, namely with-
phrases. The attachment preferences found were the following: (the preferred attachment is 
the first of the pair in each case) 
Verb Attachment Preferred to Attachment to the Noun 
(5.8) 	a. The spy saw the cop with binoculars. 
b. The spy saw the cop with the revolver. 
(5.9) 	a. 	The little girl tried to cut the apple with plastic knives. 
b. The little girl tried to cut the apple with plastic coating. 
(5.10) 	a. The landlord painted the walls with a brush. 
b. The landlord painted the walls with cracks. 
(5.11) 	a. Jim played the records with John's needle. 
b. Jim played the records with deep scratches. 
(5.12) 	a. The kid hit the girl with a whip. 
b. The kid hit the girl with a wart. 
(5.13) 	a. The doctor examined the patient with a stethoscope. 
b. The doctor examined the patient with a toothache. 
NP-Attachment Preferred to Attachment to the Verb 
(5.14) 
	
	a. The couple admired the house with a garden. 
b. The couple admired the house with a friend. 
(5.15) a. The woman married the man with money. 
b. The woman married the man with delight 
105 
	
(5.16) 	a. The doctor cured the woman with tuberculosis. 
b. The doctor cured the woman with penicillin. 
(5.17) 	a. The hospital admitted the patient with cancer. 
b. The hospital admitted the patient with urgency. 
(5.18) 	a. John ordered a pizza with pepperoni. 
b. John ordered a pizza with enthusiasm. 
In summary, these results show that for the verbs see, cut, paint, play, hit and examine 
there is a preference for an instrumental modifier of the verb over a modifier of the noun. 
And for the verbs admire, marry, cure, admit and order there is a preference for a noun 
modifier over either an adverbial modifier of the verb or a comitative modifier of the verb. 
This difference would then seem to be linked in some way to the semantics of the verb in 
question. 
It is not only the memory-based approach that has trouble explaining the adjunct attach-
ment preferences. Any approach based on verbal subcategorization will, by definition, not 
have anything to say about adjuncts. These data require an explanation based purely on the 
semantics of the verb in isolation from their subcategorization properties. 
We need then to find some content-based explanation of these results. We want somehow 
to constrain the theory of content that is relevant to psycholinguistics to as small a subset of 
all possible meanings as possible. There are a number of plausible strategies that could be 
applied to this problem. 
One such strategy is the one I have taken in this thesis: to look at the range of semantic 
features that are reflected in the languages of the world. An example of such can be found in 
Talmy (1985). Alternatively we could try to link the sort of features that influence parsing to 
those that seem fundamental cognitively - a plausible candidate is the human conception of 
force dynamics, or cause and effect. It comes as no surprise that there is an overlap between 
these two approaches. Force-dynamics and cause and effect are grammaticalized in most (if 
not all) of the world's languages. 
A first approximation to the semantic features involved in these sentences can be found in a 
subset of the conceptual relationships that are encoded in thematic-conceptual structure: the 
notion of contact. The set of verbs that result in verbal attachment preference mostly involve 
some notion of contact. The possible exceptions being examine and see. If we examine the 
notion of contact itself we can get a more satisfactory and inclusive feature to explain these 
differences. 
In a contact event an initiator comes into contact with an endpoint. This contact can be 
mediated when the initiator comes into contact with an item that then in turn comes into 
contact with the endpoint. So, in effect, what we have in English is an event bounded by a 
subject and an object, where it is possible for an intermediary item to mediate this event. 
This mediation is only possible for stereotypical causation-type events. We need then some 
type of representation for stereotypical causation events which allows this mediation. 
In English the initiator of the causal chain is usually associated with the subject and the 
endpoint of the causal chain is associated with the object. Thus subject and object delimit 
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the verbal segment of the causal chain. 
Using this framework I propose that verbs which license an instrumental adjunct argument 
will have lexical entries such as (5.19) and verbs that occur only with adverbial adjuncts or a 
comitative argument will not. 
	









Y 	Z 	 INSTRUMENT (2) 
 Event) 
(5.19) 	 X=l,Y=2,Z=3 
The most important factor in the licensing of an instrumental reading is the simple cau-
sation event relating the initiator and the endpoint. This causation event can be mediated. 
There are further semantic restrictions on the causation event which may well differ from lan-
guage to language. We have already seen that contact seems to be among these for English. 
The instrument in English may also not be volitional. The verbs examine and see seem not 
to be captured by the restriction of contact - unless of course vision is seen in some way as 
a metaphorical contact (cf. eye contact, catch sight of). This suggestion would seem to be 
particularly plausible in the light of the strength of the visual metaphor in the grammatical-
ization of language (Recall the work of Sweetser in the grammaticalization section of Chapter 
3). Alternatively, it may be that vision itself is another of the restrictions. 
On reading a verb associated with a lexical entry like that in (5.19), this verb being 
then followed by with, the sentence processor will have the expectation that an instrumental 
argument will follow the with and continuations reflecting this expectation will be processed 
more quickly than those which violate it. The verbs that do not have a lexical entry similar to 
(5.19) will never license an instrumental argument, and a noun phrase modifier is the resulting 
expected continuation. 
In all cases there still exists the possibility that the plausibility of the item as either an 
instrument or as a noun modifier can have an additional effect on the parsing time. 
The strength of this content based approach to these parsing preferences comes in the 
link I have established between the thematic-conceptual structure I have proposed and the 
properties and relative saliencies of human cognition both in acquisition and as I argue in 
Chapter 6, in language evolution. 
I have proposed above a number of semantic features that seem to have a bearing on psy-
cholinguistic phenomena. It seems that these features are particularly salient to the individual. 
Evidence for this can be found in experiments performed with very young children. There is 
evidence that children of a very young age exhibit knowledge of force dynamics as we saw in 
Chapter 3 in the experiments of Baillargeon (1987); Spelke (1991); Leslie (1984). 
Given the argument advanced here, it would seem hardly surprising that human language 
mirrors the way we perceive the world and that the representations involved also include 
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elements of human cognition. If language has evolved from other aspects of human cognition, 
it is hardly surprising that the language learning system, as well as the sentence processor, 
employs these aspects of cognition in the learning process (See Chapter 6 for a speculative 
discussion on how this development may have occurred). In addition, if Siskind's hypotheses 
about language learning prove to be correct it seems that the sentence processor may well use 
the same principles as the language acquisition device. 
The explanatory failings of both tree-based and memory-based approaches with respect 
to NP-VP-NP-PP ambiguities leads us to accept that some notion of content is essential to 
psycholinguistic theory. 
5.2 Sentence-Level Priming is Not Dependent on Syn-
tactic Structure 
Priming is a well-known effect at the lexical level. The phenomenon of word priming has 
shed a good deal of light on the issues of representation and process in word recognition. 
Indeed, word-level priming phenomena have been one of the most influential and productive 
areas in psychology. The basic explanatory principle behind priming is that if the processing 
of one stimulus affects the processing of another stimulus, then the two are assumed to be 
related along a dimension relevant to the cognitive system. The phenomenon of sentence 
priming promises to do the same at a higher level of language processing. Sentence priming is 
greatly under-researched and is potentially an area of ground-breaking research of even greater 
importance than lexical priming. Branigan et al. (1995b) argue that priming provides a means 
for tapping in to the underlying commonalities of representation that are basic across language 
processes underlying both perception and production. Branigan et al. (1995a) have explained 
the relevance of sentence priming to linguistic theories in the following way. Processing theories 
have been content to assume that theoretical linguistics describes mental representations and 
that theories of parsing and comprehension draw on such theoretical linguistic constructs in 
their formulation. Since priming assumes that the primed structure and the prime must be in 
the same mental category, priming studies are now in the position to suggest the knowledge 
of language that cognitivist theories seek to describe. Thus priming studies allow for theories 
of comprehension and production to suggest the content of theoretical linguistic constructs, 
rather than relying on the output of theoretical linguistic theories top give structures upon 
which theories of comprehension can be based. 
Sentence priming in the sense used here is not to be confused with the related phenomenon 
on corpus based priming. Schenkein (1980) and Tannen (1984, 1989) found a general tendency 
for repetition at many levels including the lexical and discourse level and Weiner and Labov 
(1983) found a tendency for syntactic forms to be repeated in interview situations. Sentence 
priming in the sense used here is said to occur when the process of reading or producing one 
sentence results in a facilitation of either the reading or production of another sentence sharing 
some similarity of form. This phenomenon is particularly exciting as it potentially provides 
one of the most direct methods available for tapping into the representations that lie behind 
language use. Also, as I argue below, this is not only at the level of syntactic structure, but 
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also at the level of thematic-conceptual structure and perhaps at even higher levels of linguistic 
structure, such as focus. Sentence priming may yield a major step forward in understanding 
not only the syntactic and conceptual representations behind language, but also the processes 
involved in their interaction in language use. 
The early papers in this field argued for a priming effect based simply on the syntactic 
structure of the sentence, reflecting the contemporary hegemony of syntax in the psycholin-
guistic literature. However, there is recent evidence which strongly suggests an alternative 
interpretation in terms of conceptual structure. 
Branigan (1995) concludes from a number of experiments in syntactic priming in com-
prehension, production and from comprehension to production that the basis of priming is 
syntactic structure representation and not a procedure that is common to both comprehen-
sion and production. She also claims that it is only constituent structure that is relevant to 
priming and specifically that thematic roles have no influence. Branigan et al. (1995a) add 
further that as syntactic priming takes place between sentences containing different verbs, 
this indicates that syntactic information is specified over classes of verbs and is not stored 
separately as part of each verb's lexical entry. 
I will show that there is an alternative explanation of the results (See also Evans (1993)), 
where there is direct implication of thematic roles, or more accurately the extended represen-
tational theory of thematic-conceptual structure. In addition, this thematic representation is 
inextricably linked to a procedure which is common to both comprehension and production. 
There are then two issues to be addressed. First, can it be shown that thematic-conceptual 
structure of some kind is involved in the priming of structures where it has been assumed that 
thematic roles have no influence of any kind. Once this has been shown to be the case it 
also follows that syntactic information is shared between verbs and is not stored separately 
in each verbs lexical entry. Commonalities in the syntactic behaviour of verbs based on their 
underlying thematic-conceptual structure is exactly what we would expect. 
The second issue is whether there is a process of some kind which could be relevant to both 
comprehension and production, but will nonetheless predict the differential results that have 
been discovered for priming in production versus priming in comprehension. I will argue that 
this procedure is the linking of constituent structure (among other syntactic elements) to the 
conceptual structure specifically relevant to language and .vice versa. The differential effects 
found in experiments on comprehension and production will be explained by considering the 
different strategies that are inherent in being a speaker versus a listener. 
I will then describe in more detail how the thematic-conceptual representation and the 
linking procedure interact to predict the results of Branigan (1995) and Bock and her colleagues 
(Bock (1986, 1989); Bock and Loebell (1990); Bock et al. (1992)). Further predictions will be 
made to await empirical study. Suggestions as to how this could be achieved are to be found 
in section 5.4. Some of the experimental programme proposed in section 5.4 has since been 
carried out by my colleagues and the results are presented at the end of this chapter. 
I will also provide further theoretical justification for the Conceptual Structure and Linking 
Hypothesis. We have seen that the justification has been drawn from a wide range of fields as 
diverse as language acquisition, psycholinguistics, and linguistic theory, all of which conspire 
to bolster the hypothesis. I will also include more speculative evidence from the fields of 
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primatology and evolutionary studies in Chapter 6. 
5.2.1 Thematic Structure in Syntactic Priming 
It has been claimed (Bock (1986, 1989); Bock and Loebell (1990); Branigan (1995)) that 
syntactic priming occurs at the level of gross constituent structure. The constituent structure 
is gross as the priming effect occurs between structures that are slightly different in terms of 
modifiers added to the major constituents having no effect on priming. It is also claimed in 
these works that thematic roles have no additional effect on the priming mechanism. In this 
section I will show that, for a number of reasons, it can be claimed that thematic roles or 
thematic-conceptual structure are involved in priming. 
These reasons are that first, in the cases where Bock claims no effect of thematic roles, there 
are methodological problems which militate against this claim. Second, in the cases where it 
is claimed that two different structures have the same thematic relations encoded in them, I 
will show that what on the surface are similar thematic roles are actually quite different in 
a more detailed, extended version of representation, i.e. at the level of thematic-conceptual 
structure. 
The data specifically of relevance in the argument against the influence of thematic roles in 
priming is found in Bock (1986); Experiments 2 and 3, Bock (1989), Bock and Loebell (1990), 
Branigan (1995); Chapter 6: Experiments 1 and 2. 
There are two types of construction that are used in these experiments, both of which are 
alternations'. The first of these is the passive alternation (5.20) and the second is the Dative 
alternation with either a Goal second object and the preposition to (5.21), or a Beneficiary 
second and the preposition for (5.22). 
	
(5.20) 	a. The man kicked the dog. 
b. The dog was kicked by the man. 
(5.21) 	a. The doctor gave the patient a prescription. 
b. The doctor gave the prescription to the patient. 
(5.22) 	a. The cook made the cake for the sailor. 
b. The cook made the sailor the cake. 
Bock and Branigan use different experimental methods to achieve similar results and make 
the same explanatory assumptions. Bock uses repetition of a spoken sentence as a prime 
followed by picture descriptions of the target. On the other hand, Branigan uses a relatively 
unambiguous written sentence completion as a prime (or a pair of such primes) followed by an 
ambiguous sentence completion as the target. In all of these cases, it is assumed that producing 
a certain constituent structure will prime the later production of an analogous structure. For 
example, repeating or completing a double-object dative will favour the production of a double-
object dative when describing a picture or completing an ambiguous sentence compared with 
producing a prepositional dative structure after the same prime. Alternatively, prepositional 
'One may be a purely lexical alternation and the other a transformational alternation. This issue bears 
more directly on procedures and will therefore be discussed in the next section. 
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dative primes should facilitate production of a further prepositional dative compared with 
producing a double object prime. 
Bock 1986 In this paper Bock used sentences such as those in (5.20) and (5.21) to test the 
syntactic priming hypothesis. These priming sentences were embedded in a series of sentences 
and pictures in the guise of a sentence and picture memory test. In this experiment, the 
picture to be described could have been equally well described by either of the alternate forms 
in (5.20) for depictions of an active/passive, or equally well by either of the alternate forms in 
(5.21) for dative depictions. 
The hypothesis was that the form of the prime sentence would influence the form of the 
sentence the subject then used to describe a picture. The priming sentence and the relevant 
picture description did not have open-class words in common, so the priming effect could not 
be attributed to repetition effects of the open-class words. 
However, it was still possible that the closed-class words could be implicated in a repetition 
effect. Bock (1989) attempted to discount such an effect. 
Bock 1989 The results of Bock (1986) could have been explained by a mechanism or repre-
sentation other than constituent structure. It may have been the case that the priming effect 
was caused by sentential frames associated with certain prepositions being primed from sen-
tence to sentence. To was the preposition in the dative sentences and by was the preposition 
in the active/passive sentences. 
Bock (1989) constructed sentences which compared the effect of to/for, to see whether 
changing the preposition in the prime sentence influenced the priming effect in any way. 
	
(5.23) 	a. The secretary is baking a cake for her boss. 
b. The secretary is taking a cake to her boss. 
(5.24) 	The secretary is taking her boss a cake. 
She found that both of the prepositions was equally good at priming the subsequent prepo-
sitional form of the dative. Bock felt justified in claiming that sentence frames associated with 
certain prepositions could not be responsible for the priming effect. We shall see, however, 
that certain methodological problems indicate that this conclusion has been reached somewhat 
prematurely. 
Bock and Loebell 1990 Here the emphasis switched away from sentential frames and 
towards thematic roles. Bock et al tested whether sentences with the same structure but 
different thematic roles (5.25) were worse primes than sentences with the same thematic roles 
and the same structure (5.26) for picture descriptions of the form in (5.27). 
(5.25) 	a. The wealthy widow drove her Mercedes to the Church. 
b. The 747 was landing by the control tower. 
(5.26) 	a. The wealthy widow gave her Mercedes to the Church. 
b. The 747 was landed by the control tower. 
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(5.27) 	a. The girl handed her paintbrush to the boy.. 
b. The boy was stung by the bee. 
They found that the thematic dimension, as they defined it, had no effect on the strength 
of the priming effect. However, once again we shall see that methodological problems make 
this conclusion premature. 
Branigan 1995 uses a method where subjects complete relatively unambiguous prime sen-
tences such as: 
(5.28) 	a. 	The girl gave the book... 
b. The girl gave the boy... 
It was hypothesized that the form of the prime sentence the subject produced would influ-
ence the target sentence completion which was ambiguous between the two forms. 
(5.29) 	The politician showed... 
Branigan assumed that the two forms differed only with respect to their constituent struc-
ture (although we will have cause to doubt that this is actually the case). Branigan replicated 
Bock's findings for this construction in this alternative methodology. 
In a second experiment Branigan examines whether the priming structure has to be iden-
tical to the target or whether it can be substantially different at some lower level, provided 
that there is a local substructure shared by both prime and target. 
(5.30) 	a. The teacher gave the book that frightened the child... 
b. 	The barrister showed.... 
(5.31) 	a. The teacher gave the youth that frightened the child... 
b. 	The barrister showed.... 
(5.32) 	a. The teacher frightened the child that gave the book... 
b. 	The barrister showed.... 
(5.33) 	a. The teacher frightened the youth that gave the child... 
b. 	The barrister showed.... 
The results were starkly different to what we have seen up to now. Prepositional sentences 
were produced more often than the double-object in all four conditions. The syntactic structure 
of the previous sentence had no discernible impact on the proportion of each structure produced 
for the target sentence. Thus priming does not seem to be based on strictly local structures. 
Branigan puts this result down to insufficient activation of the relevant rule. That is, 
the loss of effect is due to processing factors and not just the representation. In the priming 
sentences that have no effect there are two VPs and in the sentences where priming is successful 
only one VP is present. If priming is based on the VP, Branigan argues, there could be 
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competition between the two VPs in the priming sentence to act as the relevant prime for the 
target sentence. 
We note here that Branigan has stopped talking purely about constituent structure as 
being behind the priming effect and has started to refer to vales. I suggest that these rules 
are the procedures that are common to both production and comprehension. I shall claim 
that these procedures will be available to explain not only the failure of priming in this case, 
but also all of the other findings reported in this section, but in a very different way: it will 
be proposed that thematic-conceptual structure is indeed centrally implicated in syntactic 
priming effects. 
There are a number of methodological aspects associated with Bock's experiments that 
cast some doubt on her conclusions. 
As we have seen above, her 1989 paper had the aim of showing that the priming effect was 
not specific to the closed-class lexical item to/for that occurred in the prepositional form of 
the dative construction. 
The problem can be put down to Bock's assumption that to and for will result in different 
sentence frames being constructed and that if no difference in the priming effect could be found 
these frames cannot be implicated in the priming procedure. 
The problem is that these different prepositions could well be associated with different 
sentence frames but the methodology of the experiment did not allow these different frames 
to express themselves in priming. 
All the pictures that the subjects had to describe depicted a scene that could only have 
been described with a prepositional dative with to or its associated double object alternation. 
If the pictures had allowed a description with a for-dative, the experiment would have been 
more interesting. However, it is unlikely that this will be possible with pictures, as producing 
a for-dative requires the inference that the recipient of the action will in some way be pleased 
by the action described. Thus a mental state has to be inferred. This is not easily depicted. 
It may have been the case, then, that the subjects made the closest description possible with 
respect to the sentential/conceptual frame. Alternatively the conceptual frames associated 
with to and for may have been similar enough for there to be no difference expected (as Bock 
seems to concede p.183). In addition, it seems unwise to base a conclusion on a lack of a result. 
This impasse could be solved experimentally if we design an experiment using the written 
sentence completion paradigm described by Branigan (1995). This paradigm allows the subject 
to complete the sentence in any way she pleases, she is not constrained by the conceptual 
relations present in a picture. Thus, if there is a difference in the conceptual frames of a 
to-Dative and a for-Dative, we would expect a difference in their suitability as a prime for the 
complementary structure. So a to-Dative should be better than a for-Dative prime for another 
to-Dative. We would need material such as the following. 
(5.34) 	a. to-Dative Prime The lecturer gave the book... 
b. to-Dative Prime The lecturer loaned the car... 
C. for-Dative Target The student baked... 
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(5.35) 	a. to-Dative Prime The lecturer gave the book... 
b. to-Dative Prime The lecturer loaned the car... 
C. to-Dative Target The student brought... 
(5.36) a. for-Dative Prime The lecturer baked the cake... 
b. for-Dative Prime The lecturer cut the carrot... 
C. to-Dative Target The student brought... 
(5.37) a. for-Dative Prime The lecturer baked the cake... 
b. for-Dative Prime The lecturer cut the carrot... 
C. for-Dative Target The student made... 
If there is a different strength in the priming effect between contexts with supporting 
sentential frames (5.35) and (5.37) than in non-supporting sentential frames (5.34) and (5.36) 
we will have found evidence contra Bock that sentential frames and their underlying conceptual 
basis do have an effect on priming. If we do not find any differences we have further empirical 
justification for Bock's position. I leave this as an open topic for further research. It is 
important for the aims of this thesis to note that the Branigan interpretation is open to 
doubt. 
Bock and Loebell (1990) suffers from the same problems with respect to the pictures used. 
The pictures allow only one description and they do not allow for any differential effects to 
appear. The experiment attempted to show that thematic roles had no influence on priming 
by comparing prepositional dative primes (The widow drove the old Mercedes to the church) 
to prepositional locative primes (The widow gave the old Mercedes to the church). Both these 
sentences are assumed to have the same constituent structure and different thematic roles. 
A second experiment compared by-Agents in passives (The boy was kicked by the dog) and 
by-Locatives with a similar constituent structure (The boy was eating by the lamppost). 
This again could be better decided with a sentence completion experiment with the fol-
lowing materials (Once more I leave this as a topic for future research). 
Datives versus Locatives 
	
(5.38) 	a. Prepositional Dative Prime The widow gave the old Mercedes... 
b. Prepositional Dative Prime The lecturer gave the new book... 
C. Prepositional Locative Target The widow drove... 
(5.39) 	a. Prepositional Dative Prime The widow gave the old Mercedes... 
b. Prepositional Dative Prime The lecturer gave the new book... 
C. Prepositional Dative Target The student loaned the car... 
(5.40) 	a. Prepositional Locative Prime The widow drove the old Mercedes... 
b. Prepositional Locative Prime The lecturer rode the new cycle... 
C. Prepositional Dative Target The pilot gave... 
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(5.41) 	a. Prepositional Locative Prime The widow drove the old Mercedes... 
b. Prepositional Locative Prime The lecturer rode the new cycle... 
C. Prepositional Locative Target The pilot moved... 
Agents versus Locatives 
(5.42) 	a. Agent Prime The construction worker was hit... 
b. Agent Prime The minister was cut... 
C. Prepositional Locative Target The foreigner was loitering... 
(5.43) 	a. Agent Prime The construction worker was hit... 
b. Agent Prime The minister was cut... 
C. Agent Target The foreigner was confused... 
(5.44) 	a. Prepositional Locative Prime The foreigner was loitering... 
b. Prepositional Locative Prime The minister was praying 
C. Agent Target The 747 was alerted... 
(5.45) 	a. Prepositional Locative Prime The foreigner was loitering... 
b. Prepositional Locative Prime The minister was praying... 
C. Prepositional Locative Target The 747 was landing... 
Thematically Similar Structures in Parsing? 
We have seen above that some residual conceptual effects were not easily removed from the 
priming of the passive/active sentences of Bock et al. (1992). Itis probably for this reason that 
Branigan removed the passive/active alternation from her sentence completion experiments. 
Instead she concentrates on the Double Object/PP Construction which she, following Bock, 
claims are: 
Equivalent in their focus, semantic content and register. 
If it could be shown that these two structures do differ in one or more of these aspects, 
the conclusion that syntactic priming is based purely on constituent structure would become 
more doubtful and another explanation should be sought. 
At the level of what have been termed thematic roles, the structures are indeed similar, 
but following the discussion of chapters 2 and 3, what are known as thematic roles are merely 
shorthand for frequently occurring structures within a theory of extended thematic-conceptual 
structure. And what on the surface seem to be the same are actually different at this deeper 
level. At a deeper level there are indeed differences between the double-object and the PP 
form. These differences have been shown by Pinker (1989) to have explanatory potential for 
the theory of acquisition of lexical alternations by young children. I will now concentrate on 
the differing conceptual relations that these representations reflect. 





ACT THING THING 	 EVENT 
[(Bob)] 	[(ring)] 
(5.46) 	 GO 	THING 	PATH 
(ring) 
to 	PLACE 
at 	 THING 
(sue) 
and the thematic-conceptual core of the double object form is: 
EVENT 
(5.47) 	
ACT THING THING 	 STATE 
[(Bob)] 	[(Sue)] 
HAVE THING THING 
(Sue) 	[(ring)] 
These two conceptual representations reflect two main differences in the thematic-conceptual 
relations expressed by the propositional and the double-object forms. 
First, in the double-object form the transferred object is the patient, in the prepositional 
object form the recipient is the patient. This causes pragmatic differences in which argument 
is construed as 'affected' or acted on in the double-object form. 
(5.48) 	What John did to Bill was give him a book. 
(5.49) 	What John did to Bill was give a book to him. 
and the entailments are different in terms of to what extent the recipient is affected. 
(5.50) 	John taught English to the students. (unsuccessfully) 
(5.51) 	John taught the students English. (successfully) 
The second difference is that in the double-object form the change of possession is expressed 
not as an analogue of motion (as in the PP) but as a causation-state whereby the possessor 
has (HAVE) the object. 
This is apparent in the way that the double-object form is not available with some verbs, 
while with other verbs the prepositional object form is not available. If these forms were con-
ceptually identical then every verb which allows for a double-object should have a prepositional 
object form and vice versa. 
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(5.52) 	a. PP: X causes Y to go to Z 
*They  spared the punishment to the policeman. 
b. DO: X causes Z to have Y 
*She  carried the mailbox the letter. 
We have seen the empirical results of experiments into syntactic priming in production. 
The materials and methodology of the experiments were also presented. The basic claim 
in the literature was that it was only the constituent structure of the prime sentence that 
was relevant to priming. It has been specifically denied in the literature that either thematic 
roles or sentential frames associated with particular closed-class items are relevant to syntactic 
priming. 
However, a number of problems were found with the materials and the assumptions that 
the experiments were grounded on. These problems cast doubt on the conclusions reached by 
Bock and her colleagues and Branigan in two different and complementary ways. 
Where no thematic/conceptual difference was assumed to be present, it actually seems to 
be a clear conceptual difference and this difference predicts the structure that will be used. 
On the other hand, where the experiments specifically tried to demonstrate that thematic 
roles or sentential frames had no relevance to priming, it turns out that the experimental 
method employed allowed no possible differential priming effect to emerge. A number of 
experiments were suggested that may further illuminate this issue. 
Up to now, I have concentrated only on syntactic priming in production. This concentration 
was for expository purposes; the results of experiments on syntactic priming in comprehension 
are quite distinct from those for priming in production. Another reason for concentrating 
initially on the production experiments is that they were the initial experiments conducted 
on syntactic priming and thus most of the assumptions concerning syntactic priming in the 
comprehension literature have been based on the assumptions made in this earlier work. 
In the next section I shall propose a procedure that will go some way to explaining the 
production data. I propose that this procedure is also relevant to syntactic priming in compre-
hension. I will then proceed to demonstrate that the different communicative strategies used 
by speakers and listeners acting together with this procedure make the correct predictions 
with respect to syntactic priming in comprehension, given that a number of other assumptions 
prove to be correct. 
5.2.2 Procedures in Production and Comprehension 
To capture the syntactic priming in production data we have seen up to now I propose the 
Thematic-Conceptual Structure and Linking Hypothesis. 
(5.53) 	The Thematic-Conceptual Structure and Linking Hypothesis(CSLH) 
Any given thematic-conceptual structure is related to its surface representation by 
a linking rule. 
Initially I shall concentrate on the linking from conceptual structure to constituent struc-
ture as this is what has up to now been claimed to be relevant to syntactic priming. 
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We shall see that the CSLH is also relevant to syntactic priming in comprehension. The 
CSLH is a procedure that can be primed both for comprehension and production. This 
viewpoint rests on the assumption that the mental representation must be based on a set 
of knowledge, the units and structures, which provide the speaker with the ability to turn 
messages into utterances and which underlies the hearer's ability to perform the translation 
in the opposite direction. 
Before I turn my attention to sentence priming in comprehension it remains to be shown 
how the CSLH can explain the data from production. Turning first to the sentences showing 
a dative alternation, we have seen that the double object form and the prepositional form are 
associated with different conceptual structures. The CSLH states that both of these conceptual 
structures can be potentially associated with a different surface constituent structure. A 
linking rule maps each conceptual structure to the relevant constituent structure. 
Thus the form in all cases will be: 
(5.54) 	Thematic-Conceptual Structure -* Constituent Structure 
The argument is thus that when priming takes place it is not the constituent structure that 
is primed but rather the linking rule that translates underlying thematic-conceptual structure 
into surface structure. 
As the linking rules specify only the framework of the constituent structure with particular 
emphasis on arguments and not the details of the constituent structure we have a concise 
explanation of why it is that the constituent structure of the priming and target clause do 
not have to match exactly. The linking rules determine the ordering of the constituents and 
the prepositions necessary to encode the conceptual relations expressed by that structure. As 
long as this is in place, modifiers can be freely added to this structure without affecting the 
priming effect. 
We also saw though that if two clauses were involved in the priming task, the priming 
effect disappeared. Branigan (1995) proposed a competition effect between the two clauses as 
an explanation for this. However, it seems unclear why the local constituent structure should 
be affected by the clausal status of the contents of that structure. On the other hand, as 
each clause will by its very clausal nature be associated with a different conceptual structure 
representing the clausal relations expressed by that clause, it is not at all surprising that the 
linking rules for each of these clauses will compete in such a way that no priming effect occurs. 
In other words, it is much more likely that linking rules will be in competition as opposed 
to constituent structure. 
In some ways this is similar to the approach taken by Bock et al. (1992). They identified 
two ways that the surface structure could be associated with the underlying relations. In one, 
the interpretation of linguistic relations is in terms of deep-structure subjects and objects and 
transformations are implicated; this is mediated mapping. In the other, syntactic functions 
are individuated with respect to the verb. There is thus a direct mapping to surface syntactic 
relations and transformations are not involved. 
Bock et al examined the passive construction and tested to see whether animacy had any 
influence on the priming effect. It seems that animacy is a good predictor of subjecthood and 
this is a challenge to the purely structural interpretations of the subject relation. Thus, in 
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the encoding of conceptual relations into syntactic structure, animacy may be playing a role. 
A further reason to suspect this is that in Bock's earlier experiments pictured events with an 
animate patient and an inanimate agent resulted in a bias towards passive sentences. 
Bock et al tested the two hypotheses under the following assumptions: The mediated 
mapping hypothesis predicts that active and passive primes with animate underlying object 
arguments (the surface objects of actives and the surface subject of passives) should elicit 
more active targets (all of which had animate objects and inanimate subjects) than active and 
passive primes with inanimate underlying object arguments. Conversely, the direct mapping 
hypothesis predicts that active and passive primes with animate object arguments (the surface 
objects of both) should elicit more active targets than active and passive primes with inanimate 
object arguments. 
Bock et al claim that their results show that in language production two procedures are in 
operation in the realization of syntactic form. These two procedures are: 
The binding of arguments to syntactic relations. 
• Building constituent structure. 
An alternative explanation is that there is a single procedure and that animacy is but one of 
the conceptual differences that can result in a preference for an active production or a passive 
production. Thus sentential focus may be represented as part of the thematic-conceptual 
structure. If it could be shown that two different structures with similar focusing could prime 
each other, this hypothesis would be supported. In any case the Bock et al. (1992) paper is a 
significant weakening of the position initially taken by Bock and still taken by Branigan. Bock 
is conceding that thematic-conceptual structure can have some effect but does not re-examine 
her earlier work for possible conceptual differences between the alternate structures she has 
used. 
Applying the CSLH to Comprehension 
In comprehension the listener/reader is trying to decode the thematic-conceptual structure 
incrementally and as quickly as possible. In effect the linking rules are being run in reverse. 
The aim is to derive the full conceptual structure that the sentence expresses as quickly as 
possible. 
There is a theory of syntactic ambiguity resolution that takes a very similar stance. Pritch-
ett (1988, 1992) proposes that the Human Sentence Processing Mechanism (HSPM) tries to 
assign thematic roles associated with the clause's verb as rapidly as possible in line with that 
verb's maximal theta-grid. 
(5.55) 	Theta-Attachment 
The theta criterion attempts to be satisfied at every point during processing given 
the maximal theta-grid. 
If this strategy results in a re-analysis of the input sentence, a second principle accounts 
for the relative difficulty of reanalysis. 
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(5.56) 	The On-Line Locality Constraint 
The target position (if any) assumed by a constituent must be governed or dominated 
by its source position (if any), otherwise attachment is impossible for the HSPM. 
When this analysis is impossible a conscious garden-path sentence results. 
This prediction of conscious garden-path sentences is particularly relevant when we look at 
the results of experiments on syntactic priming in comprehension. It is precisely the sentences 
that usually result in conscious garden-path effects that can be primed so that the target 
sentence no longer seems to result in as serious a garden-path, or possibly no garden-path. 
Thus it seems that the dispreferred analysis can be primed but not the preferred analysis that 
would be proposed by Theta-Attachment. 
In this way, the dispreferred (b) readings of (5.57) and (5.58) could be primed in com-
prehension, but sentences similar to those in the production experiments (5.59) and (5.60), 
sentences including subject/object relatives (5.61), and sentences containing an attachment 
ambiguity, but not one that results in a conscious garden-path effect (5.62) did not result in 
any priming effect in comprehension experiments (Evans, 1993, Branigan, 1995). 
(5.57) 	a. While the woman was eating the soup the pudding went cold. 
b. While the woman was eating the pudding went cold. 
(5.58) 	a. The caretaker reminds the porter that the sleepy boss annoyed the old architect. 
b. The caretaker reminds the porter that the sleepy boss annoyed about the dress. 
(5.59) 	a. The motor-bike injured the walker. 
b. The walker was injured by the motor-bike. 
(5.60) 	a. The hurdler gave the whistle to the judges. 
b. The hurdler gave the judges the whistle. 
(5.61) 	a. The badminton player that assaulted the inspector jogs by the river. 
b. The badminton player that the inspector assaulted jogs by the river. 
(5.62) 	a. The thief opened the safe with a key today. 
b. The thief opened the safe with the lock today. 
Branigan (1995) appears to concede that a rule of some type is being primed in the sentences 
where priming occurs. She suggests that priming happens due to the level of activation of 
this rule. The rule associated with the dispreferred structure is boosted after reading a similar 
dispreferred structure. What Branigan means by rule is unclear as she argues that the priming 
effect is still based on constituent structure and argues throughout her thesis that priming is 
based on representation and not on procedures. 
However, she does suggest a number of options as to the content of such rules. First it 
could be that priming of a single rule that specifies a local tree e.g. VP -* V NP versus VP 
-* V. In this view, the structures could differ to some extent, as long as this local structure 
is similar in both prime and target. However, such an account gives us no explanation as to 
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why one structure is preferred over the other. A similar account would be where the non-local 
structure has to be the same. This can be criticized for the same reason, why should one of 
the structures be preferred? 
The third possibility is that the only relevant aspect of syntactic structure is the nodes on 
the right edge of the tree and their daughters. 
In sum all three of these possibilities claim that rules (which are most easily identified as 
Phrase-Structure rules in Branigan's work) are implicated in priming. For some unexplained 
reason some of these PS-rules are dispreferred and can be primed. This does not explain the 
lack of effect in comprehension of the sentences that resulted in a priming effect in production 
as the passive form of the active/passives and the object relative form in the subject/object 
relatives (Pickering and Shillcock (1992)) are also dispreferred structures. Thus in production, 
although the form produced could be influenced by priming, this was only a relative effect; 
relative to a generally preferred production form. 
However, if we assume that the reader is trying to derive the thematic-conceptual structure 
as rapidly as possible from the input we can arrive at a more plausible explanation. The 
processor uses such principles as Theta-Attachment as a strategy to derive a maximal thematic-
conceptual representation. This explains the preferred attachments found for the sentences 
above at the same time as providing a mechanism for reverse linking. When this strategy 
fails and reanalysis has to occur, the reanalysis involves invoking a different procedure for 
reverse linking, or in effect a specific linking rule from the input to the conceptual structure 
is identified and can thus be primed (this linking rule having proved successful at integrating 
challenging input). 
5.3 Future Research on Sentence-Level Priming 
Theoretical Questions 
It has been claimed (Bock (1986, 1989); Bock and Loebell (1990); Bock et al. (1992); Brani-
gan (1995)) that sentence level priming is dependent on the representational level of syntactic 
structure. Above I have argued that an alternative explanation can be found at the level 
of thematic-conceptual structure. In experimental demonstrations of sentence-level priming 
conducted by Evans (1993) and Branigan (1995), three different factors could have been re-
sponsible for the priming effect at sentence level: First, it could result from syntactic processes. 
That is, they could be related to the sentence's surface representation or a rule implicated in 
generating a particular syntactic structure, as Branigan (1995) argues. Second, it could arise 
from the underlying conceptual structure, which in English is canonically realized by a cer-
tain syntactic form. For example, focus on the patient rather than the agent of an action is 
naturally expressed with use of a passive. Or, alternatively, it could be related to the use of 
a linking rule which is responsible for mapping a particular conceptual structure onto surface 
syntactic form. 
An example of how these possibilities differ as proposed explanations can be seen if we 
consider one of the structures which seems to provide a robust sentence level priming effect: 
the Double-Object/to-Dative alternation. 
121 
(5.63) 	a. Bob gave the ring to Sue. 
b. Bob gave Sue the ring. 
Branigan (1995, P.  135), following Bock, claims that these alternate forms are c equivalent 
in their focus, semantic content and register', and concludes therefore that the locus of any 
priming effect must be at a syntactic level. If, however, it could be shown that these two struc-
tures differ in one or more of these aspects, the conclusion that the locus of sentence priming 
rests entirely with constituent structure becomes more doubtful and alternative explanations 
would also need to be considered. 
At the level of what has been termed thematic roles, the structures are indeed similar, but 
following Jackendoff (1983, 1990) and Pinker (1989) it can be argued that what are known 
as thematic roles are merely shorthand for frequently occurring structures within a theory of 
extended conceptual structure. 
Thus, in this account, the differing surface syntactic structures reflect a different underlying 
conceptual structure, and it is this which may form the basis of the priming effect. Another 
possibility is that it is not the underlying conceptual structure that is primed, but rather 
the process that links the conceptual structure to syntactic structure (and other expressive 
linguistic devices, such as intonation). 
Under this account it is possible that a particular conceptual structure may be associated 
with more than one linking rule, or alternatively, a single linking rule to syntactic structure 
may be associated with more than one conceptual structure. 
On the basis of current evidence, it appears that both the syntactic explanation and the 
conceptual explanation (with or without linking rules) are possible and it is very difficult 
to find empirical data capable of distinguishing the two in a language like English, where a 
difference in syntactic structure, arguably, goes hand in hand with a difference in conceptual 
structure. 
I have set out a theory of thematic-conceptual structure and linking that can now be 
applied to the question of whether it is conceptual structure or syntactic structure that is 
implicated in sentence level priming. The elements of conceptual structure can be expressed 
in a number of ways, of which syntactic variation is just one. 
What is needed, therefore, is a situation where conceptual structure is closely matched in 
two sentences where the syntactic structure is different. 
A solution to the difficulty is to adopt a cross-linguistic methodology. If the same or 
a similar conceptual structure can be expressed by two different syntactic structures in one 
language and by only one syntactic structure in another language and, assuming that priming 
at sentence level is possible across languages, we would expect a different pattern of results 
if conceptual structure rather than syntactic structure is responsible for the priming effect. 
Recent evidence suggests this is the case. 
In 1996 I suggested a number of experiments to tease apart these possibilities. My sug-
gestions are given in below. In section 5.4 the results of the research following from these 
suggestions is given. The results thus far seem to show a much greater role for thematic-
conceptual structure in sentence priming than has previously been the consensus. 
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Empirical Background 
Heydel and Murray (1996) present work from cross-linguistic priming experiments that sug-
gest it is conceptual structure, rather than syntactic structure, that is centrally implicated in 
sentence level priming. In their first experiment, bilingual (English/German) subjects were 
presented with a pair of target pictures; the first picture depicted an intransitive action (e.g. 
a man swimming) and the second picture depicted an event that could be described by either 
an active or a passive sentence (e.g. a shark attacking a man). The subject then read a Ger-
man sentence which was either a transitive Subject-Verb-Object untopicalized active sentence, 
an Object-Verb-Subject topicalized active sentence, or a passive sentence. The subject was 
required to decide whether this sentence related to the events shown in the pictures (in the 
experimental items, it never did) and then to describe in ENGLISH what was happening in 
the pictures. The syntactic structure of the subject's description was then analyzed in terms 
of whether it was an active or a passive or some other sentence type. 
This task was thus a cross-linguistic priming experiment. No translation was involved, 
as the picture to be described had no content in common with the sentence that was read 
(the judgment was included only to ensure processing of the prime sentence). The subject 
was primed with a German sentence and had to produce an English picture description. The 
results clearly showed cross-linguistic priming of actives by actives and passives by passives, 
but, crucially, German topicalizations primed English passives not the structurally similar 
actives. 
Their second experiment employed a similar procedure but involved translation. Here 
again the subject saw the two target pictures, read a priming sentence (SVO-active, OVS-
active, passive) in German, but this time the prime did describe the events in the pictures. 
The subject was required to produce a translation of this into English which corresponded to 
the events shown in the pictures. The results from this study again showed reliable priming, 
but even when the task involved translation, German topicalizations did not prime English 
actives. 
It is striking that the results of both experiments show German topicalizations priming 
English passives. This is surprising as the topicalization sentence has a syntactic structure 
most closely resembling an English active rather than an English passive. Thus it appears 
very likely that the priming effect rests not with syntactic structure per se, but rather with 
some other (higher level) representation or process, such as conceptual structure. 
However, it is unclear from these results whether it is the representational level of con-
ceptual structure itself which is primed, or whether instead it is the procedure of linking the 
conceptual structure to surface level expressive linguistic devices. The following proposed 
experiments address this and other important issues necessary for establishing a clear under-
standing of this process. 
The Experiments 
The experiments fall into two main groups: 
• Monolingual Experiments on Native Speakers of German 
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• Cross-linguistic Experiments 
Each of these groups of experiments sheds light on the questions identified above. The 
experiments on German speakers examine whether the results of the preliminary experiments 
on cross-linguistic priming were critically related to the fact that the experiment was cross-
linguistic or whether the effect also appears within a single language (as a conceptual structure 
interpretation would predict). The second set of experiments examine the levels at which 
conceptual structure can be primed and the strategies speakers adopt when the language they 
are switching to, or from, is either more restricted or more free in the way it can express a 
certain conceptual structure with its surface expressive linguistic devices. 
The experiments share their methodology with Heydel and Murray (1996). The subjects 
describe pictures after having read a priming sentence with one of the forms active, passive 
or topicalization. The subject's productions are then analyzed as to their syntactic structure 
and, in experiment 5, as to their intonational form. 
Experiment 1: German-German Conceptual Priming Subjects: Native German Speak-
ers 
It might be suggested that the initial results from the cross-linguistic studies could have 
been complicated by subjects adopting specialist processing strategies when using their second 
language. To test this, it is important to establish whether the basic findings can be replicated 
in a German monolingual study. If the priming is indeed based on conceptual structure then it 
should be the case that German passives (like c) will prime both passives and topicalizations 
(b) and, crucially, German topicalizations will prime both passives and topicalizations, but 
not actives (a). Also, actives should prime neither passives nor topicalizations. 
(5.64) 	a. Active: Ein Hai attackiert den Schwimmer. 
b. Topicalization: Den Schwimmer attackiert ein Hai. 
C. Passive: Der Schwimmer wird von einem Hai attackiert. 
The first part of the study will establish the baseline for the natural frequency of these 
structures with a simple picture description task. The second phase, using different subjects, 
will involve an identical procedure, but with the additional insertion of a priming sentence in 
the same way as employed by Heydel and Murray. The results from this study will establish 
both whether conceptual structure effects are found monolingually and, if so, whether these 
replicate the pattern found in the cross-linguistic studies. They will therefore comment both 
on the question of whether the previous findings may have involved some specialist process-
ing strategy' and whether the cross-linguistic procedure itself is an appropriate means for 
investigating effects of conceptual structure. 
If the results show priming of the same structures, but no 'transfer' between passives and 
topicalizations, this would be compatible with an account based solely on identical syntactic 
structure, but this is not the only possible explanation; the linking rules from conceptual 
structure to syntactic structure could still form the basis for this apparent syntactic structure 
effect. At this stage we will have discovered whether it is conceptual structure (as in Heydel and 
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Murray (1996)) that is responsible for the priming effect, or alternatively that it is syntactic 
structure that is most likely to be the basis of the effect. In either case, the extent of the 
involvement of linking rules is unclear. The remaining experiments address this issue and tease 
apart the contribution of conceptual structure, syntactic constituent structure and linking rules 
at a more detailed level. 
Experiment 2: Main/Subordinate Clause Priming Subjects: Native German Speakers 
The importance of linking rules can be established by considering the question of whether a 
virtually identical conceptual structure represented by different syntactic structures, without 
any difference in focus, shows sentence priming effects from one of these structures to the 
other. 
In German, main clauses have an SVO word order (a) whereas subordinate clauses have 
an SOV order (b). 
(5.65) 	a. Den Schwimmer attackiert ein Hai. 
b. (Ich habe gehoert) dass den Schwimmer ein Hai attackiert. 
This will test whether the topicalization structure of a main clause can prime a subordinate 
clause structure, and vice versa. This approach does not suffer from the problems inherent 
in previous experiments on sentence priming, since it is difficult to argue for any conceptual 
difference, at any level, between the two sentence types. Syntactically, however, they are 
very different. In fact, in syntactic theory in German, (b) is described as scrambling, not a 
topicalization. 
This experiment is important in theoretical terms as it will provide evidence of whether 
sentences that are as close as possible conceptually (they both focus on the Patient rather 
than the Agent of an action), but are different syntactically can prime one another. Theories 
that stress the importance of syntactic structure for sentence priming would predict that no 
priming can take place between these two structures in spite of their conceptual identity. Also, 
if rules linking conceptual and syntactic structure are critically involved, we would expect to 
find no evidence of priming. If priming is found, it clearly indicates the crucial role played by 
conceptual structure per Se. 
Experiment 3: Cross-linguistic Priming from German to English Subjects: Native 
German Speakers with Intermediate/Advanced English Language Proficiency. 
It could be suggested that native English speakers (as tested in the Heydel and Murray 
study) find topicalizations to be a more marked structure than passives because of the lack of 
an English equivalent (there is, for example, evidence that they acquire this structure later and 
with difficulty (Rogers (1995)). They might therefore either a) assume that there is a stronger 
focus on the patient in a topicalization than in a passive and therefore feel constrained to 
produce a marked form in English - a passive, or b) become more form-focused and adopt a 
processing strategy not normally applied in natural discourse. In contrast, German speakers 
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will not treat topicalizations as a more marked case since this is a frequently occurring struc-
ture. Thus, when producing English they will not be prone to any focus bias. Consequently, 
if the results with this population mirror those found by Heydel and Murray it will indicate 
that the previous results cannot be attributed to any such bias. 
Further, this study has the potential to test whether linking rules are crucially involved. As 
shown in the examples below, in German there is a choice of linking rule from the underlying 
patient-focused conceptual structure to surface structure resulting in either (a), a passive, or 
(b), a topicalization. Whereas in English there is a single rule linked to (c). 
(5.66) 	a. Der Schwimmer wird von einem Hai attackiert. 
b. Den Schwimmer attackiert ein Hai. 
C. The swimmer is being attacked by a shark. 
d. The swimmer is attacking a shark. 
German speakers, with their implicit awareness of this choice, may therefore attempt to 
identify a linking rule not available in English, resulting in an increase in the frequency of 
alternative syntactic structures and inappropriate responses, such as (d). This would be the 
most extreme scenario. Other clues to the interference of linking rules include increased onset 
time to start speaking, reformulations, or a greater level of pausing. If these occur, it suggests 
that linking rules, by themselves, may be primed across languages. 
Experiment 4: Cross-linguistic Priming from English to German Subjects: Native 
German Speakers with Intermediate/Advanced English Language Proficiency. 
The question of the importance of linking rules can also be tackled from another direction. 
The conceptual structure of an English passive can be realized in German in two different 
surface forms. This experiment will test whether Germans primed by English passive sentences 
are more inclined to produce only passives or both passives and topicalizations. If there is 
priming from the English linking rule then passives would be expected only to prime other 
passives. However, if it is the underlying conceptual structure which is most important, then 
both passives and topicalizations should be primed. (The extent of priming in this experiment 
can be established by comparison with the baseline results obtained in the first phase of 
Experiment 1.) 
Experiment 5: Intonational Change Subjects: English Speakers with Intermediate/Advanced 
German Language Proficiency 
This experiment will be a preliminary investigation into the way conceptual structure 
is reflected across languages, not just by syntactic structure, but by a range of expressive 
linguistic devices. Steedman (1990) has suggested that there is a close organic relationship 
between syntax and intonation. 
The results from Heydel and Murray (1996) show that German topicalization structures 
prime an English passive. However, as priming is a relative effect, a proportion of the sentences 
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produced will be in the active form. This experiment will test whether when active structures 
are produced after a topicalized prime, the subject attempts to express the focus structure 
inherent in the prime in some other way. The most likely possibility seems to be by the use of 
intonational cues. Consequently, this experiment will employ a variation on the procedure used 
in the preceding experiments. Subjects will see pictures and written German primes in the 
same manner as previous experiments, but will be asked to provide a spoken response, which 
will be recorded. These responses will be presented (with no indication of their respective 
primes) to new subjects who will judge whether actives produced following a topicalization 
prime differ in intonational form from those produced following active primes. The judges will 
be asked to score each utterance for degree of emphasis on the focused constituent. 
Further Implications of the Research 
An important distinction between lexical and sentence priming can be drawn. Whereas lexical 
priming may be argued to be based on discrete atomic entries in the lexicon, the nature of the 
experiments proposed here argues that sentence-level priming is based on composite entities. 
In other words, the elements that are being primed would not exist if they were not part of 
the processing of the sentences that brings them into being. This has implications for the 
time-scale of both processing and priming. The results of the experiments we propose above 
will therefore make predictions about the time-scale of processing that will be amenable to 
further research. 
The data obtained in the experiments on cross-linguistic priming would enable us to identify 
the level of natural language processing at which cross-linguistic transfer takes place and the 
mechanisms involved in this transfer. This aspect of the research has profound implications for 
theories of second-language acquisition and their application in language teaching. In general 
terms, the findings should inform practice in this area. More specifically, if it can be shown that 
sentence level priming is sensitive to conceptual and/or focus structure, rather than syntactic 
structure, this would have important implications for teaching practice. It would indicate that 
second language learners use of a) linking rules that do not exist in the target language, or 
b) ones that are inappropriate in a given context, needs to be explained as a consequence of 
teaching practice, rather than as an unavoidable stage in second language acquisition. 
5.4 Recent Experiments in Thematic- Conceptual Sentence 
Priming 
5.4.1 Cross-linguistic experiments 
Heydel and Murray (2000) have again reiterated in their initial cross-linguistic work that 
as particular conceptual structures will normally be realized by certain syntactic structures 
in a particular language, the repeated production of the same syntactic structure does not 
necessarily imply that it is the syntactic form, or syntactic processes that are primed. Thus 
it may equally be the case that it is the canonical linking rule from the thematic conceptual 
structure to the surface syntactic form that may have been primed. 
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Heydel and Murray have performed at least two studies using crosslinguistic methodology 
that show that sentence-level priming effects extend cross-linguistically and these studies fur-
ther suggest that sentence-level priming maybe more closely linked to conceptual rather than 
to syntactic form. 
The studies rely on that fact that in some languages a particular thematic-conceptual 
structure can be linked to two or more syntactic structures, whereas in another language only 
one linking rule from thematic-conceptual structure to syntactic structure is available. Thus 
a focussed patient can be realized as either a passive sentence or a topicalized sentence in 
German, but only as a passive in English. 
Heydel and Murray (1997b) includes two experiments on cross-linguistic sentence-level 
priming. In the first experiment the task was that participants were presented with picture 
pairs and German sentences. For each pair of pictures they had to decide whether the German 
sentence related to the events shown in the picture (this was never the case for experimental 
items) and to describe each picture in one complete sentence. 
(5.67) 	Prime Types: 
(Active) Ein PR-Mann beraet den Manager. 
(Passive) Der Manager wird von einem PR-Mann beraten. 
C. (Topicalization) Den Manager beraet ein PR-Mann. 
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It could be argued that the results may have been a side-effect of the odd' task in this 
experiment. The task could be regarded as 'odd' as translation is not required in normal 
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discourse. This seems unlikely for two reasons: related types of animacy effects have been 
found in mono-linguistic experiments, e.g. Prat-Sala et al. (1996); also, in translation, syntax 
plays a role which can best be described as 'excessive'. Inexperienced translators, in particular, 
tend to reproduce the syntactic surface structure of the original utterance, at times regardless 
of conceptual or grammatical constraints (Krings (1996); Bosshardt and Hagen (1988)). 
Nevertheless a second experiment was carried out to exclude the pseudo-effect of the trans-
lation class from the range of possible explanations: 
The same material as for Experiment 1 was used, except that the associated priming 
sentences always described the events shown in the right hand picture. Participants were 
asked to provide a description of the left hand picture and translate a German sentence, such 
as those below, into English. 
	
(5.68) 	a. 	(A) Ein Auto ueberfaehrt den Igel. 
b. (F) Der Igel wird von einem Auto ueberfahren. 
C. 	(T) Den Igel ueberfaehrt ein Auto. 
The responses could be: 
(5.69) 	a. 	(A) A car runs over the hedgehog. 
b. (P) The hedgehog is run over by a car. 
C. (A*) *The  hedgehog runs over a car. 
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As expected there was a massive effect of syntactic form. Given the magnitude of the effect 
it might be argued that there is something odd about the translation task. This seems unlikely, 
given the number of 'Other' responses, and because responses never included any semantically 
anomalous sentences such as A*.  In fact topicalizations were pulled in both directions. But if 
we take another conceptual feature which would make participants more likely to use passives 
(such as an inanimate agent), the pattern changes quite dramatically: for animate agents (15 
items) there were 56.4% actives, but for inanimate agents (9 items) the percentage of active 
responses dropped to 13.9%. Heydel and Murray (1997b) conclude that the conceptual effect 
in Experiment 1 is clearly not due to 'translation'. There is also evidence from lexical priming 
in language comprehension from bilinguals that suggest that proficient bilinguals do not rely 
on translation equivalents in order to access the meaning of a word (Frenck-Mestre and Prince 
(1997)). Thus it would seem perfectly plausible that bilinguals would be able to understand a 
sentence without translating it into their own language. 
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There are alternative explanations of the results indicating thematic-conceptual effects in 
cross-linguistic sentence priming experiments (Heydel and Murray (1997a)). 
The first of these explanations is that only one of the structures is primed and the other 
is not affected. In this scenario, if only the active was primed, then the equivalent results 
with passives and topicalizations would not in effect be showing the critical role of thematic-
conceptual structure in sentence priming. Thus a baseline test is necessary for this counter-
explanation to be discounted. 
Heydel and Murray (1997b) performed a further study to discount this effect: To establish 
a baseline rate for the production of actives and passives, participants were asked to provide 
descriptions of the events shown in the pictures in the same manner as in Experiment 1. The 
pictures were the same as for the other two experiments, but there was no priming sentence. 
Prime - BseIine 
• Active Resp. 
• Passive Rep. 
Active 	Passive 	I opicah2ation 
Prime Type 
Reanalyzing the cross-linguistic experiment against this baseline, we can see very clearly 
that both forms were primed. 
The second counter-explanation is that it is the specific procedure itself that leads to 
the results shown. This has been discounted by changing the procedure by introducing an 
intermediate sentence, with no lessening of the effects found. 
5.4.2 Mono-lingual experiments 
It could perhaps be argued that the results of the cross-linguistic priming experiments were a 
pseudo result of the cross-linguistic task itself. Heydel et al. (1998) carried out an additional 
monolingual experiments where the result could not be due to translation. 
Participants were presented with the same picture pairs used in the original cross-linguistic 
experiment and with English sentences which were either actives, such as (5.70), or passives, 
such as (5.71). For each pair of pictures they had to decide whether the sentence related to 
the events described in the pictures (for experimental items this was never the case) and to 
describe each picture in one complete sentence. 
	
(5.70) 	A consultant is advising the manager. 
(5.71) 	The manager is being advised by a consultant. 
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The results show that mono-lingual priming produces results which are equivalent in mag-
nitude to the ones obtained in the cross-linguistic study (and very similar to those reported 
by Bock). Crucially, the effects here are not larger - which they would have to be, if syntactic 
structure and conceptual form had independent additive effects. 
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JTM 	 - 	 - 	- 
It is also not the case that the conceptual effects found in sentence priming are limited 
to German. Heydel et al. (1999) have produced similar results for monolingual experiments 
conducted in Spanish. 
Evidence for conceptual effects in cross-linguistic priming has also been found at the lexical 
level (Ketley et al. (1994); Basden et al. (1994)). Results from these studies show that cross-
linguistic priming takes place if and only if subjects are encouraged to access the underlying 
conceptual structure of an expression. 
5.5 Theoretical and Representational Aspects Of Sen-
tence Level Priming 
It has become clear from the discussion above that sentence level priming is a robust phe-
nomenon. The phenomenon is not only fixed to the repetition of the same lexical verb in the 
prime and the target, but rather acts across classes of verbs. Sentence level priming is also 
not limited to either production nor comprehension and indeed priming from one modality to 
the other has also been seen to occur. 
There are two competing versions of how this cross-verb sentence level priming should be 
represented. The first of these is Branigan and Pickering reanalysis of their work in terms 
of Roelofs (1992, 1993) model. The second is the theory of thematic-conceptual structure 
expounded in this thesis. 
Levelt et al. (ress), argued that lexical entries include a lemma stratum encoding syntactic 
information and a word-form stratum encoding phonological and morphological information. 
Pickering and Branigan (1998) identify three types of information that need to be included in 
the lemma stratum of a verb. These are: 
• Category information (N, V, A). 
• Featural Information (Number, Person, tense). 
• Combinatorial Information (how the verb can combine with other linguistic units). 
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In Roelofs' model the lemma stratum contains lemma nodes (one for each lexical concept) 
which are connected to nodes at the conceptual stratum (messages generated) and the word 
form stratum (where morphology and phonology are specified). Pickering and Branigan (1998) 
propose an extension to the lemma stratum to incorporate the syntactic aspects of verb rep-
resentation2 . They assume the existence of combinatorial nodes which are activated when the 
verb is used in a particular construction, and are open as to whether this is in terms of subcate-
gorization frames or overall combinatorial potential (including adjuncts) 1 . The other types of 
verb information are also activated by the input (Aspect, Number, Tense). The model is then 
investigated with date from sentence priming. Sentence priming is then explained in syntactic 
terms based on activation of nodes at the lemma stratum. The crosslinguistic evidence found 
in the Heydel and Murray experiments already militates against such an account. 
The sentence priming experiments in Pickering and Branigan (1998) also show that sentence 
priming effects occur across verbs, with the priming effect stronger when the verb was the same 
(expected by both accounts) and that tense, aspect and number had no effect on the magnitude 
of priming. Pickering and Branigan (1998) conclude that the 'findings argue against approaches 
to syntactic representation in which combinatorial information is represented separately for 
each verb (P646)' 4 . 
Indeed, Pickering and Branigan (1999) seem to be moving in a direction that incorporates 
information of a more conceptual nature. They point out that speakers and listeners benefit 
from priming effects in dialogue and reiterate the findings that interlocutors tend to produce 
the same kind of forms, and in this way are coordinating their contributions. There is evidence 
of such coordination at a number of levels. In describing mazes participants converge on the 
same type of descriptions (Garrod and Anderson (1987); Garrod and Clark (1993); Garrod 
and Doherty (1994)), and even more interestingly from the thematic-conceptual standpoint, 
there is semantic coordination in terms of mental models or 'conceptual pacts' in how to refer 
to an object (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986); Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992)). 
Pickering and Branigan have themselves gone on to show that in picture descriptions with 
a confederate interlocutor scripted to produce one form or other as a prime (P0, DO), the 
subject also used the primed form more frequently (75.5% of the time if the verb is the same 
and 63% of the time if the verb is different) 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter it has become clear that thematic-conceptual structure can be used to explain 
psycholinguistic observations that have otherwise proved difficult to explain. 
2 1t may be worth considering whether the combination of the conceptual stratum and a phonological stratum 
would be sufficient to explain parsing data. Fodor (1998a) has made the suggestion that prosodic packaging 
couples with MA and LC would be able to account for many parsing phenomena. In this chapter we have seen 
that thematic-conceptual structure is required to account for some of the more complex data. A combination 
of the two without recourse to a separate syntactic extension of the lemma stratum may be sufficient for 
explanatory purposes. 
3 This second option comes very close to the Thning Hypothesis of Mitchell and Cuetos (1991). 
4 11owever in Pickering and Branigan (1999) it is made clear that this representation is only regarded as 
the least redundant way to have a representation that is drawn on by both production and comprehension. 
Pickering and Branigan explicitly state that there can be no simple procedural account of priming from com-
prehension to production as the operation is reversed. I have argued against this saying it is the linking rule 
that is primed and that the linking rule is a procedure that can run in either direction. 
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Thematic-conceptual structure was also argued to be the representation type at which 
sentence-level priming can be explained. This contrasts with the current standard explanation 
of sentence-level priming purely in terms of syntactic structure. 
It was not clear, however, whether priming took place at the level of thematic-conceptual 
structure itself, or rather at the linking rules that connect the underlying thematic-conceptual 
structure to the particular surface expressions of a language. I suggested a number of ex-
periments that would clarify this point. The results thus far would certainly seem to give 
thematic-conceptual structure a much greater role in sentence priming than has been the case 
up to now. 
It should have been quite clear from my approach up to now that I believe that thematic-
conceptual structure has a major role to play in explaining psycholinguistic phenomena. 
Claims for a distinction between conscious and non-conscious parsing difficulty would seem 
to be supported by the empirical evidence. The explanation of parsing difficulty from the 
viewpoint of the thematic-conceptual structure is relatively easy to describe. 
If a sentence has been misparsed, recovery will be consciously difficult if: 
• An argument has to be relinked as part of a different predicate to the predicate to which 
it was originally linked; or 
• An argument has to be reanalyzed as being linked to an alternative linking point within 
the same predicate. 
The operation of this parsing principle, of course, is dependent on the type of on-line 
structure building that Pritchett proposed. In the case of thematic-conceptual structure, 
this on-line structure building is stated in terms of assigning arguments to potentially linked 
positions as soon as possible, and it is the undoing and rebuilding of this semantically motivated 
structure that proves difficult in the two cases given above. 
This semantic reanalysis is a more plausible source of difficulty than any strictly syntactic 
explanation. It is unclear why a reanalysis of syntax by itself should be difficult, but it seems 
a good deal more plausible that once a semantic representation has been built in terms of 
thematic-conceptual structure, it will be difficult to undo this understanding and to rebuild a 
new thematic-conceptual structure with a quite different semantics. 
The open roles central to the Discourse Strand of the work of Tanenhaus and his col-
leagues (section 4.2.1) are readily available in a thematic-conceptual structure. The thematic-
conceptual structure will always represent all the potential linking points for arguments, 
whether these are filled or not. The unfilled linking points will be implicit arguments, or 
open roles as Tanenhaus terms them. The implicit roles will be part of the possible interpre-
tation of a sentence as a result of being part of the semantically and conceptually motivated 
thematic-conceptual structure. This interpretive element will allow for the easy continuation 
of discourse based on either filled or implicit arguments. 
We also saw in Chapter 4 that the ease of discourse continuation of a sentence is not 
explained merely in terms of open roles. There also seems to be a difference in the ease of 
continuation based on the thematic role type that the subject of the continuation plays in the 
first sentence. 
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This thesis situates such findings and proposals into a much wider context, both concep-
tually and linguistically. In the concluding chapter I will draw the relevant sub-disciplines 
together and explain once more why thematic-conceptual structure should be central to lin-
guistic inquiry. I will also discuss other disciplines and sub-disciplines that I believe also shed 
some light on the centrality of thematic-conceptual structure to linguistics, but were perhaps 




The initial chapters of this thesis presented an overview of the role thematic information has 
been seen to play in linguistic theory. In Chapter 2 we saw how initially thematic information 
was presented in a decompositional theory known as Generative Semantics. The decomposition 
of Generative Semantics was unconstrained and thus resulted in very large structures that 
relied on an equally large number of transformations to convert to surface structure. After 
some time where thematic information was theoretically regarded as almost equivalent to 
argument structure, there was a redevelopment of decompositional approaches to thematic 
structure. The most successful of these in the view of this thesis was what I have termed 
thematic-conceptual structures. 
Thematic-conceptual structures are constrained to include only those semantic elements 
that have been grammaticalized in some language of the world. We saw in Chapter 3 how 
thematic-conceptual structures can explain the learning of a number of verb alternations. 
Also in Chapter 3 we saw how grammaticalization is not only a most complex operation that 
may not be easily expressible in terms of binary parameters, but also that grammaticalization 
seems to operate on metaphors that are particularly salient to humans in their ecological niche. 
There is more on this link between language structure and phylogeny in the next section. 
It seems to be the case that the earliest stages in language acquisition are thematic-
conceptual in nature and that such syntactic notions as functional categories develop matura-
tionally. Also, in the earliest stages many of the semantic categories represented in thematic-
conceptual structures and in the learning of the earliest alternations and the differentiation 
of certain word meanings are also seen to be relations in the world that are understood very 
early by children. 
At the end of Chapter 3 this discussion resulted in a number of predictions. These were: 
Thematic-conceptual structures will be a major player in the processing of sentences, 
as processing is then understood as the linking from thematic-conceptual structure to 
syntax or vice versa, depending on whether production or comprehension is being con-
sidered. 
The grammaticalization of metaphors that have become central to humans in their eco-
logical niche (See Chapter 6 for further discussion) will play their part in the content 
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that is relevant to processing. 
The breaking down of a higher processing system will result in the processor falling 
back on lower processing systems. The lowest level of this processing will be thematic-
conceptual structure, as thematic-conceptual structure forms the earliest stages of lan-
guage acquisition. 
Linguistic parameters may well be able to be stated and defined at the level of the linking 
of thematic-conceptual structure to the surface syntactic structure. 
In Chapter 4, where the role of thematic information in sentence processing and other 
aspects of psycholinguistics was discussed, the third of these predictions was seen to be the 
case. When the sentence processor broke down, the parse could be recovered by accessing 
thematic information. There were also indications that thematic-information may be centrally 
implicated in the processing of sentences, and that it is thematic information that determines 
the processing difficulty of the sentence. 
The idea that thematic information could be driving sentence processing was examined 
in detail in Chapter 5, where it was shown that the early indications are that the Thematic-
Conceptual Structure and Linking Hypothesis I proposed there was the best predictor for 
patterns of sentence processing and sentence priming and for the first time represented a 
process that could be common to both production and comprehension of sentences. We also 
saw how the metaphorical nature of grammaticalization (specifically the metaphorical link of 
vision to contact) is implicated in processing patterns. 
Provocatively, the idea that processing patterns are determined by the linking or de-linking 
of thematic-conceptual structure means that it could be argued that linguistic parameters 
of how a language expresses on the surface the underlying conceptual structure could be 
expressed at the level of these linking rules. This would mean that syntax would only have 
one level and the type of movement operations assumed to be behind such aspects as raising 
and passivization. It is well known that the gaps posited by such operations are hard to pick 
up psycholinguistically and, encouragingly, the work of Williams discussed in Chapter 2 would 
seem to suggest that raising at least can be captured at the thematic level without positing 
gaps. Jackendoff (1990) has also suggested that binding could be captured in a mono-level 
thematic-conceptual structure. This is a topic ripe for future research and outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to explore some more speculative arguments 
that I believe have a bearing on the theory of linguistics we should be following. Language is 
something that has developed evolutionarily and the evolution of language will have a bearing 
on its manner of operation today. Also language fulfills a role for humans in our ecological 
niche and will thus be shaped by the elements that are important for humans to cognize in 
order to survive. 
6.1 Thematic-Conceptual Structure and Phylogeny 
Thematic-conceptual structure can be seen as the link between our phylogenetically deter- 
mined conceptualization of the world and the structure of language. It forms the structural 
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level at which sentence-level priming occurs and the linking rules associated with thematic-
conceptual structure can be regarded as a procedure that is common to both production and 
comprehension. 
Linking rules are of central importance in another respect. Linking rules differ from lan-
guage to language. Crosslinguistic differences occur in the expression of thematic-conceptual 
structures (which do not differ from one language community to another) in the surface ex-
pressions of a language. Linking rules encode in thematic-conceptual terms how a particular 
language expresses a certain underlying thematic-conceptual structure. The strength of the 
linking rule over syntactic parameters is that linking rules make reference to the semantic 
content of the expressions whereas syntactic parameters operate merely in terms of abstract 
configurational representations. We saw in the discussion of grammaticalization that theories 
based on a small number of configurational differences are unlikely to be able to capture the 
wealth of crosslinguistic differences that occur. 
There may well be patterns that occur often cross-linguistically in how languages or groups 
of languages express particular thematic-conceptual relations. These patterns will be express-
ible in terms of the thematic-conceptual structure of the linking rules. If a language expresses 
a particular thematic-conceptual relation in a certain way in the surface expression of a lan-
guage, it may be the case that other patterns of linking rules can be predicted from such a 
fact, if it is commonly the case that other languages have shown it to be the case that groups 
of linking rules occur. Thus the number of options that a language will have in expressing sets 
of thematic-conceptual relations may well be limited in number. 
An attractive feature of the proposals laid out in this thesis is that it can be applied to 
both linguistic structure and language processing. In chapters 2 and 4 we saw that structural 
and processing theories were formulated in differing notations and with a differing emphasis. 
There seems to have been very little cross-discipline fertilization with regards to formulating 
theoretical structures that are relevant to both domains. 
Not only has thematic-conceptual structure been shown to be applicable to both structure 
and processing, it has also been shown to be applicable to both sentence comprehension and 
sentence production in processing. In production thematic-conceptual structures are converted 
via linking rules into the structure expressed. In comprehension the linguistic expressions are 
de-linked to decode the thematic-conceptual structures that allow for the semantic interpre-
tation to take place. 
6.2 Grounding Thematic-Conceptual Structure in Evo-
lutionary Terms 
We have seen pointers that indicate the explanatory potential of thematic-conceptual structure. 
That is, we have seen the sorts of things that we would want any theory of thematic-conceptual 
structure to be able to accomplish. In this chapter I will ground the theory of thematic-
conceptual structure in phylogenetic and ontogenetic terms. In so doing, thematic roles will 
emerge as part of a greater structure that has its basis in conceptual terms. 
It would appear that some of the problems that theories of thematic information have 
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faced up to now stem from the fact that they are embedded in a theoretical framework, where 
the language system is seen as fundamentally separate from the rest of cognition. I am not 
denying that this may be the case. However, there is a difference between on the one hand 
assuming that language is modular now and that other aspects of cognition can have no effect 
upon its operation, and, on the other hand, the position I take, that whatever the modular 
status of the language system today the form of the computational procedures taking place 
within it will have been shaped by the evolution of the language system from its cognitive 
precursors. 
The direct bearing that this approach has on thematic-conceptual structures is that the-
matic information seems to me to be the clearest reflection of the interface of language and 
cognition. An understanding of the cognitive and evolutionary precursors of language will 
illuminate the nature of the thematic relations and their formal properties. These cognitive 
precursors will determine to a large extent the type of relations that a language can express, 
and the linguistic structure that is required to express these relations. Thematic-conceptual 
relations are therefore the bridge between language and cognition. 
There are three ways that we can look for the precursors of language. First, we can examine 
the evolution of language itself. This, of course, is an area where any argument is based on 
speculation to some extent, but if the speculation is informed I see nothing wrong with this. 
The difficulty of the task does not preclude it providing information on the nature of language. 
Second, and related to the first we can examine computational systems in the brain that 
probably existed before language and were therefore likely to have been co-opted in the phy-
logenetic development of language. In addition, it may be the case that ontogeny reflects 
phylogeny to some extent and that we will see that the formal nature of the early stages of 
language acquisition reflect more deeply embedded structures of the brain. Brain functions 
that are in some way more basic may develop earlier in infants and language acquisition will 
be constrained by the form of the computational processes and knowledge that these earlier 
brain functions encode. 
Third, we can look at our nearest evolutionary relatives; monkeys and apes. Not only 
do they give us information on the extent to which they can be taught some form of human 
language, but they can also, and probably more importantly, give us information on capabilities 
outside of language that seem central to primates and thus are more likely to be deeply 
embedded in humans as well. Certain of these abilities may have a bearing on the later 
evolution of language. 
The chapter begins with a quick exposition of the most recent view of the evolution of 
mankind itself. This will form the backdrop for the second section which assesses the evolu-
tionary status of language. The discussion in these two sections will have implications as to 
the sort of theories of language evolution that will be plausible. 
It is likely to be the case that the sorts of computational or cultural adaptations that 
resulted in the emergence of language will still be of relevance to its structure today. Some of 
these adaptations will become clear from the discussion in the first three sections. 
However, much more can be gained by looking at our primate relatives and examining the 
language-like abilities that they possess. cLanguagelike  should be understood in two different 
ways. There are the cognitive, computational and structural precursors of language. These 
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may be used in a domain other than language in other primates. I believe that humans have 
co-opted into the language system some of these precursors during the evolution of language, 
and that the structure of modern languages will reflect the structure of these precursors. These 
possible precursors of language as seen in contemporary primates will be discussed. 
The other language-like abilities can be seen in attempts to teach human-type languages 
to apes. This is addressed in section 4.5. The successes and failures of these attempts will 
be contrasted. I shall argue that a large part of the success of the bonobo, Kanzi, in learning 
language is due to the manner in which he learnt language. This manner has been termed 
cultural learning. I then present the theory of cultural learning and include a discussion of a 
theory of language evolution based upon cultural change. 
6.3 A Brief History of Humankind 
Before we look at the evolution of language, it is useful to put its evolution in context of the 
evolution of Mankind. It is often claimed that it is language (Donald (1991); Edelman (1992); 
Leakey (1994)) that led directly to the pre-eminence of homo sapiens over other species of the 
Homo genus. 
Leakey (1994) identifies four key stages in the evolution of Homo Sapiens. 
The origin of the human family 7 million years ago when bipedal ape-like creatures 
evolved. 
The proliferation of bipedal species through adaptive radiation between 7 million years 
ago and two million years ago. 
In this proliferation was a species with a significantly larger brain. This species was the 
first in the genus Homo. 
The origin of modern humans with language, consciousness and technological innovation. 
The questions that arise from these stages that are particularly relevant to the task in hand 
are: What is the shape of the human family tree? When did language first evolve? What 
caused the dramatic increase in brain size? These questions are particularly important for 
various reasons. The shape of the family tree will tell us how closely related we are to any 
other primates we examine for language or language-related abilities. The time when language 
evolved with respect to other human competences will inform us as to what the language system 
could have been based on. The cause of the increase in brain size will allow us to examine 
claims that language evolved only after a certain brain size was achieved (Chomsky (1988)) 
or whether language itself caused the brain to increase in size, or whether the situation was 
much more complex than either of these two positions suggests. Later sections will address 
these questions further and will modify the conclusions we can make from human evolution as 
presented in this section. 
Darwin made two assumptions with respect to human origin. The first was that the 
origin of humans was in Africa. This assumption is generally agreed with today. The second 
assumption is what Leakey (1994) terms the Darwinian Package. The Darwinian Package is 
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the belief that bipedalism, technology and an enlarged brain evolved in concert. The reasoning 
can be put down to the time at which Darwin was forming his theory. It was difficult enough 
to persuade people that we were in effect a species of ape, but the task was made easier if 
we could be shown in some way to be a considerable distance apart from the rest of nature, 
and the co-evolution of the elements of the Darwinian Package provided this distance. The 
Darwinian Package remained unquestioned until recently and formed the centrepiece of the 
science of anthropology. It may be that Chomsky's feelings about the evolution of language 
could have their origin in the Darwinian Package. 
The folly of the Darwinian Package was shown in the early 60's when it was claimed on 
the basis of a fragment of jaw that was found that Ramapithecus was the first hominid species 
around 15 million years ago. The tooth in this jaw had hominid features and thus it was argued 
that it must have come from a hominid species that was bipedal and had a complex social 
environment. In other words, because the jaw had one hominid feature, the hominid whose 
jaw it was must have had all the other hominid features in the Darwinian Package. Sarich and 
Wilson (1967) working on blood proteins found that they could be used as a molecular clock 
- the longer a species has been separate from another, the more mutations accumulate in the 
blood protein. Based on this, they calculated that humans and apes had split only 7 million 
years ago. Thus Ramapithecus was not a hominid but a primitive ape. 
There are a number of explanations of human origin, all of which have informed theories 
of the evolution of language. The theories can be characterized in the following way. 
• The Expanding Brain Hypothesis 
• Man the Toolmaker 
• Man the Killer Ape 
• Man the Hunter-Gatherer 
• Man the Hunter 
. Woman the Gatherer 
All these have in common the assumption of the Darwinian Package. If it is the case that 
the Darwinian Package is true, then we would expect evidence in the archaeological record to 
reflect this truth. This evidence is singularly not there. The earliest tools in the record are 
from 2.5 million years ago, leaving 5 million years between the evolution of hominids and the 
first tools. However, it may be the case that there is a link between the advent of technology 
and the increase in brain size. 
The latest hypotheses are couched in biological rather than cultural terms and specifically 
focus on the origin and selective advantage of bipedalism. It is argued that bipedalism was 
loaded with evolutionary potential as it freed the upper limbs to manipulate objects'. This 
freeing of limbs is a much more likely explanation than the popular but entirely inaccurate 
'Out of the trees and onto the savanna' hypothesis. It is inaccurate as the savanna of East 
Africa only developed 3 million years ago - 4 million years too late. 
'A source of a theory of language evolution (Armstrong et al. (1995))(See section 6.5) 
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Another possible reason for bipedalism was that it was a more efficient means of locomotion 
(Rodman and Mdllenry (1980)). This may seem unlikely if we compare bipedalism with dogs 
and cats, but the comparison is true if we compare like with like and compare bipedalism with 
the knuckle-walking of chimpanzees. 
Moving on from the evolution of hominids to the evolution of Hoino Sapiens we find our 
clues as to the family tree. When a new species evolves, a process of adaptive radiation takes 
place. This is a burgeoning of variants on the species. We thus expect many types of hominid 
to have evolved. The archaeological record is sparse before 2 million years ago, but we know 
that 2 million years ago there were at least four species of Australopithecine and three species 
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It was with the evolution of homo habilis that the major shift in brain size occurred. There 
was a jump from 450cc in homo erectus to 600cc in early homo habilis. The jump in brain size 
coincided with a difference of hominid lifestyle. When apes are born, their brain is half its 
adult size. From homo habilis onwards, when hominids were born their brain was a third of its 
adult size. This means that children are born helpless and have a prolonged childhood. There 
is also an unusual growth spurt in adolescents of 25% compared to a more steady growth in 
apes of 14%. Bogin (1990) explains this by claiming that children learn better if there is a 
greater difference in size between adults and children. 
This unusual pattern of childhood makes culture possible. Culture could be argued to be 
the human adaptation. Not only was there a change in child rearing, there also was a change in 
other aspects of human culture. There was a general change in social context. Males became 
141 
closer to females in size, indicating that males were now probably staying in their native groups 
and were more likely to be cooperating. This cooperation needs to be motivated. This could 
have been for defence against other tribes. Alternatively, a large brain needs a great deal of 
energy, which can best be supplied by energy rich foods such as meat. The hunting of meat 
by a relatively weak, relatively slow hominid would have required cooperation. 
In this process we can find a motivation for the evolution of language as a method of 
more efficient communication Culture developed and social life became more complex. This 
complexity led to a need for social and economic coordination. Dunbar (1993) argues that as 
humans formed larger groups, grooming became inefficient and language replaced hands-on 
grooming as a more efficient way to integrate groups. Central to both these arguments is the 
social nature of language, an element which is often ignored in Chomskyan linguistics and 
theories of language acquisition. 
As indicated above there are two main views of language evolution. It is clear that brain 
size is implicated, but how is not clear. The first view as espoused by Chomsky is that at a 
certain brain size threshold language appeared rapidly. The other view is that selection acted 
on various cognitive capacities producing a more complex and enlarged brain. It can also be 
argued that a large brain had a selectional advantage and that in the same manner as for the 
peacock's tail, the advantage resulted in an adaptive feedback loop (Wills (1994)). 
It is often argued that the abrupt language hypothesis is supported by the sudden differ-
ence in human behaviour in the Upper Paleolithic, when complex tools and cave paintings 
appeared. It can be argued that the Chomskyan view is a more modern version of the Dar-
winian Package in its motivation; language is so very different to other mental capacities and 
is largely unrelated to them and thus we are very different from the rest of nature. This may 
be comforting but it is unlikely to be true. Falk (1983) argues against the Chomskyan view by 
pointing out that if hominids were not using language in some form or other what else were 
they doing with their autocatalytically increasing brain size 2 . 
Pinker (1994) thinks that Chomsky has it backwards; the brain is more likely to have grown 
as a result of the evolution of language. The evolutionary evidence favouring an early evolution 
of language with gradual improvement based on more complex socialization is backed up by 
fossil evidence on the structure of the brain. Holloway (1983) has found evidence in homo 
habilis of Broca's area and slight brain asymmetry, arguing for some level of laterality and 
development of areas associated with language, although it is unclear whether these areas were 
being used for language - or for some other capability which shares some of the computational 
properties of language. Further evidence for laterality is provided by the research of Toth 
(1985) into hominid tools. These tools show evidence for right-handed preference. 
From the form of the family tree we can safely conclude that the primates should be able to 
provide data that will be of relevance to our own cognition. We have also seen that evolutionary 
theories of language that rely on the brain expanding in size before the emergence of language 
seem dubious. The social aspect of language would seem to be of central importance. 
There seems to be a cluster of properties that appear whenever language evolution is 
discussed and a successful theory of language evolution will have to link them in a satisfying 
2 Although one could perhaps argue that mountain gorillas use their large brains for keeping track of social 
interactions. 
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way. These features are brain size, bipedalism, society and lateralization. 
Before I attempt to derive an explanation of the linking of these features (Section 6.5), I will 
show that an adaptive explanation of language emergence is the only viable theory (Section 
6.4). 
6.4 The Evolutionary Status of Language 
The first task is to show that language is indeed an instinct that has evolved. The argument 
here will follow closely that of Pinker and Bloom (1990). I agree with much of the framework 
of their argument, but I reconsider some of the specifics. 
Central to the argument that the language system has been formed by the process of 
evolution is the principle that biological artifacts which show complex design are understood 
to have been formed by natural selection. Crucially then, it is necessary to show that language 
has complex design. 
The following questions were posed with respect to the human eye by Dawkins (1986). As 
the first question can be answered negatively and all the others positively for the human eye, 
Dawkins concludes that the human eye has evolved by natural selection. I hope to show that 
the same answers will be given for the questions with respect to the human language system. 
Could language have arisen directly from no language at all, in a single step? 
Could language have arisen directly from something slightly different from itself, some-
thing that we may call X? 
Is there a continuous set of Xs connecting the modern language system to a state with 
no language at all? 
Considering each member of the series of hypothetical Xs connecting language to no 
language at all, is it plausible that every one of them was made available by random 
mutation of its predecessor? 
Considering each member of the series of Xs connecting human language to no language 
at all, is it plausible that every one of them worked sufficiently well that it assisted the 
survival and reproduction of the animals concerned? 
Language is clearly a complex system. Pinker and Bloom (1990) list the following un-
controversial building blocks of grammar, all of which interact with each other in complex 
ways. 
Grammars are built around symbols for major lexical categories that can enter into rules 
specifying tell-tale surface distributions, inflections and lists of lexical items. Together with 
minor categories that characteristically co-occur with the major ones, the different categories 
are thus provided with the means of being distinguished in the speech string. These distinctions 
are exploited to distinguish basic ontological categories such as things, events or states and 
qualities. This order of development reflects the general process of grammaticalization that 
we saw discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Within this general framework a number of other linguistic entities make up the total 
complex design. Major phrasal categories are constructed with a major lexical item which is 
allowed to combine with specific kinds of affixes and phrases. The resulting conglomerate is 
then used to refer to entities in our mental models of the world. 
Phrase structure rules force the structure of the string to reflect the semantic connectedness 
in the underlying proposition and thus provide linear cues of underlying structure. Rules of 
linear order allow the order of words within these concatenations to distinguish among the 
argument positions that an entity assumes with respect to a predicate. 
Case affixes on nouns and adjectives can take over these functions, marking nouns according 
to argument roles and linking noun with predicate even when order is scrambled. In addition to 
case affixes on nouns, verbal affixes signal the temporal distribution of the event that the verb 
refers to and the time of the event. Also related to the verb, auxiliaries convey relations that 
have logical scope over the entire proposition such as truth value, modality and illocutionary 
force. 
Mechanisms of complementation and control govern the expression of propositions that are 
arguments of other propositions, using specific complementizer morphemes. Other features of 
language design include anaphora, pronouns and wh-movement. 
And these aspects of language form only a partial list. The complexities of the interactions 
of these elements of the language system are only beginning to be understood. Having estab-
lished the complexity of language in general terms we can then turn to Dawkins's questions. 
The first question has already been answered to some extent. It is implausible that a 
system as complex as language could occur in an individual species in any way other than by 
natural selection. The alternative seems totally implausible. What possible single adaptation 
could have resulted in a system of the complexity of the language system? 
What X could plausibly have been the basis of language, this X being slightly different 
to language? To answer this question we need a system making somewhat similar types of 
computations to the language system. This similar system was then used for the initial stages 
of language, probably somewhat clumsily. As the language system evolved, the computations 
required by the language system became more and more specialized and a system devoted 
to them would have become more and more innate. This is known as the Baldwin Effect 
(Baldwin (1896)). 
One possible brain system that could have provided the initial computational style required 
by language is the visual system. Language could have arisen and probably did arise by a 
revamping of primate brain circuits that originally had no role in vocal communication, and 
by the addition of some new ones. The neuroanatomist Galaburda (1994) has discovered areas 
in monkey brains that correspond in location, input-output cabling, and cellular composition 
to the human language areas. 
In this respect it is also provocative to note that Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) propose 
that there is an observation/execution matching system that provides a bridge from 'doing' 
to 'communicating', as the link between the actor and observer becomes a link between the 
sender and receiver of the message. One area of the monkey brain (F5) contains neurons that 
discharge not only when an action is carried out, but also when it is observed to be carried 
out. These are termed mirror neurons. The area F5 is generally agreed to correspond to 
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Broca's area in the human brain. It would seem then that Broca's area, before it became 
more specialized for speech, was endowed with a mechanism for recognizing actions made by 
others. We see here a link between gesture, action and language that will tie in well with my 
arguments later in this chapter. The findings of Rizzolatti and Arbib also provide a neural 
basis for this link. 
Another possible brain system would be the system for the hierarchical representation of 
the social environment, which has been shown to be present in primates. This system may 
have been co-opted for the representation of syntactic relations. 
Is there a continuous set of Xs connecting the modern language system to a state with no 
language at all? One must be reminded of the fact that tiny selective advantages are sufficient 
for evolutionary change. According to Haldane (1927), a variant that produces on average 
1% more than its alternative allele would increase in frequency from 0.1% to 99.9% of the 
population in a little more than 4,000 generations. 
Is it plausible that the language system could have been gradually modified by small 
random changes? I believe so. It is hard to separate the cultural evolution of language from 
its biological evolution. A sensible approach would be to assume that much of Universal 
Grammar has a biological basis, which in the early stages of language evolution changed in 
small, biological, brain-based increments resulting either in a language which lost expressive 
capacity and thus selectional advantage, or in a language of increased expressivity which would 
have been actively selected for. 
Considering each member of the series of Xs connecting human language to no language at 
all, is it plausible that every one of them worked sufficiently well that it assisted the survival 
and reproduction of the animals concerned? Once language was in place, we have to assume 
that each subsequent change had some evolutionary advantage for the species, in the efficiency 
of either production or comprehension of language, or in its ease of acquisition. 
Premack (1990) reviews evidence that pedagogy is a universal and species-specific hu-
man trait, and the usefulness of language in pedagogy is not something that can be reason-
ably doubted. Devices designed for communicating precise information about time, space, 
predicate-argument relations, restrictive modification and modality are not wasted in such 
efforts. Recursion, in particular, is extraordinarily useful 3 . 
Humans depend on cooperative efforts for survival. In a group of communicators competing 
for attention and sympathies, there is a premium on the ability to engage, interest and persuade 
listeners. This dependence in turn encourages the development of discourse and rhetorical skills 
and the pragmatically relevant grammatical devices that support them. 
Humans fell into a lifestyle that depended on extended cooperation for food, safety, nur-
ture and reproductive opportunities. This lifestyle presents extraordinary opportunities for 
evolutionary gains and losses. Any adaptation that improved any of these aspects of behaviour 
would have a selectional advantage for the species. 
I believe that the evolutionary status of language has been established. However, there 
are a number of other possible explanations for the existence of language that have to be 
discounted. There are two basic arguments that compete with an evolutionary account of the 
language system. The first is that language is not a separate complex system. This argument 
3 Hierarchical structure may well have been present in the cognitive system before language. 
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claims the brain is a general computational device and that language is just one of the abilities 
that this computational system has (Christiansen (1994)). The important point to note is 
that the theory claims that the same types of computation can explain many different types 
of behaviour. Another argument of this same type is that as the brain has grown larger in 
evolutionary time, its sheer size has made more complex computations such as those involved 
in language possible. 
The second type of argument concerns the theory of evolution itself. Gould and Lewontin 
(1979) have argued that many adaptations present in creatures first evolved to perform some 
other task than that which they are used for today, and these changes were then found to be 
useful for their current purpose at some later time. Their contention is that language is one 
of these evolutionary 'spandrels', as Gould and Lewontin term them. Another evolutionary 
argument of this second type is that changes in the structure of a being during its lifetime can 
be passed on to its offspring. This approach is known as Larmarckism after its most famous 
proponent. 
Common to the arguments against natural selection as the origin of the language system is 
the idea that language is a mere side effect of other forms of cognitive development. There are 
reasons why the brain should not be seen as a general multipurpose learning device. It should 
be borne in mind that language learning is not direct programming. The language learner is 
provided only with sentences of the language not the rules of the language. The rules have 
to be derived by some learning device. The evolutionary argument posits that it is natural 
selection that is the programmer (or has provided the program). 
The opposing claim to this is that the mind is like a machine equipped with a single 
learning device that could learn from examples. However, Pinker and Bloom claim that there 
is no psychologically realistic multipurpose learning program that can acquire language as a 
special case, because the kinds of generalizations that need to be made to acquire a grammar 
do not align themselves with those that are useful in acquiring other systems of knowledge 
from examples (Chomsky (1986)). This is a large claim which is not necessarily substantiated 
in the text of Pinker and Bloom. 
There is, however, another strong argument that motivates against the multipurpose learn-
ing device position. This argument is the Poverty of the Stimulus: The grammar of the lan-
guage encapsulates the constraints and functions as a set of specifications that allow for the 
production of all the grammatical sentences of a language. The language learner has to extract 
this set of specifications from a finite set of instances. This is quite impossible, it is claimed. 
There is an infinite set of grammars that could explain a finite set of utterances. 
If a language learner hypothesizes a plausible rule from the data and the learner has not 
yet identified the constraints on language constructions, the learner's language will probably 
include constructions outside the restricted set of the target language. We then have to 
assume that there is a language informant of some kind or other that allows the learner to 
obtain evidence about the validity of the rule. Negative feedback would provide linguistic 
information on inappropriate sentences. 
But there is little negative information available to the learner (Pinker (1989)). Most people 
speak accurately most of the time. Non-instances are therefore a statistical rarity. However, 
negative evidence could be argued to exist in the form of the non-occurrence of particular 
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forms. Adults rarely correct the grammatical mistakes their children make (Hirsch-Pasek 
et al. (1984)), focusing much more on the factual accuracy of what they say. 
Children do not get systematic negative feedback on what they say, and the feedback 
they do get under-determines the correctness of their productions. Given that constraints on 
language are negative statements and that there is little negative data available to the learner, 
how can the constraints be learned? This learning of constraints despite insufficient negative 
feedback is the paradox of language learning. 
Thus the evidence does not seem to support the multipurpose learning device position. 
The second argument of this type to repudiate is that changes in brain quantity result in 
changes of brain quality. Mere largeness of brain is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for language, nor is there any reason to believe that merely more and more neurons in a circuit 
will result in computationally interesting abilities. There is also no good evolutionary reason 
why a creature should evolve a metabolically very expensive large brain in the hope of some 
useful ability evolving at a later date. 
The second type of competing explanation of the appearance of language phylogenetically 
sees language as a side-effect of other evolutionary events. It is perhaps instructive to discuss 
the status of the side-effects of other evolutionary changes within the theory of evolution. 
Gould and Lewontin (1979) speak of natural selection being replaced by exaption. This is the 
process where a side-effect of some other evolutionary event proves to be useful and thus has 
reproductive advantage and is then maintained. This type of situation is an example of an 
unmodified side-effect. Natural selection would play no role here. 
An uninteresting case would be where side-effects are not involved in any aspect of be-
haviour - such as redness of blood. Much more interesting is the case Gould is arguing for 
here; whereby side effects are modified and put to use. Natural selection plays a central role 
in these cases. A designer is needed and that designer is natural selection. 
It is hard to see how language could be an exaption. How could one side-effect of another 
evolutionary event result in a system as complex of language? 4 The complexity of design in 
the language system lends far more credence to an account based squarely on the more central 
process of evolution, namely, natural selection 5 . 
The only elements adopted by Neo-Lamarckians are basically two: the inheritance of ac-
quired characteristics, and the principle of use and disuse. The principle of use and disuse 
states that those parts of an organism's body that are used grow larger. Those parts that are 
not used tend to wither away. All evidence suggests that the idea that acquired characteristics 
are inherited is false. 
Having discounted these alternative explanations of the phylogenetic development of lan-
guage, one may think that the development of language by natural selection has been estab-
lished. However, there have been arguments against a natural selection account and these also 
have to be shown to be spurious. 
4 Although this discounting of language as an exaption, of course, depends on how complex the language 
system as a whole may be. It is perfectly plausible in my view that parts of the language system may be 
exaptions of other parts of our cognitive apparatus. For example, later in this chapter, we will see that vervet 
monkeys have a hierarchical representation of social relations. This representation may well have been exapted 
to represent linguistic syntax. 
5 Although, here again, there is another interpretation where natural selection acts on a series of exaptions 
to produce the language system. 
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The first objection is that grammatical devices and expressive functions do not pair up in 
a one-to-one fashion. For example, some languages use word order to convey who did what 
to whom; others use case or agreement for this purpose and reserve word order to distinguish 
topic from comment. How can one say that the mental devices governing word order evolved 
under selection pressure from expressing grammatical relations if many languages do not use 
them for that purpose? 
The answer to this objection is that the evolution of structures that serve not one, but a 
small number of definite functions, perhaps to different extents in different environments, is 
common to biology. Indeed, though grammatical devices are put to different uses in different 
languages, the possible pairings are very circumscribed. No languages uses noun affixes to 
express tense. Equally, other aspects of cognition may explain the circumscriptions in the 
language system. 
Even a rudimentary grammatical analysis reveals that surface diversity is often a mani-
festation of minor differences in the underlying mental grammars. When one looks at more 
abstract linguistic analyses, the underlying unity of natural language is even more apparent. 
Chomsky has suggested that anything you find in one language can also be found in every 
other language, perhaps at a more abstract level of representation. 
Piattelli-Palmarani (1989) presents a different kind of argument: Grammar is not com-
pletely predictable as an adaption to communication, therefore, he claims, it lacks design and 
did not evolve by selection. This arguments takes two forms: 
• Language could be better than it is. 
• Language could be different to what it is. 
However, even if it could be shown that one part of a language had no function and the 
structure of language was therefore not optimal, that would not mean that all parts of language 
had no function. Indeed, many constraints that at the moment seem to have no real basis 
could later be shown to be part of more underlying principles. 
Further, the idea that natural selection aspires towards perfection has long been discarded 
in evolutionary theory. Trade-offs among conflicting adaptive goals are a ubiquitous limitation 
on optimality in the design of organisms. The eye is a classic example. The blind-spot is caused 
by much of the wiring of the eye being on the front instead of the back. Wiring on the back 
would clearly be a more perfect design, but the evolutionary history of the eye has resulted in 
the extant structure. 
Trade-offs of utility within language are also unavoidable. There is a conflict of interest 
between speaker and hearer. Speakers want to minimize articulatory effort and hence tend 
toward brevity and phonological reduction. Hearers want to minimize the effort of understand-
ing and hence desire explicitness and clarity. Clearly any shared system of communication is 
going to have to adopt a code that is a compromise among these demands, and so will appear 
to be arbitrary from the point of view of any one criterion. 
The second form of this type of argument was that the system of language could be different 
to the way that it actually is. The fact that we can conceive of a biological system being 
different from the way it actually is says nothing about whether it is an adaptation. 
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With respect to language, any communicative system requires a coding protocol that can 
be arbitrary as long as it is shared. This is the requirement of parity. In the evolution 
of the language faculty, many arbitrary constraints may have been selected simply because 
they defined parts of a standardized communicative code in the brains of some critical mass of 
speakers. This does not mean that the language system is optimum to any extent, as Chomsky 
(1994) seems to imply. 
To be sure, some combination of historical accidents, epiphenomena of other cognitive 
processes, and neurodevelopmental constraints must have played a large role in the breaking 
of the symmetry that was needed to get the grammar fixation process running away in one 
direction or another. But it still must have been selection that resulted in the convention then 
becoming deeply entrenched. 
In this section, following Pinker and Bloom, I have presented arguments for the phyloge-
netic development of language based on natural selection. These arguments show that the 
language system with its most general properties shows the same kind of complex design as 
the eye. The arguments against natural selection have been shown to be spurious. Alterna-
tive theories for the emergence of language have also been shown to be unlikely. Although 
I agree with the general thrust of Pinker and Bloom's arguments, I do not agree that what 
has evolved is the theory of Principles and Parameters as they seem to suggest, rather it is 
the general properties of language that have evolved, what language expresses, to what uses 
it is put, and to some extent, the devices language uses to express the conceptualizations we 
have as humans. Pinker would like the evolved state of language to mirror PPT exactly as 
he believes in the Continuity Hypothesis (Pinker (1984)) of the language system throughout 
the child's development. In other words, all the principles of PPT are available to the child 
innately. The Continuity Hypothesis has been shown to be dubious in Chapter 3 so it is not 
necessary to make the extreme assumptions that Pinker and Bloom have made. 
6.5 Scenarios of Language Evolution 
In the section on human evolution we saw that socialization required a more efficient form 
of communication. Bickerton (1991) argues that language cannot be seen purely as a system 
of communication but also has to be seen as a system of representation and that we cannot 
study the function of language without also studying the structure that underlies that function. 
Language he argues can be nothing but an evolutionary adaptation and as such it must have 
antecedents of some kind, both social and structural. 
Bickerton sees the difference between human communication and animal communication as 
a freeing up of referential abilities. The adaptive function of communication for other species 
is a specific set of referential abilities that rely on calls for things for which sensory evidence 
exists, whereas for humans the adaptive advantage comes with a system of reference as a 
whole. 
However, we cannot have a representation without a medium in which to represent it. The 
representations are thus constrained by the nature of the medium that represents them i.e 
the human brain. Representations for any creature are not veridical. Thus the nature of the 
representations of dogs (with a large range of olfactory perception) and bats (with a large range 
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of auditory perception) and humans is constrained by the evolutionary needs and ecological 
niche of each species and is reflected in the form and nature of their input devices and neural 
structure. In other words the categories we can distinguish and represent are determined not 
by the nature of reality but by the nature of our nervous system and what we need to survive 
and reproduce. 
This has often been found difficult to accept but if it seems easy to accept that bats or 
insects have adapted to fit their environment, why should it not be equally easy to accept 
this for humans? We may be a lot more complex, but we have our evolutionarily determined 
limitations as well. 
Bickerton sees language as a representational system par excellence, but a representational 
system that has two sides: An atlas of reality which is reflected in semantics, and a method 
of traversing this atlas which is reflected in syntax. The nature of our mapping of reality is 
not arbitrary and relies on three mappings: 
• Reality —+ Sensory Perception. 
• Sensory Perception -4 Categorization. 
• Categorization -+ Language. 
Bickerton argues that we learn concepts on the basis of their functionality and that these 
concepts are encoded in semantic space which is constrained by what we think exists as required 
by what we, as a creature, want to be there. That is, there may well be any number of concepts 
in the world that we do not encode as they are not relevant to us as humans in our ecological 
niche. We only encode, and perhaps only perceive, the concepts that are relevant to us as 
humans. 
We encode what we perceive in the world as a thing and that thing's behaviour. This 
distinction is unexpected as it corresponds to nothing in nature 6 . We could just as well have 
a holistic representation of such a situation. But the subject and predicate distinction is 
fundamental to us. This fundamental status could be because, phylogenetically, concepts of 
entities preceded concepts of behaviours. The functional utility of the later development of 
verbs could be that they represent chunks of behaviour that are functionally significant for 
our species 7 . 
The ordered learning of concepts based on their phylogenetic age can be seen in the learning 
of colour terms. Berlin and Kay (1969) showed that colour concepts are learned in a fixed order. 
This fixed order reflects the stages of colour discrimination in all primates and specifically 
reflects their phylogenetic age. 
This is a first example of the link between phylogeny and ontogeny. With respect to 
language it may be the case that some aspects of language's computational structure emerged 
earlier than others and will be of greater salience when it comes to language processing. 
6 Armstrong et al. (1995) propose a method by which we could have separated holistic events into subject 
and predicate. This method will be explained below. 
71t could also reflect the fact that different brain structures are responsible for recognizing things and 
carrying out actions. If our representation of actions of others is parasitic upon an internal representation of 
an action in terms of its productions and its putative effects, then this representation would make the two 
distinct. 
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The semantic space in which we encode concepts is organized as a hierarchical structure 
and shows contiguity constraints. So, for example, only contiguous sectors of the colour 
continuum can be encoded. And in some languages there is a single verb for existence, location, 
possession and ownership but our conceptual system automatically links certain concepts 
together so that where languages use one verb to encode one or more of these relations we find 
no language which has a single verb for location and possession and another verb for existence 
and ownership. 
There would seem, then, to be a limitation on how we as humans categorize the world. 
Cultural limitations on our conceptualization of the world will be reflected in the language we 
use. This would seem to be the Sapir-Whorf 8 hypothesis in reverse. 
So the conceptual system is constrained by the way we perceive the world as determined by 
our ecological niche. In addition to this, the syntax that allows us to cross this conceptual map 
in forming sentences is itself constrained by the form of the conceptual map. So for example 
we can produce predicatability trees (Keil (1981)) that represent what can be predicated by 
what. Thus a quality at the top of the tree can be predicated of any class beneath it. 
ALL THINGS 
-- -Ive fear 
THINGS WITH 	 ABSTRACT CONCEPTS 
SPATIAL LOCATION - - 
PHYSICAL OBJECTS 	 EVENT 
	 story idea 
/ / 	 INTENTIONAL NONINTENTIONAL 
SOLID EVENTS 	EVENTS 
OBJECTS AGGREGATES 
(6.1) 	 milk water fight kiss thuderstorm, sunrise 
These trees reflect the contiguity constraints in the conceptual map, thus if a property 
can be predicated of humans and plants, it must also be predicatable of mammals. These 
trees of concepts also appear to be acquired in a certain order reflecting innate discriminatory 
saliencies. 
Half the words in a language as it is produced are grammatical items. These grammatical 
items do not mirror anything specific in experience but they allow things to be plotted relative 
to the observer in space, time, number and so on. There seems to be a short list of grammatical 
items but an infinite number of relations in the world. 
Turning to syntax itself, we can see a sentence as a play with roles being filled, the number 
of roles is small. The roles are particularly important as, if anything is consistent across 
languages, it is the roles that languages are capable of expressing. The same cannot be said 
of tense, formal syntactic structure or the semantic range of words. And to understand a 
sentence and to integrate it into discourse, it is essential to work out the thematic relations 
that the sentence encodes. 
The less contentful notions of syntactic structure such as Case and Government can be 
regarded as a back-up system for the efficient processing of the products of the argument 
8 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis claims that our view of the world is influenced and shaped by the particular 
language we speak. 
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structure system and should thus be seen as subservient to the thematic relations and not vice 
versa. 
Bickerton gives the following definition of Representation: 
Responding or having permanent propensity to respond to x, an entity or event in 
the external world, in terms of y, a particular pattern of neural activity. 
Simple representations evolved so that creatures could respond to the environment. Initial 
unrepresented responses can be seen in plants where the same cells that receive the stimulation 
are the ones that respond. The first step to representation comes when it is different cells that 
receive and respond. Thus in insectivorous plants, one cell notices contact with the plant and 
a different cell causes the leaves to trap the insect. However, there is no element of learning 
at this stage. 
The next stage is the freeing up of stimulus and response. If two types of sensory cell are 
linked to one intermediate cell the creature can now give a number of responses. 
To categorize these perceptions a process of selection takes place determined by species 
membership. It is possible that some categories are innate but their number will be limited as 
they will be linked to a single response and will therefore be inflexible. There are thus three 
stages in concept formation. 
• Object in External World. 
e Patterns of cell activity triggered by that object. 
• The observer's internal and external responses to these patterns. 
Bickerton proposes that the first step to language was probably a proto-language with a 
form analogous to the language of the under-twos, feral-children and pidgin languages. He 
claims all of these have features in common. The differences between proto-language and 
real language are that there is a low incidence of grammatical items, no attention is paid to 
subcategorization requirements, any recursion that occurs has been learnt in a rote fashion, 
word order changes are not tied to emphasis or presupposition and the use of null elements, 
or more accurately, implicit arguments, is unconstrained. 
Bickerton is thus making a claim about the nature of language acquisition in that if chil-
dren's early productioh is based on proto-language it may be that they have no true language 
grammar and no neural structures to support such a grammar until they are around two years 
of age. Combinations before this age are an exercise in semantics and not syntax. If this 
is the case it may be expected that the combinations are constrained in some way, although 
Bickerton does not address this. 
The nature of the first step to language and the motivations for it have to be explained. 
There are three possibilities as to the nature of the change: syntax before lexical, lexical 
before syntax or simultaneous. Simultaneous evolution is unlikely according to Bickerton 
as it is clear that proto-language can operate largely by ignoring syntax. Syntax can only 
have evolved first if it performed some other established function. Bickerton discounts this 
argument as he feels syntax needs a lexicon to operate. This may well be true for language but 
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it does not preclude the possibility that before language and lexica there was some syntax-like 
computational process taking place in the brain that was later co-opted for language. 
With respect to human evolution and the time course of the first step to language, Bick-
erton's position seems rather confused. He does not believe that language is connected with 
tool use as linguistic structure is hierarchical and tool use is serial, although he does concede 
this connection would be enough for proto-language. As he is here explaining the emergence 
of proto-language, his claim is odd. 
He disputes any claim that sign-language had a role as it complicates linguistic history, 
it does not answer how syntax developed or how elements acquired reference and children 
do not go through a signing stage. All of these facts are hotly disputed by Armstrong et al. 
(1995) as we shall see later in this section. Indeed, when Bickerton turns his attention to our 
ecological readiness for language he uses a similar argument to Armstrong et al. in saying that 
the freeing of the hands allowed for an enrichment of neural connections with cross-modal 
connections being made between the visual the auditory and the tactile - precisely the kinds 
of interconnections he argued made categorization possible. Other factors Bickerton considers 
relevant are the formation of social groups with varied eating habits over long ranges, requiring 
complex mapping abilities (found in many creatures without language) and long pursuit of 
prey requiring a planning ability. 
The most contentious part of the claims of Bickerton (1991) about the evolution of language 
is his view that the change from proto-language to true language was a catastrophic, all-at-once 
event, and not an event that took place gradually over time. Curiously he uses arguments from 
the fully formed language system to back this up. Thus, he claims, in the course of a child's 
acquisition of language, the steps from the proto-language stage to the true language stage 
will show the clustered appearance of the systematic expansion of structure, the obligatory 
expression of subcategorized elements and the automatic identification of null elements. It 
suffices now to say they are dubious. In any case it is unclear whether the emergence of 
language is informed by such 'facts'. 
A second curious claim against gradualism that Bickerton uses is that there is not gradu-
alism in the transition from pidgins to creoles. The first generation of children of immigrants 
grammaticalize the pidgin into a full language, a creole. Thus he identifies a species-specific 
biological characteristic - the ability to create a language in the absence of a specific model. 
This is well and good, but it explains a competence of the evolved linguistic system and says 
nothing about its evolution. 
When he turns to phylogeny itself, he points out that evolutionary abruptness is different 
from everyday abruptness - although his previous two arguments were based on everyday 
abruptness. In other words evolutionary abruptness is over a relatively long time - gradualness 
in disguise, in other words. However, he points to the sudden change in the paleontological 
record in the Upper Pleostine as evidence for the sudden emergence of language. The sudden 
increase in artifacts may however have come well after language evolved, and why should 
syntactic language and not proto-language be the relevant trigger? 
In other words Bickerton is looking for a crucial single mutation, that could impose a 
hierarchical structure on language. This hierarchical structure being the three level X-bar 
theory. The mutation he argues for is a linking of the lexicon brain area to the brain area 
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where the structure of events is analyzed. 
The structure of events is indeed important and will form a major part of the representation 
I have adopted for thematic-conceptual structure. 
There are a number of comments that can be made about this scenario. First, it assumes 
that the structure that evolution moved towards is the structure that contemporary linguistic 
theory claims to be correct. This seems to be argumentation in reverse. We should be looking 
for what evolution can tell us about the structure of language and not what a highly abstract 
theory of linguistic structure can tell us about evolution. Second, it is unclear what kind of 
single genetic mutation can have resulted in such a sudden linking of two supposedly separate 
functional areas of the brain. 
There are a number of ideas that we can take from Bickerton's work. He has stressed, and 
it is important to realize, that cognition is species-specific and constrained by its ecological 
niche. We should not be afraid to apply this insight to humans. Thus the constraints on our 
conceptualizations are reflected in the structure of language. 
Bickerton sees the linking of event structure to the lexicon as being of vital importance 
in the evolution of language and this linking of event structure and lexicon would appear to 
be much more plausible than the other element of his approach, a catastrophic shift from 
proto-language to true language. 
There is also the expectation that language will have societal and structural antecedents. 
To find evidence for these I will discuss evidence from research into primates. Also of relevance 
are models of human society as can be found in the work of Dunbar (1993). 
Armstrong et al. (1995) take an almost diametrically opposite position to Bickerton. Not 
only do they see language evolution as a gradual process, but they see gesture as the major 
step towards language. For them, sign language is a biologically related homologue to spoken 
language as they share the same evolutionary history. 
They state a number of reasons why gesture and language cannot be separated. Kendon 
(1991) and McNeill (1985) have shown that gestures that accompany speech are very closely 
integrated into the timing of the speech act and are therefore probably being generated by the 
same processes. Intonation, also, seems to straddle gesture and language. 
The outline of their theory and general approach is the same as the line that I am taking 
in this dissertation. That is, they are suspicious of taking the formal categories proposed by 
contemporary linguistics as the starting point and arguing back from these to possible precur-
sors and alleged brain mechanisms. Instead we start with the raw materials of communication 
in humans and non-humans. 
Humans working in groups led to a selective advantage and communication within the 
group led to a further advantage. The specific emphasis on gesture that is made in their 
book is justified by their view of humans as primarily visual creatures. Thus visual language 
(gesture) is more likely to have been a viable first step to language than invisible language 
(speech). 
They propose that the key to building syntax incrementally is the discovery of relationships 
within symbols and that the germ of this discovery is inherent in the form of simple visible 
gestures. They claim that a basic sign has a structure where something does something to 
something else, or in other words SVO, the basis of syntax. Getting from a sign like this 
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to syntax is an exercise in analysis and not synthesis. Syntax is formed, then, by taking 
a gesture apart rather than stumbling on a large number of logical categories that combine 
spoken words. 
The fact that a gesture involves a hand and its movement allows for early humans to see 
that what acts, and the action it performs, are distinct events as it is learning internal to the 
creature. In some ways, it could be argued that the ordering of signs and their form are the 
natural order of things - indeed hominids may have dimly perceived this from the external 
world. However, it is another step to symbolize them, and this symbolization is more likely to 
have come about by neural connections based on internal bodily functions rather than by an 
analysis of the external world. 
The next step of course was to equate the relations in a gestural 'sentence' with relations 
in the outer world. This could be achieved by pairing visible events in the world with similarly 
structured visible gestures. 
Up to this point of the argument, the syntax that the human being has achieved is very 
basic. There has been no explanation of how adverbs, adjectives and subordination could 
have entered into the system. In contemporary sign language such elements can be added by 
simultaneous expression, thus the possibility of modification was also inherent in the structure 
of visible gestures. 
By taking this approach to language evolution, it is argued, we can see a much more 
obvious link between handedness and left-hemisphere language preferences. They are both 
forms of praxis, where complex motor actions are planned. It has been shown that there 
is a clear preference for handedness in gesture and that in deaf children the preference for 
handedness in gesture precedes the handedness preference for object manipulation (Bonvillan 
and Richards (1993)). 
The view that the basis of language is in its bodily realization has consequences for the 
conception of the form of grammar. The body is located in time and space and grammar will 
reflect this. The Spatialization of Form Hypothesis (Lakoff (1987)) argues that grammar is 
ultimately spatial and makes a number of predictions. 
• The acquisition of grammar takes place when linguistic information is routed to, and 
processed by, the spatial centres of the brain. 
• Linguistic expressions are processed in terms of image schemas. 
• Image schemas are embodied schemas which represent cognitive models of the body and 
its interaction with the environment. 
It is easy to see how this can be related to language having its first step in gesture. It also 
has implications for the role of the body in perceptual categorization. Armstrong et al adopt 
the learning theory of Edelman (1987), which argues that categorization requires at least two 
separate sensory channels which each supplies signals to neural maps. These maps interact 
with each other in a process termed reentry by Edelman. 
These reentrant maps interact in turn with non-mapped regions (frontal lobes, basal ganglia 
and cerebellum) to form global maps which result in categorizations. 
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Thus, in learning, embodied action is involved. Cognition depends on the kinds of experi-
ence that come from having bodies with various sensorimotor capacities. Perception consists 
of perceptually guided action and the cognitive structures that are formed from this action 
emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided 
(Varela et al. (1991)). If this is true, the cognitive structures underlying language should also 
have emerged from perceptually guided action. This action is argued to be gesture. 
Thus the global mappings that can be made given the nature of our perceptual systems 
will be the basis of the form of language. The global mappings that are formed by cor-
relating objects, actions and spatial and temporal relations will be the best conception of 
thematic-conceptual relations we can arrive at. These thematic-conceptual relations will be 
phylogenetically and functionally determined and therefore will be language universal. Func-
tional theories of linguistics such as Cognitive Grammar, Cognitive Semantics and Functional 
Grammar address this issue. However, they do not address the full form of language that 
involves great linguistic differences in the encoding of these thematic relations in structure. 
Armstrong et al. also give us indications that humans are basically visual creatures. In 
addition to this visual basis, there is a tactile side to sign language that may well have left a 
vestige as an increased saliency of tactile metaphors in language content and structure. Such 
tactile relations would include contact, support, and so on. Concepts that we have seen in 
Chapter 3 appear early in cognitive development. 
In general, what comes to be internalized and available for incorporation into the language 
system is constrained by our ecologically determined perception of the world. 
6.6 Primate Behaviour and Primate Cognition 
An analysis of primate behaviour and the clues it gives us about primate cognition is important 
as it provides evidence as to the cognitive abilities and processing and representation systems 
of our closest evolutionary relatives. We will be able to get an idea of the sorts of cognition that 
will also be particularly salient for human beings and of possible language-like computational 
processes that could have been co-opted for language processing and language representations. 
Indeed, if it can be shown that primates have representations of some form or another and 
we know the sorts of behaviours these representations govern, we will have clues as to the 
types of behaviour and cognitive abilities that can lead to representations being formed. This 
in turn will allow us to reassess the various theories of categorization and concept formation 
we have encountered above. 
We will not be confusing the account in this section with the literature on the specific 
linguistic capabilities of primates. We will address that issue in the next section as it will be 
able to give us an idea as to what extra is required over and above the normal abilities of 
primates to result in a full linguistic system. This section, however, as indicated above, seeks 
only to find nonlinguistic capabilities that had a computational form that could have later 
been useful for language. 
Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) have looked at the behaviour of vervet monkeys in two main 
areas, social behaviour and vocal communication. They have found that vervets do not interact 
at random but base their actions on five features of vervet social interaction: kinship, dom- 
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inance, reciprocity, sexual attraction and defence. They identify three motives that underlie 
this behaviour: attraction to kin, deference to those of high rank and a desire to increase their 
own status. They argue that these motives make evolutionary sense as there are evolutionary 
benefits of kin selection, and deferring to those of higher rank as well as trying to increase 
one's own rank reflects a mixed strategy common in groups where high rank is correlated with 
reproductive success. 
Vervet monkeys act as if they understand such relations as kinship and dominance, but 
it could be that we are imposing our categories on them. Cheney and Seyfarth go on to 
investigate whether there is evidence that monkeys represent this knowledge mentally. 
Overall they found that a number of different species appear to observe interactions in 
which they are not themselves involved, and to recognize relationships that exist among oth-
ers. For example, if females hear a juvenile's cry for help, they expect a response from that 
juvenile's mother, as evidenced by their looking at the juvenile's mother when they hear its 
call. Monkeys' classification of social relationships seems to be based on abstractions rather 
than on physical features or the number and type of interactions. The abstraction seems to 
be based on all these elements. They seem, in some way, to be using a kind of analogical 
reasoning that results in them representing hierarchies of individuals. 
Cheney and Seyfarth argue that this kind of analogical reasoning seems similar to the sort 
of analogical reasoning that can be carried out by language-trained chimpanzees. What is 
important at the moment is that vervet monkeys show evidence that they can represent hier-
archical relations. Hierarchical relations were what Bickerton saw as being the vital mutation 
in hominids that allowed for the development of a full syntactic language. If what Cheney and 
Seyfarth claim is accurate it would seem, however, that the hierarchical relations of language 
could have been based on a pre-existing system of hierarchical representation of society. 
Turning to the vocal communication of vervet monkeys, Cheney and Seyfarth point out 
that it is impossible to tell whether a monkey deliberately intends to communicate or whether 
calls simply come out as part of their ongoing behaviour. 
Vervet monkeys give different sounding alarm calls in response to at least three different 
predators: leopards, eagles and snakes. Each alarm elicits very different escape responses from 
other vervets nearby. It seemed then that vervets were using calls to denote different external 
referents. It was suggested that the difference in the calls was perhaps only due to the level of 
panic in the vervet making the call. Seyfarth et al. (1980) tested this by playing recordings 
of the three alarm calls adjusted for length and amplitude to vervets in the wild. They found 
that these alterations made no difference to the escape strategies that each of the calls elicited. 
Vervet monkeys also grunt in at least four different social situations: 
• When approaching a more dominant individual. 
• When approaching a subordinate. 
• Watching another animal or initiating a movement across an open plain. 
• When a monkey has spotted members of another group. 
In contrast to the strikingly different alarm calls, the grunts all sound similar. However, 
the experiments of Cheney and Seyfarth (1982) have shown that the vervets seem able to 
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distinguish the grunts. The grunts were played to the monkeys in different contexts and 
consistent differences in the responses to the grunts were observed, except in the case of 
grunts to a dominant male and grunts to a dominant female. Marler (1976) has suggested 
that dividing a graded stream of sounds into discrete categories is the most difficult problem 
to surmount on the course to language. However, the fact that vervets have so few grunts 
suggests that other constraints are at work and therefore that humans have an additional 
capacity to monkeys. 
It now remains to examine to what extent the vocalizations of monkeys mean something 
to them. We have seen how vervets' vocalizations function in their society, but it is unclear 
up to now whether vervets recognize that a vocalization X means Y which would be based on 
an abstraction away from the function and the vocalization's acoustic properties. 
Cheney and Seyfarth utilize the theory of intentional stance (Dennett (1987)), which iden-
tifies a number of levels of intentionality, to assess the meaning of vervets' vocalizations. The 
levels of intentionality are: 
. Level 0 - no beliefs or desires. In other words, calls are given due to fear. 
• Level 1 - Beliefs and desires but no beliefs about beliefs. The caller has no conception 
of the audience's state of mind. A vervet at this level gives a call because he believes a 
predator is near and wants others to react. 
• Level 2 and beyond - The caller has some conception about both his own and other 
individuals' state of mind. Here a vervet would give a call because he wants others to 
believe there is a certain predator nearby. 
It seems that vervets surpass Level 0 as they have some degree of voluntary control over 
their vocalizations, and can modify their calling rate dependent on their audience (higher rates 
with kin, males producing higher rates to a female than to another male). 
With respect to the abstraction of meaning, research on chimpanzees (Premack (1976)) 
has shown that they can associate an abstract chip with its referent in the real world. Thus 
Premack's chimpanzee, Sarah, was taught that the symbol of a blue triangle referred to an 
apple and when asked to describe the properties of the symbol she described it as red and 
round. Sarah could also reverse this and describe the symbol for the apple as being triangular 
and blue. Based on their behaviour in the wild, it does not seem that vervets have this 
particular ability. 
Armstrong et al. have contended that language originated in the mental links that could 
be made through representational visible gestures. Another line of research that is particularly 
interesting with respect to this contention is found in Perrett et al. (1989). They found that 
cerebral cortical cells in the superior temporal sulcus of macaque monkeys responded to visual 
displays of goal-centred activities of the type where human subjects would attribute causal 
and intentional relationships. Some cells respond selectively when viewing seven different 
actions: reach for, retrieve, manipulate, pick, tear, present and hold. Other cells differentiate 
agents of an action, thus there is a greater sensitivity for hand-object interactions compared 
to object-object interactions. 
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The conclusions we can reach in this section are diverse, but I believe they do shed light 
on the evolutionary theories of language we have previously considered. It seems that vervet 
monkeys can represent social relations in terms of hierarchies and that this was not therefore 
a mutation that was needed specifically for language. It was probably latent within the 
hominid line, as our social relationships were most likely to have been generally similar to 
other primates. This latent ability needed only to be built into the language system as it 
developed, that is, as other cognitive precursors were also built in. The interactions of these 
cognitive precursors in addition to their own computational style will have constrained the 
nature of the fully-formed linguistic system. It seems then, that Bickerton's idea of a crucial, 
catastrophic mutation is misguided 9 . 
Some of what Bickerton has claimed is supported by the data from apes. Apes do seem able 
to identify concepts and to represent them and these conceptualizations and representations 
do indeed seem to be based on the creature's internal and external responses to activations in 
response to an object's presence. 
Perrett's research would seem to bolster the claims of Armstrong et al. It also seems that 
certain goal-directed activities that are evolutionarily significant for a species can be pref-
erentially neurally represented and differentiated. It may therefore be the case that certain 
evolutionarily determined goals of humans are more deeply embedded in their linguistic rep-
resentation and that they will in turn be more easily encoded and decoded from the speech 
stream. This would be a more teleological approach to language than is fashionable. 
6.7 Teaching Human Language to Apes 
There have been six notable attempts to teach language to apes' ° . Gardner and Gardner 
(1969) attempted to teach Washoe, a chimpanzee. Premack (1976) worked with the chim-
panzee Sarah. Rumbaugh (1977) worked with another chimp, Lana. An unusual study in-
volved a gorilla named Koko (Patterson (1978)). Terrace (1979), who was sceptical about ape-
language programs, worked with a chimpanzee, Nim Chimpsky. Finally, Savage-Rumbaugh 
(1984) worked with a bonobo named Kanzi. 
In all cases, except for the case of Kanzi, the results were disappointing. Much of this can 
be put down to the methodology of the experiments. It was recognized early on that the shape 
of an ape's vocal tract is not conducive to the articulation of language, and thus, other forms 
of linguistic communication were sought. Two main strategies were used. A form of American 
Sign Language (ASL) was taught to Washoe, Koko and Nim. Sarah and Lana used lexigrams 
on plastic chips or a keyboard to communicate. Each of these apes was taught intensively 
with much moulding and shaping of the ASL signs. Although none of the apes could be shown 
conclusively to have syntactic knowledge, they did have a number of language-like properties 
in common. 
Washoe learnt 132 signs by 51 months and extended some of these signs to other referents. 
78% of Washoe's two-word utterances fitted into seven of Brown's (1973) categories 11 . Sarah 
9 As he now seems to believe himself (Bickerton (1996)). 
10The references for each of these six attempts is the first relevant reference of the many produced for each 
study. 
11 These categories were very similar to the semantically motivated thematic roles that Jackendoff proposed. 
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and Lana were able to learn categories other than basic-level categories. They could thus 
sort items out according to colour, or could learn the class-name for a set of objects, such 
as tools. Koko had learnt 250 items by 48 months and 75% of her multiword utterances 
could be classified into 12 of Brown's semantic relationships. She also coined new modifier-
noun combinations. By the age of three Nim had learnt 125 signs, would overgeneralize and 
undergeneralize terms to referents and 84% of his multiword utterances could be classed into 
8 of Brown's semantic categories. 
On the face of it, these results seem impressive and, indeed, in a limited way they are 
useful to the aims of this thesis. Of particular interest is the fact that the utterances of chimps 
fit into a limited number of semantic relations in a way very similar to young children at the 
two-word stage. In general terms, however, these early studies into ape language have been 
regarded as being unsuccessful. To see why this is so, we will have to look into how the data 
have been reassessed by other researchers. 
For example, an analysis of Lana's multiword strings reveals that all of them were variants 
of only six sequences that could have been learnt by conditioned discrimination coupled with 
paired-associate learning. A further problem was that the chips Lana used were coloured 
according to semantic category and the strings produced by Lana could have equally well been 
guided by a patterning of colours rather than any syntactic or even semantic understanding. 
Terrace (1979) argued that the language taught to Sarah, or more accurately, the manner in 
which it had been taught made it not much different to what can be learnt by rats and pigeons. 
Thus strings were taught by getting Sarah to repeat strings and then replacing just one of 
the words in that string. There was thus no semanticity in the string, it was just a matter of 
learning orderings. The proposal that the language learnt by Sarah was not in any true sense 
language-like is bolstered by the finding that people with profound language-learning deficits 
could learn the 'language' that Sarah had learnt. 
It has also been argued (Wailman (1992)) that the vocabulary counts attested for the 
apes have been inflated due to over-interpretation of natural gestures that apes make. It may 
also be the case that apes are not referring but are merely making signs that have becOme 
associated with rewards 12 . Thus, except in the case of Kanzi, there is a virtual absence of 
displaced reference, i.e. reference to an object that is not present at the time of utterance. 
Turning to syntactic ability in general it has been argued (Wallman (1992)) that much of 
what seems to be syntactic ability has been over-interpretation of the data. So, for example, 
many 'two-word' utterances are in fact a combination of a taught sign/symbol and a natural 
ape gesture. Also, although many of the utterances could be categorized into a small number 
of semantic relations, there seemed to be no syntactic patterning of these relations, so that 
differing word orders were used (by the same chimp) to express the same semantic relation. 
What word order is shown by chimps in these early studies can be argued to be a result of 
assigning words to a stable sentence position across utterances, and not in any way due to its 
semantic category. 
Wallman concludes with respect to these studies and earlier diary studies of Kanzi that: 
See Chapter 2. 
12 This interpretation does not seem to be accurate when we consider the representational abilities of vervet 
monkeys, or the results of a study on Kanzi that is described below. 
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Given that Kanzi knows the meaning of these words or at least has forged appro-
priate associations between these words and their corresponding things or actions, 
and given he is able to 'select the critical words' and 'respond appropriately', there 
is only one way we should expect Kanzi to respond to the coupling of grab with 
Jeannine or to the combination of give, trash and Jeannine. 
Given the results of a more carefully controlled experiment (as can be seen below), this 
conclusion seems to have been hasty. 
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993) attempted to counter criticisms such as Wallman's by 
addressing the issue of syntax head-on in a controlled setting. The main difference in the 
approach is that it examines what the ape can comprehend and not what he can produce. 
The study in question also compared the comprehension abilities of Kanzi at age 8 with the 
comprehension abilities of a human child at age 2. 
A vital difference can be found in the way Kanzi acquired language. In each of the earlier 
attempts to teach language to an ape, explicit instruction was used. The same was true for 
Kanzi's mother, Matata. And in each of the cases where explicit instruction was used, the 
results were disappointing. Kanzi differs from this in that he learnt language in the way 
that a child learns language, without explicit instruction. Kanzi observed his mother being 
taught language from the age of 6 months to the age of 2 years 6 months. Kanzi was thus 
younger than most of the apes used in earlier studies. This combination of starting young and 
non-explicit learning of language appears to have resulted in much better language learning in 
Kanzi. When Kanzi's mother was taken away from Kanzi for breeding purposes, Kanzi showed 
a good knowledge of the lexigrams the researchers had been attempting to teach Matata. 
Kanzi was soon producing multiword utterances. Most of these were requests, as was 
usually the case for the other apes, but some were comments on events. What Kanzi appeared 
to have done was to learn through a combination of observation and social interaction. At age 
6 when Kanzi was tested on his comprehension of 310 multiword utterances, he was correct on 
298 of them. However, this is the experiment that produced the sceptical quote from Wallman. 
In the study in question here, both the human and the ape subject were tested in surround-
ings that were familiar to them. There was an initial pretest to see that each of the individual 
words to be used in the studies was known to the subjects. Sentences were spoken to the 
subjects in both blind and non-blind trials. In the blind trials, the sentences were read by a 
researcher hidden behind a one way-mirror. The aim of the blind trials was to prevent cuing 
from the researchers that would guide the subject's actions' 3 . However, the subjects were 
initially ill at ease with the blind trials, so non-blind trials were used to overcome this unease. 
Objects were present in arrays in front of the subjects, or in other rooms' 4 , as relevant to the 
sentence being tested. Sentences were generated by randomly selecting objects, locations and 
agents. The structure of the sentences was varied systematically. Multiple sentences were used 
for each of the possible arrays of objects. Unusual nontypical actions were often expressed by 
the sentences e.g. Wash the hot-dogs. 
13 Terrace had argued that much of the behaviour that Nim demonstrated was due to the humans around 
him inadvertently cuing Nim towards the correct behaviour. This is known as a Clever Hans effect. 
14 The experimental design included two rooms. In each room there was a selection of objects. Some objects 
were only in one room. Other objects were duplicated in each of the rooms. 
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In sum Alia (the child) took part in 180 non-blind trials and 410 blind trials and Kanzi 
took part in 244 non-blind trials and 416 blind trials. 
The sentence constructions used were (with examples): 
(6.2) 	a. Put object X in/on transportable object Y (Put the ball on the pine needles) 
b. Put object X in non-transportable object Y (Put the ice water in the potty) 
(6.3) 	a. Give (or show) object X to animate A (Give the lighter to Rose)//pretend 
animates were also used, e.g. toy dog. 
b. Give object X and object Y to animate A (Give the peas and the potatoes to 
Kelly) 
C. (Do) action A on animate A (Give Rose a hug) 
d. Do action A on animate A with object X (Get Rose with the snake) 
(6.4) 	Do Action A on object X (with object Y) (Knife the sweet potato) 
(6.5) 	Announce information (The surprise is hiding in the dishwasher) 
(6.6) 	a. Take object X to location Y (Take the snake outdoors). 
b. Go to location Y and get object X (Go to the fridge and get a banana) 
C. 	Go get object X that's in location Y (Go get the carrot that's in the microwave) 
(6.7) 	Make pretend animate A do action on recipient Y (Make the doggie bite the snake). 
(6.8) 	All other sentence types. 
Overall Kanzi was correct on 74% of all trials and 74% of the blind trials. Alia was correct 
on 66% of all trials and 65% of the blind trials. These overall results break down by sentence 
type in the following way. Each of the figures refers to the percentage of correct responses to 
each sentence type. 
Kanzi Alia 
All Blind All Blind 
4.1A 64 63 72 73 
4.113 74 77 72 71 
4.2A 81 78 81 84 
4.213 33 37 57 57 
4.2C 89 91 87 91 
4.2D 71 76 60 61 
4.3 70 82 65 63 
4.4 63 67 85 83 
4.5A 75 78 69 71 
4.513 85 82 51 45 
4.5C 77 77 52 52 
4.6 70 67 60 56 
4.7 64 78 30 33 
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We see that the ape and the child are very similar in their abilities. Indeed Kanzi does 
better than Alia for sentence types 4.513 and 4.5C. The sentences were varied enough in struc-
ture and sequential ordering to discount any claims that apparent syntactic ability was a mere 
side-effect of learning recurrent positions for particular lexical items, or that particular items 
were associated with a single action. Overall, there were three word-order manipulations. (A) 
verb and word order changes and responses differ (Could you take the pine needles outside/Go 
outside and get the pine needles), (B) word order constant and response differs (Take the rock 
outdoors/Go get the rock that's outside), (C) word order changes and response changes (Put 
the juice on the egg/Put the egg in the juice). 
The results with respect to these types of sentences were: 
Kanzi Alia 
Type A 
Sentences 83 59 
Pairs 74 38 
Type B 
Sentences 79 67 
Pairs 57 38 
Type C 
Sentences 79 69 
Pairs 57 39 
Although errors on comparable pairs of sentence were higher, most of these errors were not 
inversion errors (reversing the direction of causality of the action), but were rather semantic 
errors (selecting the wrong item). 
The problems of many of the early investigations of ape language parallel the problems of 
neural net approaches in many ways. Both approaches are basically behaviourist in outlook in 
that they assume a bare minimum of cognitive apparatus which comprises perceptual mecha-
nisms, a capacity to represent in durable format the results of perception, and the ability to 
form associations between those representations. They see language as an example of verbal 
behaviour. 
These approaches in their minimality make the assumption that there are no species specific 
mechanisms involved, resulting in cross-species homogeneity. Both approaches also rely on 
intensive input and training, which is not present for the learning of language in humans and 
seems to have been counterproductive in attempts to teach language to apes. 
6.8 Cultural Learning and the Cultural Evolution of Lan-
guage 
We have been attempting to constrain both the computational form of the language processor 
and to constrain the content of the conceptual representation that the processor acts on by 
considering possible evolutionary precursors of language. We have done this in two ways. We 
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have examined the history of human evolution and we have investigated the cognitive and 
language-like abilities of the primates. 
Recent work on Cultural Learning (Tomasello et al. (1993)) sheds further light on both 
these issues and identifies an alternative source of data on what is required for the language 
system to operate. 
If we look at the evidence we have seen thus far we might like to conclude that the primary 
evolutionary context in which primate cognition evolved was a social one, we may be able to 
isolate an element of that social context that is specific to humans and made language possible, 
and in so doing added its own particular flavour to the nature of language. 
Tomasello et al propose that this vital element was cultural learning. They note that other 
creatures may live in social groups but only humans have culture. They identify three types of 
learning that culture makes possible and claim that in ontogeny these three types of cultural 
learning appear in a particular order because they are dependent on the socio-cognitive bases 
that underlie them. 
Basic to all forms of cultural learning is that the learner learns not from another person 
but through them, i.e. they try to see the relevant situation in the way the person they are 
learning through sees it. The three types of cultural learning are imitative, instructed and 
collaborative. 
In imitative learning the infant reproduces the adult's actual behavioural strategies in an 
appropriate functional context. This ability emerges towards the end of the infant's first year 
in the domains of object-directed actions and the use of communicative symbols. The socio-
cognitive bases of this ability can be isolated if we examine the other abilities a child shows 
at this age. At this age infants are both following the gaze of adults and trying to focus other 
people's attention by alternating gaze between a person and the object of interest. Thus they 
are showing understanding of people as intentional agents. 
In instinctive learning the child learns about the adult's understanding of the task and how 
that compares to the child's own understanding. Children re-enact the adult's instructions in 
regulating their own behaviour in a similar task. The socio-cognitive bases of such learning is 
inter-subjectivity. The child shows an understanding that oither people are mental beings with 
their own individual beliefs. This awareness emerges at around four years of age. 
At six or seven years of age children understand complex, second-order mental states. This 
provides the socio-cognitive basis for collaborative learning. This manifests the same inter-
subjectivity as instructed learning, but neither interactant is an authority or expert; inter-
subjectivity is symmetric. Thus learning at this stage is often the result of socio-cognitive 
conflict - a classic example being learning in the conservation task. 
The contention is thus that cultural learning is absolutely crucial for the acquisition of 
many of the most important cognitive skills including, importantly for our aims, language. It 
is therefore predicted that a loss or diminution of these skills will result in language deficit. 
By examining this deficit we can gauge what the cultural element contributes to the language 
system. 
Here we have discovered another source of evidence as regards the cognitive precursors 
or contributors to language. If we look at the language learning abilities of children with 
particular cognitive or sensory deficits we will be able to see what each of the functioning 
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cognitive or sensory systems contributes to language content and language processing. An 
example specific to cultural learning is the case of autistic children (Fay (1993)). The common 
denominator in the diagnoses of autistic children is their inability to relate to others. Given 
this it is not surprising that they show little evidence of cultural learning and correspondingly 
the diminution of capacities that it has been argued depend on cultural learning. 
Thus we find that autistic children do not collaborate in collaborative learning, nor in-
structed learning, and even with respect to imitative learning, autistic children show difficulty 
in reproducing any novel behaviour. Half never learn language at all, and those that do, do 
not use it normally. By looking at the differences between the language of autistic children 
and normal children we can see what cultural learning contributes to normal language use. 
With the cultural perspective in place we can examine another theory of the evolution of 
language - in some ways similar to Armstrong et at - that relies on a cultural basis. 
Donald (1991) has provided us with one model for the transition from ape-like hominids 
to homo sapiens with language. His theory is based on a series of major adaptations, each 
of which results in a new representational system. However, each major adaptation does not 
totally wipe out the properties of the earlier adaptations. As we have seen evolutionary theory 
results in what may be described as an 'if it works, don't fix it' phenomenon. Thus each earlier 
representational system will be left intact and cognitive vestiges will still be detectable today. 
In this classification of the development of cognition with respect to representational strat-
egy the starting point is Episodic Culture. Within this system the apes' lives are lived entirely 
in the present and the highest element in the system of memory representation is at the level 
of event representation. 
The first major adaptation is the transition from episodic culture to Mimetic Culture. 
Mimetic skill rests on the ability to produce conscious, self-initiated acts that are intentional 
but not linguistic. These acts are defined with respect to their representational function. 
Reflexive and instinctual locomotor acts are thus excluded. Mimetic skill is prior to language 
but shares many characteristics that are commonly held to be essential for language, namely: 
Intentionality, generativity, communicativity, reference and autocuing (self-initiation). 
These mimetic skills resulted in the sharing of knowledge and permitted such evolution-
ary advantageous behaviours as the modeling of social structure, reciprocal mimetic games, 
conformity and communication within the society, group mimetic acts and pedagogy. 
If the theory is correct the mimetic adaptation which characterized erectus should have 
left vestiges in its descendants and the mimetic culture which allowed for the advantageous 
behaviours listed above would continue to be useful, even after the adoption of language. And 
indeed the observations of Eibl-Eibesfeld (1989) would seem to back up the claim. He has 
documented the commonalities of human non-verbal expression and has shown that many 
patterns of communication recur in all human societies, from hunter-gatherer to modern. 
The previous representational system (episodic) is however encapsulated by the newer 
(mimetic) and the mimetic controller thus becomes the unencapsiilated central system. In the 
absence of language, the mimetic controller remains the dominant representational device. 
The second adaptation involves the transition from mimetic culture to Mythic Culture, 
where language appears. Donald sees speech and language as fulfilling the role of the sort of 
adaptation that could explain the explosion of tools, artifacts and inventions of all sorts and 
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the eventual creation and maintenance of tribal, political and social structures which regulated 
the society. Donald claims that all of these features rely on language to some extent. 
It seems that in surviving Stone Age societies, language greatly outstrips technology. Tech-
nology in these societies is primitive, while language in social contexts soars to great heights. 
The most elevated use of language in these societies is in the area of mythic invention, that 
is, in the construction of models of the human universe. 
Perhaps then language's initial function was tied to the development of integrative thought. 
Time-bounded snippets of information could be synthesized by the use of language. The 
invention of symbols characteristic of the mimetic phase can be linked to the mythic phase by 
considering the case of linguistic gesticulation.(cf. Armstrong et al. (1995)) 
The use of this type of gesture is sometimes lost in aphasia, whereas the use of mime and 
emblematic gesture are seldom lost. There are three subtypes of linguistic gesture. The first of 
these is iconic gesturing where images are traced in the air which relate to the meaning of the 
utterance. McNeill and Levy (1982) studied this type of gesturing in six narrators, producing 
a complex that had 44 movement features and 38 meaning features. Thus, the gestures were 
not completely arbitrary and had a predictable relation to the meaning of the utterance. 
The second type of linguistic gesture are metaphoric gestures where the link to meaning is 
more abstract, and the third type are beats. Beats have no content of their own but indicate 
an extra narrative content. A beat might show for example that the material it accompanies 
is not part of the main narrative. 
The loss of gesture in aphasia reinforces the independence of the mimetic and linguistic 
systems. Broca's aphasics continue to produce numerous and elaborate iconic gestures, but 
no beats. Wernicke's aphasics seem to lose iconix and metaphorix but retain beats. 
Language could not have developed without changes in the mental models held by indi-
viduals; the processor defining the world is bringing mental models under symbolic control. 
In other words symbolic thought is primary; it is the driving force behind word use. So from 
an evolutionary perspective, the language system brought not only a new vocal apparatus but 
a wholly new system for representing reality. The propositional storage system and verbal 
semantic memory were products of language and form part of one adaptation, unified under 
a linguistic controller which encapsulates the mimetic controller. 
Donald has given us an explanation of how language was a useful ability from an evolu-
tionary standpoint. He has also outlined how the evolution of language could have occurred in 
steps each of which had a selectional advantage. A vital point to understand is that language 
goes hand in hand with a new way to represent reality. The most salient idea with respect to 
the approach of this thesis is that of cognitive vestiges. Earlier representational systems will 
still play a part in performance, and many aspects of those earlier systems may well form the 
backbone of the current language system. 
It would seem that mythic culture is the vital step that allows cultural learning. Apes do 
not appear to have mythic culture, and, in the wild, do not learn language. When they are in 
an environment where cultural learning is available, however, limited language learning does 
appear to be possible, as we have witnessed with Kanzi above. 
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6.9 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have started to outline the philosophical background to thematic-conceptual 
structure. I presented the latest theory of human evolution and a number of evolutionary 
scenarios for language that would appear to be impossible. However, out of this discussion a 
number of elements that would seem to be implicated in any explanation of language evolution 
emerged. These were society, brain size, bipedalism and laterality. 
I then explained why an adaptationist evolutionary explanation of language emergence is 
justified before turning to promising theories of language evolution. 
A vital link between the hierarchical structure, which we saw was present in vervet monkeys 
as the representation of their society, and language was argued to be vital by Bickerton. It 
seems that the analysis of events made possible by the internalization of causal structure in 
gesture may be the explanation of this linking of representational types. 
The central role of gesture also allows us to explain a cluster of properties that seem to 
have emerged concurrently with language: bipedalism and laterality. Bipedalism freed up the 
hands to make gesture possible. Language and gesture both involve praxis and this praxis is 
associated with laterality; the same laterality for language and handedness being a natural 
consequence of this link' 5 . 
Gesture involves a representation of visual events and their conversion into tactile terms. 
Thus, visual and tactile metaphors and the way that hands can represent them may have de-
termined the structure of language in its early stages and are likely to be important metaphors 
for linguistic expression today. 
The fact that the hierarchical representation co-opted for language structure originated in 
social representation is provocative when we consider that we have found evidence that the 
development of this society into a culture was vital for the emergence of language. In this 
vein, it is also provocative that when a bonobo ape (with a society such as ours) is exposed 
to cultural learning, it is able to learn language to a limited extent. 
We have also seen that constraints on our cognition, or how we understand the world, as 
determined by the structure of our brain, its computational properties, and the nature of our 
representations, are likely to have constrained the structure of language. 
I propose a pair of hypotheses that can be drawn from the discussion in this chapter. The 
first is that much of the structure of language will be determined by its evolution. That is, 
there will be cognitive vestiges of earlier stages that will still be present today. These vestiges 
may be in computational, content, structural, or cultural/societal terms. 
The second hypothesis is that ontogeny in many respects will reflect phylogeny. We have 
seen that this is the case for colour perception. I see no reason that this should not be the 
case for language. In the discussion of language acquisition by children, it should be examined 
whether the order that children learn particular aspects of language reflects the course of 
evolution of language. 
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